London Banker

Hell, Handbaskets and Hellenic Default

2012-01-22T13:13:00.001Z

Regardless of what the IIF and the Greek government may announce, Greece is heading inevitably for a destabilising default to some or all of its bond creditors. The most articulate and comprehensive account of the reasons why this must be so are documented in the ZeroHedge masterclass on Subordination 101: A walk thru sovereign bond markets in a post-Greek default world. Roubini concurs.

I've written before about what this implies for the financial system:

If any OECD state were to default there would be very serious implications:
- The Basel Accord zero risk weight of government debt would be proved fanciful;
- The assumption of government debt as a liquid asset suitable for bank Tier 1 reserves to meet unanticipated and sudden cash demands will become unsustainable;
- Banks would be forced to recapitalise at much higher levels, forcing even sharper deleveraging and contraction of lending;
- Governments would lose the captive, uncritical investor base they have relied on to finance excess public expenditure for the past 30 years;
- Central banks could be forced to suddenly monetise even more government debt if required to meet the cash demands of a run on their undercapitalised banks.

Worrying, but not unexpected. A few of us predicted back in 2008 that the implosion of RMBS and bank capital, leading to central bank and sovereign bailouts, would fuel a central bank balance sheet and sovereign debt bubble. The central bank balance sheets have since balooned to 20 percent of GDP for the Fed and Bank of England, and 30 percent of eurozone GDP for the ECB. Deficits have spiraled everywhere, despite promises of austerity. Now the sovereign bubble too may burst.

From Deflation Has Become Inevitable in December 2008:

In Lombard Street, Bagehot’s seminal tome on fractional reserve central banking, Bagehot advises any central bank facing a simultaneous credit crisis and currency crisis to raise interest rates. By raising rates they will ensure that foreign creditors remain incentivised to maintain the general level of credit available while the central bank resolves the local liquidity crisis through liquidation of failed banks and temporary liquidity support of stressed banks.

The very opposite policies have been pursued by central banks in the US, Europe and UK since the beginning of the sub-prime crisis in August 2007. They have cut policy rates drastically, and as the crisis escalated and spread, the yield on government debt has dropped to negative territory. Meanwhile they have shielded those responsible for the creation of record levels of bad debt from any regulatory accountability, relaxed transparency of accounts, and provided massive taxpayer-funded financial infusions to prevent failure and liquidation.

While in the short term these policies have expediency and the maintenance of market “confidence” on their side, in the longer term these policies must undermine any confidence a rational and objective saver or investor might have that savings or investment in the US, EU or UK will be fairly remunerated at an above-inflation rate, or that savings and investments will be protected by effective oversight and regulation from the sorts of executive debasement and outright misappropriation and fraud that are beginning to colour our perceptions of the past decade.

Anyone sitting on a pile of cash now is unlikely to want to either (a) place it in a bank, or (b) invest it in the stock market. As a result, the implosion of the financial and real economy must continue no matter how big the central bank’s aspirations for its balance sheet or the treasury’s aspirations for its deficit.

I'm sorry I was right. (sigh)

Survivor Bias and TBTF Tyranny

2012-01-21T14:13:00.003Z

It's time to write again about insolvency, as the MF Global failure and the Greek debacle raise new troubling concerns.

As I wrote in Ring Fences and Rustlers before Lehman failed in 2008:

The key to having a happy insolvency, if such a thing exists, lies in ensuring that when a globalised bank goes bust, all the best assets are inside your borders and subject to seizure by [your banks or] your liquidators on behalf of your creditors.

If one were cynical, and one believed that Lehman was going to be allowed to fail pour encouragement les autres one might wonder if Lehman was quietly bidden – or even explicitly ordered – to sell off its foreign holdings and repatriate the proceeds to asset classes within the US ring fence. This would ensure that US creditors of Lehman received a satisfactory recovery at the expense of foreign creditors. It would also contribute to a nice pre-election illusion of a “flight to quality” as US dollar and assets strengthened on the direction of flow.

If one were really cynical, one might even think that a wily bank supervisor might arrange to ensure 100 percent recovery for its creditors with a bit of creative misappropriation thrown in the mix. Broker dealers normally hold securities and other assets in nominee name on behalf of their investor clients. Under modern market regulation, these nominee assets are supposed to be held separately from a firm’s own assets so that they can be protected in an insolvency and restored to the clients with minimal loss and inconvenience. Liberalisations and financial innovations have undermined the segregation principle by promoting much more intensive use of client assets for leverage (prime brokerage and margin lending) and alternative income streams (securities lending). As a result, it is often very difficult to discern in a failed broker who has the better claim to assets which were held to a client account but reused for finance and/or trading purposes. The main source of evidence is the books of the failed broker.

On the wholesale side, margin and collateralisation in connection with derivatives and securities finance arrangements mean that creditors under these arrangements should have good delivery and secure legal claims to assets provided under market standard agreements. As a result, preferred wholesale creditors could have been streamed the choicest assets under arrangements that will look above suspicion on review as being consistent with market best practice.

The official report of the court appointed examiner confirmed my worst suspicions. We now know that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the SEC co-located staff inside Lehman from March 2008 to oversee the global repatriation of assets and cash in the run up to the insolvency in September. The Fed kept Lehman on life support during this period with more than $20 billion of liquidity which it paid back to itself from Lehman cash on the day Lehman filed for liquidation. In the meanwhile, from March 2008, Lehman looted its affiliates and client accounts worldwide by using prime broker and securities lending mandates to lend assets to the US affiliate which were sold (hence the sharp fall in Eastern Europe and Asian markets and growing volatility eleswhere from March 2008) and the proceeds streamed to US creditors as margin payments on derivatives and other obligations. The official receiver elected not to challenge the cash transfer to the Federal Reserve or any of the transfers of cash or securities made to major Lehman counterparties and creditors.

Those following the MF Global failure have noted a strikingly similar pattern of conduct by JP Morgan in advance of failure as occurred with Lehman, although without obvious official mandate. Yves at Naked Capital has been covering the parallels admirably. Carrick Mollenkamp, Lauren Tara LaCapra and Matthew Goldstein at Reuters have provided a very substantive story of how JP Morgan used its superior knowledge of MF Global's trading and credit position to enrich itself at the expense of MF Global and its clients before precipitating the MF Global failure.

I am concerned that MF Global demonstrates that the too-big-to-bail banks have found a new and almost riskless way to make outsize profits. Because derivatives, repo and liquidity are so very highly concentrated now, and leverage is at pre-crisis levels again, these few players can rig the markets and liquidity to choose when and how their clients fail. Their top down view of clients' trading and custody portfolios and cash positions and flows puts them in a position to exercise tyranny. They can game their clients, taking advantage of superior information, credit and liquidity to ramp or crash targeted markets as needed to precipitate a crisis. They can demand the choicest assets as collateral, setting very high over-collateralisation thresholds, and then exercise during post-failure turmoil to retain everything they hold at rock-bottom prices.

In today's low volume markets, a crash or squeeze is even cheaper and less risky than ever before. Instead of working for their clients' success, an unscrupulous clearing bank - or several operating in collusion - can profit on engineering market instability or turmoil.

If one were a conspiracy theorist, one might suspect that such games were being played now in global markets. Perhaps gold is being used as collateral for margin and cash liquidity, sold by counterparties to bring the price lower, leading to margin calls for even more. A crisis arising from a major default (Greece, Portugal, a huge bank) would force the price lower still, when the collateral would be exercised on default. Following on, the price might rocket again to enable the conspirators to seize outsize profits. Just a scenario, mind you! (Although, I note that Lehman's counterparties reported record profits through much of 2009.)

What is left of the global markets becomes a game of engineered survivor bias. Only those operating outside the law and with unlimited regulatory forbearance can win while the rest of us lose. As I noted in 2008, after Lehman failed, in Financial Eugenics, "It's not your survival they're engineering."

I don't say absolutely that what I describe is actually happening. But it may be. Certainly market conditions are ripe for it, and MF Global reinforces the pattern.

Now over to Greece. I find the PSI (private sector involvement) negotiations for Greece's restructuring of its debts troubling because it shows the same determination to engineer survivor bias. One of the core principles of insolvency law is that all creditors of like standing should be treated equally in the resolution. The PSI approach is starkly contrary to this principle, despite the evidence that Greece is well and truly insolvent. First, the official bond holders (central banks, supranationals, governments and the ECB) are excluded from mark-downs of their debts, preferring to impose the burden of capital losses entirely on the private sector bond holders. Second, the private sector bond holders are divided between those with an interest in preventing a declaration of default (either unhedged or have written credit default swaps) and those who will profit from a default through claims on credit default swaps. Rather than being represented equally in the negotiations through a creditors' committee, the negotiations are being driven by the Institute of International Finance, a trade lobby of just the biggest banks. Why the IIF should have credence as representing hedge funds, pension funds and insurance companies holding Greek debt is beyond me.

Once again we see centuries of jurisprudence and decades of statutory law and market practice cast aside for the convenience of a handful of big banks. They argue that abandoning our principles is desirable to prevent destabilisation of the financial system - again. I am wondering if a system that requires constant sacrifice of all the principles of market price discovery, rule of law and equitable treatment of like behaviours is worth stabilising.

If the Greece negotiations fall apart, and Greece defaults, is it likely that the banks will embrace the rule of law and let their contracts stand? Or will they try to "reinterpret" their obligations or once again seek taxpayer reimbursement for their losses?

Tyranny takes many forms, but the essence is arbitrary exercise of power or despotic use of authority. Given their willingness to throw principles out the window whenever profits are threatened, it seems we are confronting a tyranny by a handful of bankers. Perhaps we should embrace some sacrifice of stability to forestall a more stable and much more dangerous tyranny.

UPDATE: Excellent, thorough analysis of the Greek debt situation is up on ZeroHedge: Subordination 101: A Walk Thru For Sovereign Bond Markets in a Post-Greek Default World. Well worth your time to read the whole thing as a primer on the potential pitfalls of all outcomes of the Greek debacle for global sovereign bond markets. Conclusion about the high stakes of the current standoff reads:

Finally, while we have no prediction of whether or not any of the above happens, one thing we are sure of: if the runaway central planners of the world believe they can legislate their way into an upper hand over the bond market, in ever more desperate attempts to avoid the day of reckoning, they will fail without any shadow of a doubt. Because demand for risk comes first and foremost from a sense of stability, of fair and efficient markets, and equitability: something which has long been missing in the stock market, and which may very soon be taken away, by force, from the bond market as well.

Banks are lawless dictators? Whose side are the police on?

2011-12-13T10:30:00.005Z

First, hat tip to Barry Ritholtz for the articles linked here. I read two of the articles, written on opposite sides of the planet, one after another, and suddenly the dangers confronting us in political instability were much clearer.

Back in June I wrote:

It used to be that the role of the state in financial market regulation was to ensure efficient market operations, promote transparency of prices and liquidity, protect consumers from abusive practices, and to resolve failed companies according to principles of equitable distribution of assets among like classes of creditors. If the role of the state now is to shield HFT, dark pool and OTC markets from transparency, provide liquidity where the market fails, oversee the orderly fleecing of consumers, and to ensure that some creditors of failing firms always win while others always lose, then we no longer have a market economy. And as virtually all these regulatory policies have evolved in the absence of public debate and legislative scrutiny, we also no longer have democratic governance of markets.

The deficit that worries me most in terms of the future of our civilisation is the legal accountability deficit - or anomie as I use it here. This deficit is huge and still growing rapidly as decisions are taken behind closed doors to shield lawless bankers from taxes or criminal sanctions and dedicate more and more public funds and/or monetary expansion to the same lawless bankers with too little public accounting, scrutiny or recourse.

This morning a commentary by Robert Fisk crystalised this concern as a political crisis in the offing: Bankers are the dictators of the West.

Let's kick off with the "Arab Spring" – in itself a grotesque verbal distortion of the great Arab/Muslim awakening which is shaking the Middle East – and the trashy parallels with the social protests in Western capitals. We've been deluged with reports of how the poor or the disadvantaged in the West have "taken a leaf" out of the "Arab spring" book, how demonstrators in America, Canada, Britain, Spain and Greece have been "inspired" by the huge demonstrations that brought down the regimes in Egypt, Tunisia and – up to a point – Libya. But this is nonsense.

The real comparison, needless to say, has been dodged by Western reporters, so keen to extol the anti-dictator rebellions of the Arabs, so anxious to ignore protests against "democratic" Western governments, so desperate to disparage these demonstrations, to suggest that they are merely picking up on the latest fad in the Arab world. The truth is somewhat different. What drove the Arabs in their tens of thousands and then their millions on to the streets of Middle East capitals was a demand for dignity and a refusal to accept that the local family-ruled dictators actually owned their countries. The Mubaraks and the Ben Alis and the Gaddafis and the kings and emirs of the Gulf (and Jordan) and the Assads all believed that they had property rights to their entire nations. Egypt belonged to Mubarak Inc, Tunisia to Ben Ali Inc (and the Traboulsi family), Libya to Gaddafi Inc. And so on. The Arab martyrs against dictatorship died to prove that their countries belonged to their own people.

And that is the true parallel in the West. The protest movements are indeed against Big Business – a perfectly justified cause – and against "governments". What they have really divined, however, albeit a bit late in the day, is that they have for decades bought into a fraudulent democracy: they dutifully vote for political parties – which then hand their democratic mandate and people's power to the banks and the derivative traders and the rating agencies, all three backed up by the slovenly and dishonest coterie of "experts" from America's top universities and "think tanks", who maintain the fiction that this is a crisis of globalisation rather than a massive financial con trick foisted on the voters.

The banks and the rating agencies have become the dictators of the West.

The banks as dictators makes sense to me. In thinking about my dissatisfaction with financial regulation for much of the past decade, I see that a great deal of it is attributable to who the regulators see as their polity. Their idea of consultation on regulations is to ask the bankers, traders and rating agencies whether they approve. The idea of making public policy in the public interest if the bankers disapprove is unimaginable to them. And so the banks get the regulations they prefer - or at least did so until the crisis.

And my queasiness about David Cameron's behaviour in Brussels on Friday stems from the same concern. He threw his toys out of the pram and turned his back on the EU because they wouldn't guarantee to preserve the City from further taxation, regulation and scrutiny. It's very clear that the polity he was serving was not the United Kingdom's 62,300,000 people - but the one per cent that make their living in the City of London.

Immediately after reading the Fisk piece, I read the moving statement of Patrick Meighan, My Occupy LA Arrest.

My name is Patrick Meighan, and I’m a husband, a father, a writer on the Fox animated sitcom “Family Guy”, and a member of the Unitarian Universalist Community Church of Santa Monica.

I was arrested at about 1 a.m. Wednesday morning with 291 other people at Occupy LA. I was sitting in City Hall Park with a pillow, a blanket, and a copy of Thich Nhat Hanh’s “Being Peace” when 1,400 heavily-armed LAPD officers in paramilitary SWAT gear streamed in. I was in a group of about 50 peaceful protestors who sat Indian-style, arms interlocked, around a tent (the symbolic image of the Occupy movement). The LAPD officers encircled us, weapons drawn, while we chanted “We Are Peaceful” and “We Are Nonviolent” and “Join Us.”

As we sat there, encircled, a separate team of LAPD officers used knives to slice open every personal tent in the park. They forcibly removed anyone sleeping inside, and then yanked out and destroyed any personal property inside those tents, scattering the contents across the park. They then did the same with the communal property of the Occupy LA movement. For example, I watched as the LAPD destroyed a pop-up canopy tent that, until that moment, had been serving as Occupy LA’s First Aid and Wellness tent, in which volunteer health professionals gave free medical care to absolutely anyone who requested it. As it happens, my family had personally contributed that exact canopy tent to Occupy LA, at a cost of several hundred of my family’s dollars. As I watched, the LAPD sliced that canopy tent to shreds, broke the telescoping poles into pieces and scattered the detritus across the park. Note that these were the objects described in subsequent mainstream press reports as “30 tons of garbage” that was “abandoned” by Occupy LA: personal property forcibly stolen from us, destroyed in front of our eyes and then left for maintenance workers to dispose of while we were sent to prison.

When the LAPD finally began arresting those of us interlocked around the symbolic tent, we were all ordered by the LAPD to unlink from each other (in order to facilitate the arrests). Each seated, nonviolent protester beside me who refused to cooperate by unlinking his arms had the following done to him: an LAPD officer would forcibly extend the protestor’s legs, grab his left foot, twist it all the way around and then stomp his boot on the insole, pinning the protestor’s left foot to the pavement, twisted backwards. Then the LAPD officer would grab the protestor’s right foot and twist it all the way the other direction until the non-violent protestor, in incredible agony, would shriek in pain and unlink from his neighbor.

It was horrible to watch, and apparently designed to terrorize the rest of us. At least I was sufficiently terrorized. I unlinked my arms voluntarily and informed the LAPD officers that I would go peacefully and cooperatively. I stood as instructed, and then I had my arms wrenched behind my back, and an officer hyperextended my wrists into my inner arms. It was super violent, it hurt really really bad, and he was doing it on purpose. When I involuntarily recoiled from the pain, the LAPD officer threw me face-first to the pavement. He had my hands behind my back, so I landed right on my face. The officer dropped with his knee on my back and ground my face into the pavement. It really, really hurt and my face started bleeding and I was very scared. I begged for mercy and I promised that I was honestly not resisting and would not resist.

My hands were then zipcuffed very tightly behind my back, where they turned blue. I am now suffering nerve damage in my right thumb and palm.

I was put on a paddywagon with other nonviolent protestors and taken to a parking garage in Parker Center. They forced us to kneel (and sit--SEE UPDATE) on the hard pavement of that parking garage for seven straight hours with our hands still tightly zipcuffed behind our backs. Some began to pass out. One man rolled to the ground and vomited for a long, long time before falling unconscious. The LAPD officers watched and did nothing.

This account turned my stomach, as it demonstrates all too clearly that the sympathies of the state are with lawbreaking bankers and not the victimised masses bailing them out.

So that’s what happened to the 292 women and men were arrested last Wednesday. Now let’s talk about a man who was not arrested last Wednesday. He is former Citigroup CEO Charles Prince. Under Charles Prince, Citigroup was guilty of massive, coordinated securities fraud.

Citigroup spent years intentionally buying up every bad mortgage loan it could find, creating bad securities out of those bad loans and then selling shares in those bad securities to duped investors. And then they sometimes secretly bet *against* their *own* bad securities to make even more money. For one such bad Citigroup security, Citigroup executives were internally calling it, quote, “a collection of dogshit”. To investors, however, they called it, quote, “an attractive investment rigorously selected by an independent investment adviser”.

This is fraud, and it’s a felony, and the Charles Princes of the world spent several years doing it again and again: knowingly writing bad mortgages, and then packaging them into fraudulent securities which they then sold to suckers and then repeating the process. This is a big part of why your property values went up so fast. But then the bubble burst, and that’s why our economy is now shattered for a generation, and it’s also why your home is now underwater. Or at least mine is.

Anyway, if your retirement fund lost a decade’s-worth of gains overnight, this is why.

If your son’s middle school has added furlough days because the school district can’t afford to keep its doors open for a full school year, this is why.

If your daughter has come out of college with a degree only to discover that there are no jobs for her, this is why.

But back to Charles Prince. For his four years of in charge of massive, repeated fraud at Citigroup, he received fifty-three million dollars in salary and also received another ninety-four million dollars in stock holdings. What Charles Prince has *not* received is a pair of zipcuffs. The nerves in his thumb are fine. No cop has thrown Charles Prince into the pavement, face-first. Each and every peaceful, nonviolent Occupy LA protester arrested last week has has spent more time sleeping on a jail floor than every single Charles Prince on Wall Street, combined.

A deflationary collapse will lead to political instability. It always does, because deflation destroys the value of paper assets which are mostly held by the most wealthy - the 1 per cent. And when deflation destroys their assets, it destroys their power and creates a vacuum. We need to be very clear in such a case that the enemy of the people is not the state, because if the state uses its police powers to protect the guilty and punish the innocent, then popular resistance and revolt become all too probable.

In Europe, the politicians know this. Even the police know this. No matter what I think of any British government, the conduct of the LA Police would be inconceivable here. The police killing just one career criminal this summer sparked nationwide riots. Brutalising non-violent protestors would have all of us on the streets.

There are values which are independent of financial assets. Those of us concerned to retain those values as a legacy for our children need to be vigilant as the bankers are only concerned with the values they can cash short term.

Thomas Jefferson wrote, "When the people fear their government, there is tyranny; when the government fears the people, there is liberty."

Fisk and Meighan remind us that the people are sovereign. The protests are because our sovereignty is undermined when it is disrespected by bankers buying lawlessness or by the police or financial regulators using state powers against the public interest. We have a right as a free people to self-governance under the rule of law. We as a free people have a right to regulate financial services to ensure that it serves a socially constructive function in the economy. Applying the rule of law to bankers reinforces the principles of justice essential to capitalism and the preservation of private property. The banks are not sovereign, and do not have a right to laws, regulators and police that protect them and them alone. There's some work to do here, of course, but having the issue crystallised helps a lot.

Why I oppose Financial Stability

2011-12-08T10:34:00.007Z

Financial Stability became a topic in the late 1990s, at a time of peak laxity in international financial supervision. The same minds which promoted the Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board) also crafted the deeply flawed and destructive Basel II.

I have never understood why Financial Stability should be an objective of public policy. Desirable, measurable outcomes of benefit to the public should be the objectives of public policy. Stability is a silly and impractical goal in a capitalist economy. Success and failure of competitive firms are the basis for economic progress, capital allocation and market pricing. Capitalism requires recognition of failure, and failure always causes economic loss and some instability as past assumptions are re-examined and re-assessed more objectively in light of current painful reality.

The management of failure can contribute to better future outcomes, but only if the costs of failure are born by those who caused the failure and not by those innocent of it. The 1990s policies promoted by regulators during the Great Moderation aimed to forestall failure by disguising it, delaying it, and subsidising it. Since the collapse of securitisation and inter-bank credit markets in 2008, governments have been too willing to socialise the costs of failure (by then magnified with leverage) to taxpayers through serial bailouts.

One strength of the US banking system from the 1930s to the 1980s was that failures were dealt with quickly and certainly. Foreclosed properties had to be sold by banks within two years of repossession, leading to a quick and certain reallocation of assets from failed borrowers to new owners. The FDIC swiftly and mercilessly shut down failed banks. New owners - often buying at distressed prices - were encouraged to invest in making the assets productive and profitable. It was this simple recycling from failed managers to better managers that was largely behind the short recessions and strong recoveries during this period of American economic history. With forbearance now institutionalised at all levels of the US economy, we are seeing Japanification instead of recovery. And it is even worse just about everywhere else where dominant banks are much more influential.

Financial Stability - like national security - can never be objectively confirmed as achieved. It is more often used to disguise the ulterior aims of its proponents, or to misdirect attention in aid of bad public policy that harms rather than promotes the public interest. For example, the Greenspan Put was a brilliant mechanism for ensuring financial stability by preventing any adjustment of the markets in response to the S&L crisis or dot-com bust. The Bernanke Put and Paulson Plan were financial stability solutions to the securitisation fraud crisis that revealed the undercapitalisation of global banks and over-leveraging of real estate. Bank bailouts and special liquidity facilities were financial stability innovations to prevent mark downs of mis-priced and illiquid capital assets.

Rather than review whether massive financial deregulation and promoting concentration in a few incumbents was in the public interest, the Greenspan Put, Bernanke Put, liquidity facility innovations and public bailouts have disguised misallocation of capital by pumping the markets with taxpayer funds and monetary laxity whenever they began to flag. Financial Stability initiatives have therefore taught incumbent bankers that any disruption is an excuse to double down on bad bets as the central banks and state treasuries would flood enough cash to make bad bets come good. MF Global made this bet, and although it (and its clients) won't be collecting, I expect the creditors/counterparties that seized all its collateral assets expect to come out way ahead.

I oppose Financial Stability because it is the most misleading banner for a set of bad, harmful and expensive public policies protecting bad executive management and preventing recognition of realistic market outcomes.

So what would I promote instead? Resiliency and resolution. Resiliency means the ability to withstand stresses and shocks which will unavoidably arise in global, competitive markets. Resolution means the dispersion of assets to creditors - and competitors - when banks fail, in hopes the assets and enterprises will be better managed by other managers than the same ones that led the bank to failure. Together these two principles - if made the basis for public policy - would do more to restore sanity to global banking than anything else I can think of. Resiliency will favour more and better capitalisation, with a focus on marketable assets with transparent price discovery (e.g., traded on transparent markets and recorded on balance sheet). Speedy and certain resolution of failed banks will make management and shareholders conscious of the risks of failure falling first on them, then on unsecured creditors and bondholders, and never on the taxpayer.

We are a long way from adopting principles of resiliency and resolution, as demonstrated by the EU's continued efforts to forestall defaults while protecting incumbent managements and bondholders. Our policy makers continue to chase the chimera of financial stability, and make bad policies worse along the way.

Anomie Watch: EFSF and bailout lawlessness

2011-10-12T12:56:00.007+01:00

Anomie literally means lawlessness. Although banks are burdened with many, many rules, they are seldom obeyed and largely unenforceable against the most powerful. Central banks are even more likely to ignore their enabling statutes and applicable regulations in innovating "financial stability" solutions. It is this lawlessness that was brought to the fore this week by a vote to reject the EFSF in Slovakia.

My post earlier this week coincided with a furore in Slovakia over approval of the European Financial Stability Facility. The EFSF is yet another mechanism for ill-transparently transferring taxpayer funds via governments and central banks to bankers, bondholders and bank shareholders.

An obscure leader, Richard Sulik, of an obscure minority party, SaS, objected to impoverishing his already poor countrymen to enrich foreign bankers. Under the terms of EFSF financing, taxpayers in Slovakia - the second poorest nation in the EU - would bear a disproportionate share of the EFSF burden relative to the size of the economy.

When the prime minister made support for the EFSF a vote of confidence, Sulik and his party brought down the government. The EFSF is likely to pass following a reorganisation of the coalition government, but in the meanwhile we have a teaching moment of real value.

I respect any politician who acts out of principle rather than self interest. Since the occurence is relatively rare, I was prompted to take a closer look at Mr Richard Sulik and his views on the EFSF. Fortunately he has documented his objections fully in a paper available online:

European Financial Stability Facility: A Road to Socialism

Just like it is impossible to extinguish fire with a fan, it is equally impossible to solve the debt crisis with new debts. The only thing that will help is to face the truth. Greece must declare bankruptcy, Italy must start saving and the rules set up by the eurozone upon its establishment must finally start being observed. It will hurt, but it is the only solution. . .

I would like to point out that this is not the same eurozone we entered in 2009. There are rules that should have been observed but all of them have been violated. Temporary EFSF and permanent EFSF will cost us 1 to 1.5 the amount of our annual state budget! Moreover, there is no guarantee that the attempts for the EFSF increase are over. . . .

EFSF ratification by the National Council will be a decision that will harm the citizens of Slovakia in the long run and to a great extent.

SaS will simply not sign up for something like this.

Whether you are for or against the EU, for or against the Eurozone, for or against bailouts, this is an important document to read. It catalogues the lawlessness and lack of accountability that made a bad financial crisis into a bad banking crisis then worse sovereign debt crisis and an even worse currency crisis.

I wish Mr Sulik had a career ahead of him in central banking or EU public policy. I fear after this week, he may once again be relegated to obscurity. His fellow Slovakians should be grateful for his principled stance and his foresight, and perhaps return him and his party to government when the costs of the betrayal of other parties become all too clear.

UPDATE: This just in! Berlusconi must face a vote of confidence tomorrow in the Italian parliament after defeat in a routine vote on government budget and accounts yesterday. Perhaps the Slovakian teaching moment will last longer than one day?

UPDATE (2): The three outgoing coalition parties have agreed with the opposition SMER party to pass the EFSF in a further vote to be scheduled before the end of the week. An election will be held on 10 March 2012. I hope the Slovakian voters remember then that the party that did not betray them to Brussels and the banksters was SaS.

Dexia, Mafia and Revolution

2011-10-10T11:24:00.004+01:00

I knew I had seen the script we're living somewhere:

What I am saying is, we have now what we have always needed, real partnership with the government.

And this is what follows: Revolution!

What does that tell you? It tells me that when predatory bankers and their complicit government cronies cannibalise the real economy to the tipping point, then regime change is just a matter of time. Politicians are acting like bankers are their only paymasters. In reality the bankers are just the noisiest and most demanding paymasters - until the people rise up in anger.

This morning the 11 million people of Belgium have woken to find themselves the 100 percent owners of a bankrupt and unprofitable retail bank at a cost of 4 billion euros, and guarantors of a further joint 122 billion euros in liabilities with France and Luxembourg. The shareholders and bondholders will be grateful, and the markets are accordingly delighted, but pity the poor Belgian taxpayer. The CEO and Chairman of Dexia have admitted that the bank operated as a hedge fund, and yet they are given serial bailouts at the taxpayers' expense. The Belgians have already thrown out their government, so now what do they do?

UPDATE: Ironically, after putting up this post about how crony accommodation of the banksters can lead to revolution, the reality is unfolding even now in Slovakia. Slovakia was the last country required for unanimous consent to the extension of the powers of European Financial Stability Fund. The prime minister made the vote on the EFSF a vote of confidence in the government. Ooops. Looks like she loses her post and the government tonight, as one of the smaller parties took offense at the blackmail against the national interest.

My new hero is Richard Sulik, leader of the coalition's SaS party, who is willing to take down the government rather than betray his country's taxpayers. The vote, which has had the market on edge all day, has now been indefinitely postponed. Even if the EFSF vote passes this week, when the fecal matter hits the ventilator in the not distant future, the voters will remember that Mr Sulik tried to do the right thing.

FT.com:
“I'd rather be a paraiah in Brussels than have to feel ashamed before my children, who would be deeper in debt should I back raising the volume of funding in the EFSF bail-out mechanism,” Mr Sulik told parliament.

Mr Sulik resisted the entreaties of Ms Radicova and other officials, who stressed that Slovakia's credibility as a responsible member of the eurozone was on the line.

While the trials of countries such as Portugal and Ireland do find sympathy in Slovakia, which is the second-poorest member of the eurozone, there is very little feeling for Greece, which is seen by many Slovaks as having caused its own problems.

“Extending the EFSF is mainly for saving foreign banks, and it will be expensive for Slovakia,” said Mr Sulik.

Zerohedge is liveblogging the Slovakian Parliament for those who like their crony capitalism raw and in colour.

Transaction Taxes and Transparency

2011-09-29T09:30:00.003+01:00

The City of London is in a stir over the EU proposal of a financial transactions tax. The great and the good are uniformly arrayed against such a tax. I am not so sure that it wouldn't be a good thing.

Here in Britain we now pay 20 per cent Value Added Tax on virtually everything we buy, except food, medicines and children's clothing. Yet the financial sector is exempt of any similar tax on transactions. This is patently unfair since approximately 5 pence of the 20 is required to finance the state bailouts of the financial sector. As a regressive and unfair tax, that is hard to beat.

In addition to raising revenues from an investment banking sector which has decimated public finances for a generation to come, a transaction tax might be a very good thing from an accountability and transparency perspective.

Those opposing say it would be anti-markets and drive trading offshore. Markets clearly do not work properly anymore at price discovery, liquidity aggregation or trade transparency. I rather think markets would work better if those participating had an economic stake in the transaction longer than a nanosecond, and a trading objective more durable than front-running real investors with HFT gaming.

More than that, a transaction tax would recognise that the state adds value to the market and deserves to be recompensed for that value. A huge part of the operational value of developed markets is derived from the rule of law. Taxing transactions would be recognising that each transaction benefits from the legal system which makes such a transaction valid and enforceable.

In my view, the way to make the transaction tax workable and cost-effective is to incentivise the reporting of transactions and the payment of tax. The way to do this is to legislate that transactions themselves will only be legally enforceable if there is a record that the tax has been paid. Anyone might choose not to pay the tax, but if they want to enforce a trade or debt obligation they are on their own. If they want recourse to the courts, rights to exercise on margin/collateral or a valid claim in insolvency, then they pay the tax as their ticket to rely on the legal system.

In the United States we see that the MERS scandal boils down to the wholesale attempt by US banks to avoid paying the transaction taxes on land mortgage registrations with local counties and states. As a result, the very enforceability of millions of mortgages is being thrown into doubt as a matter of law.

Had originators, banks, investment banks and investors been forced to register interests in mortgages in compliance with the law, some of the great abuses of securitisation would have become much more difficult to sustain for so long. In that sense, transparency would have promoted greater accountability and helped curb abuse.

The public has an interest in the integrity of markets. That integrity has been undermined horribly over the past 25 years by demutualisation of exchanges and clearing houses, fragmentation of markets to off-exchange systems and derivatives, leveraged shadow banking, and information assymetries between highly concentrated market insiders and everyone else. We now don't know who owns what and who owes what, and that means that economies are operating with dangerous blind spots. Relaxed accounting rules and forbearance on capital mean that mis-pricing and mis-allocation of capital are endemic and worsening, making any recovery even more doubtful.

A transaction tax on trades, as a pre-condition to legal enforceability, might restore some integrity to markets. That would help restore more efficient functioning to economies with much greater promise than further bailouts to banks.

Testimony of Marriner Eccles to the Committee on the Investigation of Economic Problems in 1933

2011-09-24T17:37:00.002+01:00

Below are excerpts from the testimony of Marriner Eccles to the Senate Committee on the Investigation of Economic Problems in 1933. It is an historic document – laying out the future terms of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the management of money supply nationally through open market operations, the Bretton Woods Accord on currency stability, mortgage refinancing as monetary stimulus, and reforms of the Federal Reserve System to eradicate the excesses of untamed capitalism and financial dominance of Wall Street. He proposes higher income and inheritance taxes as essential to promote economic growth, curb inequality and forestall political instability. He encourages federal regulation of child labor, unemployment insurance, social security and other farsighted reforms. And he avows himself a capitalist throughout.

Although he was a titan of industry - with banks, railroads and corporations spanning the American west - Eccles was born the son of an illiterate, bigamist, Mormon, Scottish immigrant. He was about as far as you could get from the Eastern elite ranks that ran US banking on Wall Street. But he sure understood money, economics and trade, and had the personal drive and charisma to carry his point with the president and with Congress.

Following his testimony, the Utah banker was invited by Franklin Roosevelt to come to Washington to spearhead legislation to enact his proposed reforms. Within two years he had drafted and enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Banking Act of 1933(a.k.a., The Glass-Steagall Act, which separated investment and commercial banking and established the FDIC) and the Banking Act of 1935 (which created the modern Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Open Market Committee). He served as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1934 until 1951.

Read this and know that just one person, with vision and principles, can make a difference to the world in a time of crisis, establishing the basis for decades of prosperity and growth.

[page 8]

Before effective action can be taken to stop the devastating effects of the depression, it must be recognised that the breakdown of our present economic system is due to the failure of our political and financial leadership to intelligently deal with the money problem. In the real world there is no cause nor reason for the unemployment with its resultant dsestitution and suffering of fully one-third of our entire population. We have all and more of the material wealth which we had at the peak of our prosperity in the year 1929. Our people need and want everything which our abundant facilities and resources are able to provide for them. The problem of production has been solved, and we need no further capital accumulation for the present, which could only be utilised in further increasing our productive facilities or extending further foreign credits. We have a complete economic plant able to supply a superabundance of not only all the necessities of our people, but the comforts and luxuries as well. Our problem, then, becomes one purely of distribution. This can only be brought about by providing purchasing power sufficiently adequate to enable the people to obtain the consumption goods which we, as a nation, are able to produce. The economic system can serve no other purpose and expect to survive.

If our problem is then the result of the failure of our money system to properly function, which today is generally recognised, we then must turn to the consideration of the necessary corrective measures to be brought about in that field; otherwise, we can only expect to sink deeper in our dilemma and distress, with possible revolution, with social disintegration, with the world in ruins, the network of its financial obligations in shreds, with the very basis of law and order shattered. Under such a condition nothing but a primitive society is possible. Difficult and slow would then be the process of rebuilding and it could only then be brought about on a basis of a new political, economic and social system. Why risk such a catastrophe when it can be averted by aggressive measures in the right direction on the part of the Government?

* * *

[page 9]

We could do business on the basis of any dollar value as long as we have a reasonable balance between the value of all goods and services if it were not for the debt structure. The debt structure has obtained its present astronomical proportions due to an unbalanced distribution of wealth production as measured in buying power during our years of prosperity. Too much of the product of labor was diverted into capital goods, and as a result what seemed to be our prosperity was maintained on a basis of abnormal credit both at home and abroad. The time came when we seemed to reach a point of saturation in the credit structure where, generally speaking, additional credi was no longer available, with the result that debtors were forced to curtail their consumption in an effort to create a margin to apply on the reduction of debts. This naturally reduced the demand for goods of all kinds, bringing about what appeared to be overproduction, but what in reality was underconsumption measured in terms of the real world and not the money world. This naturally brought about a falling in prices and unemployment. Unemployment further decreased the consumption of goods, which further increased unemployment, thus bringing about a continuing decline in prices. Earnings began to disappear, requiring economies of all kinds – decreases in wages, salaries, and time of those employed.

[page 10]

The debt structure, in spite of the great amount of liquidation during the past three years, is rapidly becoming unsupportable, with the result that foreclosures, receiverships and bankruptcies are increasing in every field; delinquent taxes are mounting and forcing the closing of schools, thus breaking down our educational system, and moratoriums of all kinds are being resorted to – all this resulting in a steady and gradual breaking down of our entire credit structure, which can only bring additional distress, fear, rebellion, and chaos.

* * *

As an example of Government control and operation of the economic system look to the period of the war, at which time, under Government direction, we were able to produce enough and support not only our entire civilian population on a standard of living far higher than at present, but an immense army of our most productive workers engaged in the business of war, parasites on the economic system, consuming and destroying vast quantities produced by our civilian population; we also provided allies with an endless stream of war materials and consumption goods of all kinds. It seemed as though we were enriched by the waste and destruction of war. Certainly we were not impoverished, because we did not consume and waste except that which we produced. As a matter of fact we consumed and wasted less than we produced as evidenced by the additions to our plant and facilities during the war and the goods which we furnished to our allies. The debt incurred by the Government during the war represents the profit which accrued to certain portions of our population through the operation of our economic system. No Government debt would have been necessary and no great price inflation would have resulted if we had drawn back into the Federal Treasury through taxation all of the profits and savings accumulated during the war.

* * *

[page 11]

How was it that during the period of the prosperity after the war we were able in spite of what is termed our extravagance – which was not extravagance at all; we saved too much and consumed too little – how was it we were able to balance a $4,000,000,000 annual Budget, to pay off ten billion of the Government debt, to make four major reductions in our income tax rates (otherwise all of the Government debt would have been paid), to extend $10,000,000,000 credit to foreign countries represented by our surplus production which we shipped abroad, and add approximately $100,000,000,000 by capital accumulation to our national wealth, represented by plants, equipment, buildings, and construction of all kinds? In the light of this record, is it consistent for our political and financial leadership to demand at this time a balanced Budget by the inauguration of a general sales tax, further reducing the buying power of our people? Is it necessary to conserve Government credit to the point of providing a starvation existence for millions of our people in a land of superabundance? Is the universal demand for Government economy consistent at this time? Is the present lack of confidence due to an unbalanced Budget?

What the public and the business men of this country are interested in is a revival of employment and purchasing power. This would automatically restore confidence and increase profits to a point where the Budget would automatically be balanced in just the same manner as the individual, corporation, State, and city budget would be balanced.

[page 12]

During the past three years there has been such tremendous liquidation and scaling down of debts that extraordinary measures have had to be taken to prevent a general collapse of the credit structure. If such a policy is continued what assurance is there that the influences radiating from a marking down of the claims of creditors will not result in a further decline of prices? In other words, after we have reduced all debts through a basis of scaling down 25 per cent to 50 per cent, what reason have we to expect that prices will not have a further decline by like amount? And then again, the practical difficulties of bringing about such a adjustment on a broad scale seem to be insurmountable.

The time element required would indefinitely prolong the depression; such a policy would necessitate the further liquidation of banks, insurance companies, and all credit institutions, for if the obligations of public bodies, corporations, and individuals were appreciably reduced the assets of such institutions would diminish correspondingly, forcing their liquidation on a large scale. Nothing would so hinder any possibility of recovery. Bank and insurance failures destroy confidence and spread disaster and fear throughout the economic world. The present volume of money would diminish with increased hoarding and decreased credit and velocity, making for further deflation and requiring increased Government support without beneficial results until we would be forced from the gold standard in spite of our 40 per cent of the world’s gold, and, at that point, an undesirable and possibly an uncontrolled inflation with all its attendant evils would likely result, and thus the very action designed to preserve the gold standard and re-establish confidence would destroy both.

[page 13]

We have nearly one and a half billion currency more in circulation at the present time than we had at the peak of 1929, and under our present money system we are able to increase this by several billion more without resorting to any of the three inflationary measures popularly advocated. There is sufficient money available in our present system to adequately adjust our present price structure. Our price structure depends more upon the velocity of money than it does upon its volume.

* * *

In 1929 the high level of prices was supported by a corresponding velocity of credit. The last Federal Reserve Bulletin gives an illuminating picture of this relationship as shown by figures of all member banks. From 1923 to 1925 the turnover of deposits fluctuated from 26 to 32 times per year. From the autumn of 1925 to 1929 the turnover rose to 45 times per year. In 1930, with deposits still increasing, the turnover declined at the year end to 26 times. During the last quarter of 1932 the turnover dropped to 16 times per year. Note that from the high price level of 1929 to the low level of the present this turnover has declined from 45 to 16, or 64 per cent.

[page 14]

I repeat there is plenty of money today to bring about a restoration of prices, but the chief trouble is that it is in the wrong place; it is concentrated in the larger financial centers of the country, the creditor sections, leaving a great portion of the back country, or the debtor sections, drained dry and making it appear that there is a great shortage of money and that it is, therefore, necessary for the Government to print more. This maldistribution of our money supply is the result of the relationship between debtor and creditor sections – just the same as the realtion between this as a creditor nation and another nation as a debtor nation – and the development of our industries into vast systems concentrated in the larger centers. During the period of the depression the creditor sections have acted on our system like a great suction pump, drawing a large portion of the available income and deposits in payment of interest, debts, insurance and dividends as well as in the transfer of balances by the larger corporations normally carried throughout the country.

[page 15]

The maladjustment referred to must be corrected before there can be the necessary velocity of money. I see no way of correcting this situation except through Government action.

[page 21]

Mr Eccles: Of course, the way I look at this matter is that we have the power to produce, just as in the period of prosperity after the war demonstrated when we had a standard of living for a period from 1921 to 1929 which, of course, was far in excess of what it is now. Yet in spite of that standard of living we saved too much a I have previously tried to show.

Senator Gore: You have got Foster in the back of your head?

Mr Eccles: I only wish there were more who had. We saved too much in this regard, that we added too much to our capital equipment. Creating overproduction in one case and underconsumption in the other because of an uneconomic distribution of wealth production. . . . Of course, we are losing $2,000,000,000 per month in unemployment. I can conceive of no greater waste than the waste of reducing our national income about half of what it was. I can not conceive of any waste as great as that. Labor, after all, is our only source of wealth.

[page 22]

There could be no waste in post offices or in roads or in schools. You would have something to show for it. With war all you have left is the expense of taking care of maimed and crippled and sick veterans. That is what is left from war. And it is all wastage.

Senator Gore: You have touched the point. The real cause of the existing trouble was the war, with destruction of over 300 billion dollars of wealth in four years. We are paying the price now. The boys paid the price in blood on the field. We are paying the economic price today. And you may just as well pass a resolution to raise the dead that fell in France as to try to pass laws to avert the inevitable consequences of that war.

Mr Eccles: It is true we are suffering the consequences of the war, but there is no reason why we should be suffering from the consequences of the war if it had not been for the international or the interallied debt that resulted from it. WE are suffering from a debt structure. We are not suffering from the waste, because after all, we know today that we have the power and the facilities to produce certainly all that the people of this country need and want.

* * *

We now see, after nearly four years of depression, that private capital will not go into public works or self-liquidating projects except through government and that if we leave our “rugged individual” to follow his own interest under these conditions he does precisely the wrong thing. Each corporation for its own protection discharges men, reduces pay rolls, curtails its orders for raw materials, postpones construction of new plants and pays off bank loans, adding to the surplus of unusable funds. Every single thing it does to reduce the flow of money makes the situation worse for business as a whole.

[page 24]

I am talking about private credit. If it is credit we need why do not say 200 of our great corporations controlling 40 per cent of our industrial output that are in such shape that they do not need credit – they have great amounts of surplus funds – if it is credit that is needed why do they not put men to work? For the very reason that there is not a demand for goods, that we have destroyed the ability to buy at the source through the operation of our capitalistic system, which has brought about such a maldistribution of wealth production that it has gravitated and gravitated into the hands of – well, comparatively few. Maybe several millions of people. We have still got the unemployment and have got no buying power as a result.

[page 25 – proposal of bank deposit insurance and failed bank resolution]

[page 27 – laying out the basis for what was later to be the FDIC]

However, there is always this danger about that class of thing [Government guarantee of bank deposits]. It encourages bad practices and bad management. It may put a premium on them, which of course we do not want to do, and if it is done there must be rules and regulations for the proper conduct of banks requiring eligibility, and if they fail to meet the eligibility they would be suspended after so much notice, and the fund would be drawn upon to take care of any loss.

[page 31]

Farm mortgages at present are possibly the most undesirable and frozen of all loans, and frozen loans are preventing, to some extent, the necessary expansion of credit. The plan I have proposed [to refinance existing farm mortgages at new lower rates] will very effectively and immediately make liquid billions of dollars of assets for which there is no market today, while at the same time it will bring about a reduction of at least one-third of the average annual payments on the farm debt now required to be made by farm mortgage debtors without requiring any financing or loss by the Federal Government, thus bringing about the necessary relief in the farm mortgage field. This plan has the advantage, as a result of the Government guarantee of the Federal land bank bonds, of diverting surplus funds carried in the great creditor sections into the indirect financing of farm mortgages where it is impossible even at a high rate of interest, which farmers can not pay, to attract those funds directly.

* * *

No program designed to bring this country out of the depression can be considered apart from the relations of this country to the rest of the world unless a policy of complete isolation is adopted and an embargo put on gold exports and our domestic economy adjusted to meet such a condition.

Our international problems are far more difficult and will be slower to work out because of our inability to control the action of other nations. These problems can be met only through international conferences over a period of time. The most important of these problems and the one which must be settled before any progress can be made in the meeting of our domestic or other foreign problems is the problem of interallied debts.

There is a great demand on the part of the public and most of the press of this country that these debts be paid. It seems to me that our political leaders have lacked the courage to face this problem in a realistic manner. This has greatly contributed to prolonging the depression. The public, generally speaking, is not fully informed as to the impossibility of our foreign debtors complying with these demands, which cn only be complied with at the expense of our own people.

[page 32]

It is elementary that debts between nations can ultimately be paid only in goods, gold, or services, or a combination of the three. We already have over 40 per cent of the gold supply of the world – that is not true; it is between 35 and 40 per cent – and as a result most of the former gold standard countries have been forced to leave that standard and currency inflation has been the result. This has greatly reduced the cost of producing foreign goods in terms of our dollar and has made it almost impossible for foreign countries to buy American goods because of the high price of our dollar measured in the depreciated value of their money. This naturally has resulted in debtors trying to meet their obligations by producing and selling more than they buy, thus enabling them to have a favourable balance of trade necessary to meet their obligations to us. If this country is to receive payment of foreign debts, it must buy and consume more than it produces, thus creating a trade balance favourable to our debtors.

* * *

We must choose either between accepting sufficient foreign goods to pay the foreign debts owing to this country, or cancel the debts. This is not a moral problem, but a mathematical one.

[page 33 – the outline of what later became the Bretton Woods Accord]

Cancellation, or a settlement of the debts on a basis which would practically amount to cancellation, in exchange for stabilisation of the currency of the debtors, together with certain trade concessions and an agreement to reduce armaments would be a small price for this country to pay as compared with the great benefits which the entire world, including ourselves, would derive therefrom. Without a stabilisation of foreign currencies it will be difficult, if not impossible, in my opinion, to substantially raise the price level in this country as long as we stay on a gold basis. Our debtors will default and we will likely be forced to abandon gold and depreciate our currency in relation to that of other countries in order to raise our price level in this country and to meet foreign competition unless we are instrumental in inducing foreign countries to stabilise their currencies on a gold basis, or gold and silver basis if action is taken internationally to remonetise silver.

[page 33]

Senator Shortridge: Then I take it you would have the tariffs reduced?

Mr Eccles: No. Debts cancelled. Then I think with the prosperity that you would get in this country you can collect more than that in income and inheritance taxes when you stop this loss of $2,000,000,000 a month through unemployment. You start the process of wealth, and even a capitalist is far better off. I am a capitalist.

* * *

The program which I have proposed is largely of an emergency nature designed to bring rapid economic recovery. However, when recovery is restored, I believe that in order to avoid future disastrous depressions and sustain a balanced prosperity, it will be necessary during the next few years for the Government to assume a greater control and regulation of our entire economic system. There must be a more equitable distribution of wealth production in order to keep purchasing power in a more even balance with production.

If this is to be accomplished there should be a unification of our banking system under the supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank in order to more effectively control our entire money and credit system; a high income and inheritance tax is essential in order to control capital accumulations (this diversion of taxes should be left solely to the central government – the real property and sales tax left to the States); there should be national child labor, minimum wage, unemployment insurance and old age pension laws (such laws left up to the States only create confusion and can not meet the situation nationally unless similar and uniform laws are passed by all States at the same time, which is improbable); all new capital issues offered to the public and all foreign financing should receive the approval of an agency of the Federal Government; this control should also extend to all means of transportation and communication so as to ensure their operation in the public interest. A national planning board, similar to the industries board during the war, is necessary to the proper coordination of public and private activities of the economic world.

Such measures as I have proposed may frighten those of our people who possess wealth. However, they should feel reassured in reflecting upon the following quotation from one of our leading economists:

It is utterly impossible, as this country has demonstrated again and again, for the rich to save as much as they have been trying to save, and save anything that is worth saving. They can save idle factories and useless railroad coaches; they can save empty office buildings and closed banks; they can save paper evidences of foreign loans; but as a class they can not save anything that is worth saving, above and beyond the amount that is made profitable by the increase of consumer buying. It is for the interests of the well to do – to protect them from the results of their own folly – that we should take from them a sufficient amount of their surplus to enable consumers to consume and business to operate at a profit. This is not “soaking the rich”; it is saving the rich. Incidentally, it is the only way to assure them the serenity and security which they do not have at the present moment.

[page 35]
I feel that one of two things is inevitable: That either we have got to take a chance on meeting this unemployment problem and this low-price problem or we are going to get a collapse of our credit structure, which means a collapse of our capitalistic system, and we will then start over. And I therefore would like to see us attempt to regulate and operate our economy which today requires more action from the top due to our entire interdependency than it did in our earlier days.

The quote I have bolded is my favorite part of this testimony, though it is not Eccles' own words. I would be grateful for anyone who can track down a proper citation for the quote. Eccles thought it was either Stuart Chase or William Trufant Foster.

If you've made it this far, you might also enjoy: Fisher's Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions and a possible revision

"Deficit Attention Disorder"

2011-09-18T13:21:00.002+01:00

I must admit to being delighted that the EU finance ministers have found unity on one point: dismissal of Tim Geithner as officious, ignorant and unaccountable. He is an example, right up there with George W. Bush, of the privileged American elite who "fail upwards" throughout a career.

Europe's nations may have an escalating debt crisis, but they have been addressing it sensibly and cautiously by trying to rein in further debt through reductions in government spending.

The perfect example from the meeting logistics: EU finance ministers shared a bus to the meeting, while Tim Geithner insisted on a private car.

Geithner seems to abhor austerity and sacrifice, preferring any strategy which keeps debt growing to fund the investment banking, security, prisons and war industries on which the American economy now depends for so much of its GDP. (2 percent of Americans are in prison, while 1 percent work for the Department of Defense.)

He encouraged a ten-fold increase in leverage of the EFSF to create a massive new debt overhang. Madness. The cure for a refinancing crisis is not more leverage to be later refinanced.

Europe has its problems, but one thing I know is that the default setting for Europe is cooperation where the default setting for America is conflict. If Tim Geithner's objective in coming to Poland was to stimulate consensus among European finance ministers, then he can go home happy. He succeeded. They are unified in finding him and his policies discredited. They will work together from that consensus to find a more workable solution for Europe than could ever be conceived in Washington, precisely because they will work together in recognition of mutuality of interest.

UPDATE: As this is being linked elsewhere, I'll add a suggestion about what I would advise the eurozone finance ministers. I would advise them to have every EU state with off balance sheet, hidden liabilities on derivatives - whether undertaken for window dressing to gain admission to the eurozone or any other purpose - to default on any further margin or resettlement payments. The Hammersmith and Fulham defaults of the late 1980s proved a wonderful discipline on the investment banks, schooling them in the limits of preying on local governments. It might be time for another lesson at the national level.

Each of the defaulted derivatives contracts could be referred to an EU committee to determine whether the contract had any legitimate rationale beyond disguising the financial condition or otherwise deceiving the public or other EU governments. If there was no legitimate rationale which served the public interest, then the contract would be declared unenforceable.

This wouldn't address decades of deficit spending, but it would provide a popular demonstration of resolve to shaft Wall Street rather than the taxpayer, at least in the first instance. The politicians should then have enough breathing room to reach a more resilient agreement on fiscal policy and funding going forward.

I appreciate that questioning the validity and enforceability of derivatives contracts might be "extra-legal" in the sense that it would be contrary to accepted legal norms. But since virtually every intervention and liquidity programme innovated by a central bank since 2007 has been without legal or statutory basis, despite the huge redistributions of national wealth, I hardly consider that a sticking point.

Liquidity, Bank Capital and Market Reform

2011-09-02T12:36:00.000+01:00

A friend forwarded some thoughts on liquidity that are worth sharing here, as liquidity is central to the utility of assets as bank capital and to stabilising markets under stress. My friend's points are in bold, with my commentary below.

Central bankers and securities regulators lost sight of liquidity over the past decade or two in permitting reforms which compromised the health of the financial system. Thanks to the Greenspan and Bernanke puts, and to surplus recycling by Asian economies, many took liquidity - like oxygen - for granted. Like oxygen, you only realise how critical liquidity is when its absence becomes noticeable.

Now that bank regulators have rediscovered liquidity as an essential attribute of healthy banks and healthy markets, it is important to reinforce some key qualities.

Liquidity means you can generate cash from a physical asset or paper claim.

If you can't exchange the asset for a major currency to meet a sudden funding need, then the asset shouldn't be permitted as regulatory capital. Basel II and Basel III have generated hundreds of pages around credit scoring and asset type while ignoring the fact that most of what banks are attributing as capital cannot be turned into cash on demand.

Liquidity can be gained by sale or repo of an asset, preferably in a transparent market. Where no market exists or the market has become illiquid, then liquidity must be gained through a central bank.

Virtually all RMBS markets failed under stress in 2008 and 2009, with failures spreading to other asset classes as investors grew wary of dealer spreads and perceived shallow dealer commitment levels. As the scope of funding problems grew, illiquidity spread to sovereign debt for troubled countries such as Greece and Portugal. Few OTC asset markets have recovered sufficient liquidity for dealing in size.

When the public markets will not price an asset in size without a large spread, then the central banks become the market makers of last resort. Without central bank repo of illiquid RMBS and sovereign debt, virtually every major bank in the OECD would have failed.

Because they now have the role of market maker of last resort, central banks should become much more active in ensuring that any asset permitted to be classed as capital by a bank can be liquidated on demand in a public market. Rather than leaving market structure to the investment banks and their tame securities regulators, the central banks should be driving forward reforms to ensure that capital assets are issued in fungible series, in size, and traded in transparent exchange markets with committed market makers.

This will require a major policy reversal on exchange regulation. Securities regulators have been under pressure for several decades to liberalise OTC markets, permit fragmentation to off-exchange trading systems, and turn a blind eye to issuance of securities in small, idiosyncratic offerings that will never liquidly trade except back through the offering investment banks. The quality assurance and market conduct functions of exchanges have been eroded following demutualisation, and exchanges now are run for profit of their highly concentrated owners rather than in the public interest.

Markets are at the heart of successful civilisations. Markets require quality norms, information publication, and price transparency to operate effectively. Regulators and investors allowed credit ratings to substitute for exchange listing rules and reporting requirements during the liquidity boom. Ratings were gamed by the banks until they were meaningless. We should now be forcing assets back onto exchanges and force the exchanges to regulate quality and information norms in the public interest. If this requires re-mutualising the exchanges, or public ownership of exchanges, then that should be on the agenda. Letting the exchanges be run by the thugs who gamed the markets and the rating agencies isn't healthy.

Liquidity means that proceeds of sale will be paid as funds to your account in a currency you can use widely to meet obligations.

If you can only sell your asset into a market denominated in a currency which itself is not liquid and not legal tender for meeting your obligations, then you haven't got liquidity vested in the asset. A lot of investors in emerging markets are probably going to find that liquidity in those markets is a lot less than they might think, despite advances in exchange trading of emerging market assets, and the currencies might be less liquid too in a falling market. If they require funding in their home currency, they risk taking a big hit on sale and FX spreads when they realise the asset under stress.

Liquidity is measured by size, speed and spread - not by price levels.

Whatever the market price, a market isn't liquid if those holding assets in size cannot deal in size. A market is not liquid if those holding assets cannot sell at the time the sell decision is made, but must wait to identify or attract sufficient buyers. A market is not liquid if the spread between the bid and ask is so wide that buyers will be deterred from the market by the risk of never recovering the spread in appreciation or returns. The way that markets have levitated on minimal volumes in 2010 and 2011 is no indication that the markets are liquid. As we've seen in August, even mild selling can have a massive effect on prices in an illiquid market.

Short sales are an attribute of liquid markets. If a market can't be shorted, then the market will fail as prices fall.

Short sellers will come in to buy assets in a falling market to realise a profit. They provide liquidity when everyone else is too scared to deal.

Securities markets regulators and central bankers need to think through liquidity as an attribute of market structure in the public interest. Idiosyncratic, illiquid, ill-transparent deals and instruments which have dominated market growth for the past two decades are behind the weakness of bank capital and market recovery. The regulatory incentives should be toward standardisation of securities terms and offering documents, much larger issues of securities and series of bonds, and fungibility of asset types within a class. Exchange trading should be encouraged, fragmentation discouraged. Exchanges should provide rigorous listing rules, timely reporting of market relevant information, full price transparency and two-way quote obligations on market makers. If we got that right, then much of the misrepresentation, mispricing, inefficiency and fraud of the past would become impossible in future.

Basel Accords: "Tissue paper over a mountain range"

2011-07-13T13:24:00.000+01:00

In 1987 I used the title of this post to describe the brand new Basel Capital Accords. I was a young and novice central banker, but as soon as I looked at the proposed accords, I knew they were sowing the seeds of a great misallocation of capital. The principal flaw was the uniform weighting of assets:
- zero weight for OECD government debt and all other government debt with less than one year maturity;
- 20 percent weight for debt of OECD banks;
- 50 percent weight for mortgage debt.

Young as I was, I had the confidence to express to my elders and betters that they were making a mistake treating a French bank - with unlimited state support - exactly the same as a Italian bank - where state support would be subject to greater political and currency risk. Given the massive differences in yield and liquidity, how could an Italian government bond be just as good as a US Treasury held as bank capital?

The enthusiasm of my colleagues did not convince me. I knew that by drawing these clumsy rules we were telling banks that they no longer had individual, direct responsibility for assessment of the creditworthiness of their assets or their bank counterparties. The banks could use the uniform weightings of Basel to justify bad judgement and lend to Italian banks just as if they were French. Worse, the zero weighting of all OECD government debt would make Italian bonds just as good as Gilts or Treasuries as capital assets, despite more volatile liquidity and the obvious credit risks. [Italian governments changed almost weekly back then.] If the bank regulators slapped a label of capital adequacy on a bank, they would keep on lending unto disaster.

"But no!", my colleagues declaimed, "We are making the world safe for capitalism. With level playing fields from here to West Germany, American and British banks can grow internationally in every market because competition will favour more efficient international banks." [At the time the Soviet Union was still a bar to capitalist extremism in Eastern Europe and we were all devoted to Chicago School free markets elsewhere.]

Basel Capital Accords did promote global competition, and so the concentration of global banking into a very few global banks by punishing smaller banks with higher capital requirements. And to that extent, the plan worked to favour Wall Street and the City. The plan also worked in favour of the Italians, who could issue copious government debt to capitalise their banks at the zero risk weighting and flog that debt to American, British and German banks who carried it at zero risk too.

But as the American, British and German banks were relieved of the onerous responsibility for due diligence, they took sillier and sillier risks. For example, they bought lots of Italian government bonds. They spread the emergent model of securitisation far past any productive reinvestment of capital to the point of wasting each nation's decades of accumulated wealth to finance excess consumption. They bought ratings from willing rating agencies to justify more and more leverage with less and less capital. They used derivatives to make their balance sheets and accounting impenetrable and misleading, and then got governments to adopt the same techniques in the public sector to support increasing government debt. And all the time the bias of Basel made them more and more powerful.

Basel II cemented big banks' control of both regulators and markets. They could use ratings to justify investments in structured products that seemed to have no economic rationale for either investors or intermediaries, but were magically profitable for everyone in theory. They could use internal models to book profits now and defer losses indefinitely, so ensuring wonderful bonus growth. Ah, glory days!

It is all starting to unravel now. Despite a commitment to Basel III - to be implemented far in the future - I doubt Basel II will last much longer. This week saw Portugese and Irish government bonds downrated to junk. Even the mighty US Treasury is on creditwatch for downrating given the rising risk of default.

Junk rating means risk. Recognition of an asset as capital implies that it can be priced in a liquid market when cash is required. When sovereign debt is junk rated and only good for collateral at the ECB or Fed, then it should not be eligible for bank capital. And so, zero weighting of these bonds as bank capital assets is no longer defensible. The banks holding Irish and Portugese debt as zero weighted for regulatory capital will have to supplement their capital at a time when bond markets are already dysfunctional and becoming downright illiquid for new issues. Huge maturity mismatch and refinancing overhangs were already threatening banks over the next few years, and now it will be much, much worse.

The ECB has ripped up its liquidity facilities rulebook this week to permit Portugese government debt to remain eligible as collateral despite the downgrades. That just tells the banks that there is no longer any rulebook that will not be ripped up as the occasion requires. And that inevitably includes Basel II and Basel III. The ECB has doubled down on moral hazard.

Watch the banks use the next crisis to ensure that no rules apply to them at all. Basel II will be suspended as regulators come under pressure to agree to continue to zero weight even junk bonds, despite high risks of sovereign defaults. You won't hear the Portugese, Irish, Italians or Spanish - or likely even the Germans - object to that when the time comes and the alternative is recognition of widespread capital deficits and bank failures.

But if the Basel II rulebook gets ripped up, that will also destroy the means by which the banks suborned regulators, central banks and governments to their service, chasing ever higher yields and ever bigger marketshare. I'm not sure what will come after that, but it probably won't have zero weight and certainly not zero risk.

Related posts:
More on the lunacy of the Basel Accords
Basel Faulty: Sovereign defaults and bank capital

Protect the Bondholders?

2011-06-23T03:09:00.000+01:00

The latest twists and turns in the Greek bailout fiasco have combined with a disturbing insight into FSA attitudes here in the UK to make me concerned that the system may now be distorted beyond peaceful reform. In fact, the danger of harmful destabilisation may be much worse because supervisor actions reinforce poor outcomes.

I am told that the primary objective of the ECB in Greece and the FSA in the UK is the same: Protect the bondholders.

Perhaps I am naive, but I did not realise that the FSA saw this as its primary mission until someone at the FSA bluntly told me so and someone in the markets confirmed it independently as only just and proper that this should be so.

If protecting bondholders from bad debt really is the primary objective of the supervisors, then the supervisors have become the problem. Capitalism does not work when capitalists are shielded from the economic risks that they freely undertake for profit when they enter into private contracts for debt finance. If bondholders know that they can get the ECB and the FSA to tilt the field in their direction, they have no incentive to balance yield against risk. They should just go for yield wherever they find it, and trust the ECB and FSA to ensure that they get their money whatever happens to the company, the depositor, the employee or the taxpayer who foots the ultimate bill for their yield.

If the objective of current official interaction with the markets is to prevent market determined outcomes, then we are in for a very ugly period of instability. The market is going to force a market outcome. The officials standing in the way can influence who profits from the market clearing, but the market is going to clear. If the officials have decided that the bondholders always win, then the rest of us will always lose. And once the rest of us - the companies, depositors, employees and taxpayers - remember that we have political power, then we will change the system.

This is what we are seeing in Greece on the streets. The Greek people have realised that the government works for the bondholders; the ECB works for the bondholders; the IMF works for the bondholders. They now understand what was not clear before: No one works for the people.

Strangely, this is also the realisation taking hold in Germany too. People are waking up to the fact that their national economic self-interest is subordinate to the claims of the bondholders. The German government's priority is to protect the bondholders. Germans should know better than most that stuffing the bondholders is sometimes the best policy - having defaulted three times in the last century to lay the ground in each case for economic resurgence.

What scares me is that I naively believed the UK was different. I believed that the FSA was a market regulator that understood market operations. I am now under no such illusion. They have told me their job is to protect the bondholders. If that is true, then the UK is no different than Greece, just slightly behind Greece on the arc of history.

It used to be that the role of the state in financial market regulation was to ensure efficient market operations, promote transparency of prices and liquidity, protect consumers from abusive practices, and to resolve failed companies according to principles of equitable distribution of assets among like classes of creditors. If the role of the state now is to shield HFT, dark pool and OTC markets from transparency, provide liquidity where the market fails, oversee the orderly fleecing of consumers, and to ensure that some creditors of failing firms always win while others always lose, then we no longer have a market economy. And as virtually all these regulatory policies have evolved in the absence of public debate and legislative scrutiny, we also no longer have democratic governance of markets.

Perhaps this is what tiny Iceland realised when it determined that it would default rather than protect the bondholders. Perhaps in a small country in a big ocean it is easier to perceive a common interest in economic and political adaptation to protect the future of your children and your neighbours, rejecting the claims of the faceless, pitiless and stateless bondholders.

I suddenly have a lot more sympathy for the Greek people than I did a fortnight ago. Come the revolution here, I may be in the streets too.

Some will say that the Greeks are hard line communists pining for generous state benefits and pensions they haven't earned. Maybe so. But there is more economic justice in such a system with such objectives determined in a democratic process than in any system with a secret primary imperative to Protect the Bondholders.

The FSA is being broken up as institutional punishment for its many failings in the run up to the financial crisis. I was skeptical of breaking the FSA along prudential supervision and consumer protection lines, but now think that may be a good thing. It may draw a sharp distinction between maintaining resilient banks and tilting the playing field toward institutional players like bondholders. A consumer protection authority will have a more direct interest in countering the Protect the Bondholders mindset where it robs the consumers or risks the taxpayers to achieve its ends.

As many long time readers know, I try to remain optimistic. There is hard work to be done, but the ground is fertile for those who will make the effort to seed and nurture the reforms required. The Vickers/Indepdendent Commission on Banking review and various efforts by HM Treasury and the Bank of England are all moving in the right direction: toward getting the state out of private financial transactions except as regards the setting and enforcing of reasonable rules. Hopefully they will succeed and the bondholder bias will be curbed with the break up of the FSA and long before we Britons hit the streets under the weight of an unsustainable debt.

Anomie

2011-06-13T20:48:00.000+01:00

I came across a new word today playing Scrabble:

Anomie: a collapse of the social structures governing a given society.

Now that is one very useful word! It could usefully describe the slow motion collapse of the financial markets as investors and consumers realise that their interests are no longer protected by fiduciary, exchange, monetary and regulatory structures that once engendered confidence. Or maybe it captures the loss of patriotism and social cohesion in a globalised economy dominated by stateless corporations, their executive elites and their political puppets who are all determined to loot the public treasury while paying no taxes.

One word. So much potential. I will be finding all kinds of appropriate contexts to use it, I expect.

Concentration, Manipulation and Margin Calls

2011-05-26T11:19:00.000+01:00

Over the past 25 years the financial markets of the world have become highly concentrated in the intermediation of a handful of firms, and regulation has been harmonised in the interests of these few firms. As Adam Smith - that great proponent of free markets - cogently observed:

“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”

Sadly, these few global firms have been for some time in "a conspiracy against the public", and have subverted the organs of public governance and the infrastructure of the financial markets to their purposes. Regulators and legislatures have done what they were asked to do in rubber stamping the policies that promoted further concentration, assured the whole time that it would result in "efficient markets", when the reality has been entirely otherwise. Exchanges were demutualised, and their new owners installed electronic trading systems to a common design, with provision for co-located HFT servers right next to the exchange's boxes to better front run their client orders. Clearinghouses were demutualised, and their new owners installed common margin algorithms and collateral rules that created a liquidity bias in their favour, reinforcing their control of global liquidity. Regulators liberalised over-the-counter markets, off-exchange trading and shadow banking so that the real trade flows that drive global markets occur well out of sight or supervision.

Four global banks are intermediaries in 85 percent of OTC derivatives transactions. The same banks dominate prime brokerage. The same banks own large equity interests in the now demutualised exchanges, clearinghouses and even warehouses of the global markets. Naturally, the same banks dominated underwriting of securitised assets. The implications have scarcely been grasped of what this portends in terms of the information asymmetries and the opportunity to manipulate markets without risk.

Each of these roles gives these few banks a view into the positions of market investors. They know who owns what, using what leverage, under what terms, and trading in which markets. Knowing that, the manipulation of prices to impoverish investors and enrich the ruling banks is child's play with a bit of ill-transparent HFT through proprietary dealing desks and connected hedge funds aligned with the firms.

These banks will protest that there are Chinese walls between their trading desks and the market infrastructure they own. The problem with Chinese walls is that they have chinks in them. (Apologies to PC crowd, but it is an old Wall Street joke I'm quoting.) We have seen from what is now reported about securitisations, that these banks structured products to trade against their clients, often colluding with hedge funds to share the profits. Is it likely that when they balance the public interest in market integrity against next year's bonus they become much more altruistic?

In October 2008 the global financial markets crashed. The story in the media is that it was a panic caused by the insolvency of Lehman Brothers. This is not the truth - or at least not all of it. The crash actually followed a $2 trillion margin call by these four global banks on their prime brokerage clients and OTC counterparties - effectively a 30 per cent increase in required margin. It was the margin call that forced liquidation of global portfolios of all asset classes - and particularly the high quality, most liquid asset classes.

Eligible margin is defined by bilateral agreement for both prime brokerage and OTC derivatives. According to the ISDA Margin Survey for 2009, the eligible collateral at the time of the crash was predominantly US dollar cash, euro cash and US Treasury securities.

Bilateral agreements are not made public, and neither are the margin calls. This is why the $2 trillion dollar margin call did not make the news. Each prime brokerge client and each OTC counterparty dealt with their margin call as a bilateral obligation, despite it being systemically the most important event in the history of financial markets.

As the markets crashed, the US Congress was threatened with chaos and martial law if it did not pass the Paulson Plan to grant $700 billion to Wall Street banks without any formal process or review. The Federal Reserve in parallel innovated a series of secret, extra-legal measures to give money to the same banks in exchange for assets which would never be disclosed, publicly valued or audited. The need to raise dollar liquidity globally to meet margin calls in US dollar led to the innovation of central bank dollar swaps - to preferred central banks only, of course.

After all the global liquidity had been sucked into the hands of these few global banks, and the dollar surged to strength along with US Treasuries, the game of increasing leverage started all over. The firms sitting on all the margin cash and global liquidity bought up all the quality assets lying about the crashed global markets at deep discount, then they started lending again. They have been reporting huge profits consistently ever since as their clients and counterparties take the assets and exposures in this "recovery" on terms very profitable to those running the markets and liqudity business.

And remember, these few firms see all your positions and know all your clearing balances better than you can. And they chair all the margin committees at all your clearinghouses and exchanges too. And they even own the warehouses where you believe your gold, silver and other hedges against financial chaos are supposed to be stored.

We are now nearing the same global levels of leverage as prevailed in summer 2008. The political situations in the US and in Europe are unstable, and China is slowing. There is money to be made in instability.

It isn't the leverage that causes a crisis, but the margin call.

In the past few months we have seen a pattern of increased margin calls in exchange traded derivatives. It makes me wonder what is happening unseen in the OTC markets. The dollar is strengthening from its lows, indicating flows back to US counterparties. Perhaps another round in the game of liquidity manipulation has begun.

Leaving that aside, how would Adam Smith recommend that we protect ourselves from the well-entrenched tyranny of a global elite of manipulators? The only resilient solution is local, transparent markets with disintermediation of the controlling banks. Eliminating the information asymetries which allow them to see everyone's positions, leverage and trading activity - and trade and ration liquidity accordingly - would go a long way to preventing further concentration.

How to do this? Would the co-opted regulators allow markets that disintermediated reliable paymasters? Those are the questions we will grapple with after the next crash I suppose.

UPDATE: A timely example of the public spirit of exchange executives:

SEC -- Antonia Chion, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, added, “Johnson brazenly stole nonpublic information from NASDAQ and its listed companies in breach of his duties of confidentiality to his employer and clients. Johnson assured at least one corporate official that she could share material nonpublic information with him because he was obligated as a NASDAQ employee to hold such information in confidence, and then he illegally traded on it.”

Quote of the Day: Greenspan's reputation dead as a parrot

2011-03-21T16:56:00.000Z

“Greenspan is an ex-Maestro; his reputation is pushing up the daisies, it’s gone to meet its maker, it’s joined the choir invisible.

He’s no longer the Man Who Knows; he’s the man who presided over an economy careening to the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression — and who saw no evil, heard no evil, refused to do anything about subprime, insisted that derivatives made the financial system more stable, denied not only that there was a national housing bubble but that such a bubble was even possible.”

- Paul Krugman

Hat tip: Barry Ritholtz

"You can't build a car with 97% of the parts"

2011-03-21T04:38:00.000Z

The title statement summarises the challenge for the global manufacturing sector with Japan's industry and logistics disrupted for an unknown span of time.

Power shortages threaten global supply chain

Ford Motor Co., Samsung and The Boeing Co. are waiting for suppliers in quake-stricken Japan to increase one key export: information.

A top supplier of high-end components for the global technology and auto industries, Japan may need weeks to recover output lost as a result of the country's strongest earthquake on record, according to a forecast by Barclays Capital. . . .

“Our production won't be affected this week, but then we'll see,” Volvo spokesman Per-Ake Froberg said.

Supply of batteries, Blu-ray compact discs and magnetic heads used in hard drives also may be affected by the quake and power shortages, according to a report by Taipei research company TrendForce Corp.

“The reality is, the companies don't know the full extent of what's happened,” said economist Kim Hill at the Center for Automotive Research. “You can't build a car with 97% of the parts.”

Damage to ports, railroads, and factories in northern Japan has yet to be fully assessed - not least because engineers, corporate management and insurance claims adjusters have been kept at bay by radiation leaks from the Fukushima crisis-hit nuclear complex. Fuel shortages, power blackouts and disrupted land and mobile communications further stymie any effort to document damage or predict reopening schedules for stalled manufacturing plants. Rolling blackouts occasioned by damage to power generation and electricity grids mean even undamaged industries across the nation are producing less than expected. The scale of human tragedy - with half a million displaced refugees and 21,000 lives lost - mean many workers will be unable to report to work, or too concerned with rebuilding their homes and comforting their families to work more than regular shifts.

We have a highly interdependent, global manufacturing sector for modern goods, particularly high end electronics and automobiles. Japan may only account for 3 percent of the modern product, but it is usually the high value components that will be very difficult to source elsewhere. And as the title suggests, a failure to supply the 3 percent might result in halting production for the rest of the supply chain.

As this week rolls on, and the scale of disruption becomes better understood, I expect a lot of companies worldwide will start evaluating the implications for their operations of a disrupted supply chain. Without more precise information from Japanese suppliers on the expected scale of the disruption, few businesses elsewhere have been able to issue statements on the implications. As the information begins to flow, we can expect more than a few negative shocks about Q2 and Q3 earnings as inventories of parts run down globally.

So far as the media has noticed the issue, concern has been limited to supplies of the iPad 2. We may find that the implications are more serious for our economies than delayed gratification of Apple fans.

Intererestingly, the Japanese companies most directly affected are the only ones likely to be able to claim insurance for business interruption. Companies elsewhere reliant on Japanese-sourced components might have comparable losses, or even greater losses, but have no recourse except their reserves and such corporate finance as might be available in already tight markets.

Magnitude of insurance claims still almost impossible to measure

While analysts and risk modellers are daily raising their estimates of the economic damage, with the latest Barclays Capital estimate coming in at $US185 billion, many insurance experts believe it will be well over $US200 billion.

In terms of insured losses, risk modeller AIR Worldwide estimates it at $US15 billion to $US35 billion.

But some big-name brokers are quietly suggesting it could be $US70 billion, making it one of the biggest losses to the insurance and reinsurance industry.

Claims adjusters have poured into Japan in the past few days trying to grapple with the size of the damages and their clients' exposure, but cannot get near the radiation-affected area. Japanese insurance companies are also being hampered by power cuts in Tokyo that make it virtually impossible for them to appraise the damage.

A growing concern is how the tsunami is covered by general insurance policies. For example, AIR's estimates for insured losses do not factor in tsunami-related damage, business interruption costs or potential losses from nuclear damage.

Adding to the uncertainty of losses and disruption is the likelihood that insurers may contest coverage for some damage or disruption. After Katrina, many hurricane insurers asserted that their policies did not cover flood damage to properties. Similar disputes may arise in Japan where a trifecta of catastrophe has complicated claims assessment. The longer companies are kept from rebuilding and restarting production, the longer and deeper will be the losses for the industries dependent on them for their own operations, production lines and profits.

Inflation and Deflation revisited

2011-03-18T14:56:00.000Z

In December 2008 I came off the fence and plumped for deflation as inevitable. Mostly I reasoned that debasement of accounting practice, mismanagement of financial intermediaries, captured regulators that collaborated in perpetuating failure, and extremely poor market pricing of risks and fundamentals meant that there was litte incentive to save and no place safe to invest. I predicted that when the last great bubble in sovereign debt popped, deflation would work its cleansing power to restore fundamentals.

It is now clear to me that policy makers in the West are determined to apply every available resource to underpinning failure, misallocation and executive excess. As this discourages the honest saver from parting with cash, policy makers are ensuring that deflation will wreak its havoc on the financial and real economies of the world. Only when that deflation has played out and rational policies that reward market-based management and returns are restored will it be worthwhile to invest again.

The Fed permitting dividend hikes at bailed out banks only deepens my cynicism about the poor quality of regulation and the inadequacy of management controls.

Obviously, I was premature about deflation as events in 2009 and 2010 proved, but I am not convinced I was wrong in the longer term. Events this week in Japan, and political upheavals this year elsewhere, have me thinking that we are at a turning point in many ways. When the numbness that follows such a mammoth series of tragedies wears off, the public in Japan is going to be very angry. They have suffered three great catastrophes in one week: the 8.9 earthquake, the tsunami that swiftly followed, and the failure of safety controls at six nuclear reactors. We still don't know the scale of the final disaster, or what it will mean for the country or the world.

The Japanese state is to be congratulated that strict building codes preserved much of the physical infrastructure from the earthquake, and regular tsunami drills doubtless saved tens of thousands of lives during the tsunami. The most serious failure was in management, risk assessment and regulation of the nuclear industry. The anger will be that an industry critical to the economy, with powerful lobbyists close to government, was able to capture its regulators and erode safety standards until a crisis revealed the tragic short-termism. The anger will increase when the Japanese come to appreciate that the serial depredations of the banking industry have left them over-exposed with few fiscal policy options to meet the financial challenge of rebuilding and resettlement of refugees.

If the government and institutions of Japan are forced to liquidate and repatriate foreign assets, then fears of rising Yen and destabilisation of G7 economies are well founded. I believe it was the collective self-interest in preserving stability that motivated today's central bank interventions. The Yen appreciated 20 percent in the three months following the Kobi earthquake, and the scale of the current disaster - particularly with the risk of nuclear contamination of some part of the country - is likely to dwarf the Kobi effect.

As radiation reaches California from Fukushima today, we might all consider that regulatory capture places us all at some degree of risk. The crisis in California sub-prime real estate was borne by the currents of international finance to the pension funds of Norway and the savings banks of Germany. Both the nuclear energy industry and the banking industry had parallel patterns of political influence leading to regulatory capture and debasement of best practice, and ultimately ruination for a suffering public. It will be interesting to see how much accountability is demanded of management and regulators in the nuclear industry in Japan, and compare this with the lack of accountabiity for serial financial failures and bailouts.

Japan has 20 years more experience of financial sector accounting abuse and bailouts than the rest of us. And the result has been almost continuous deflation - even in the face of mounting deficits, ZIRP and quantitative easing.

Another factor that leads me to fear deflation over inflation is the risk of popping of the great China bubble. My view is that the Chinese economy slowed markedly in Q4 2010 as monetary tightening and administrative regulation of bank lending began to bite, and that the slowing has accelerated in 2011. This view has been confirmed by Gavyn Davies on his FT blog. With another rate rise today by the PBOC, and the supply chain shock of Japan's industrial disruption and power shortages, we could be in for a sharp, deflationary global contraction in the next few months.

UPDATE 20/03/11: Days before quake, plant operator admitted oversight

Days before Japan plunged into an atomic crisis after a giant earthquake and tsunami knocked out power at the ageing Fukushima nuclear plant, its operator had admitted faking repair records.

The revelation raises fresh questions about both Tokyo Electric Power Co (TEPCO)'s scandal-tainted past and the government's perceived soft regulation of a key industry.

The operator of the Fukushima No. 1 plant submitted a report to the country's nuclear watchdog ten days before the quake hit on March 11, admitting it had failed to inspect 33 pieces of equipment in its six reactors there.

A power board distributing electricity to a reactor's temperature control valves was not examined for 11 years, and inspectors faked records, pretending to make thorough inspections when in fact they were only cursory, TEPCO said.

It also said that inspections, which are voluntary, did not cover other devices related to cooling systems including water pump motors and diesel generators.

The report was submitted after the regulator ordered operators to examine whether inspections were suitably thorough.

Sympathy and concern for Japan

2011-03-15T12:50:00.001Z

Children of Adam all come from the same source,
When one is wounded, all share the pain,
He who cannot feel the pain of others,
Cannot call himself Son of Man.

- Saadi

Insurance and Banking: Risk, Resiliency and Harmonisation

2011-03-03T08:49:00.000Z

I attended an interesting discussion of risk management in the City this week, bringing together insurers with bankers. The two sectors manage risk quite differently, which is why there are rarely insurance crises and frequently banking crises. Insurance crises tend to occur when insurers act like banks (AIG Financial Products, MBIA and other monolines). Bank crises tend to occur when banks act like investment banks.

Insurers must not underwrite risks that they will not be able to cover in the event, and must therefore have reserves sufficient to perform at all times. This makes the insurers much more cautious about taking on risk, about pricing risk accurately at the time of contracting, and about managing reserves to be liquid when claims require payment. Regulation is fundamentally about solvency and selling.

Banks undertake risks on their books that they can only cover so long as they continue to have access to liquidity (funding, deposits, repos or central bank support). Bank capital is never enough to ensure performance without market liquidity for reserve assets. Banks are generally much less cautious about taking on risk, rely overmuch on incomplete models to price risk, and manage capital to optimise returns rather than ensure survival. Regulation focuses on capital (never enough on its own) rather than conduct, common sense and functional suitability.

One risk manager observed that in insurance the risks are exogenous, generally independent in occurrence, and finite. In banking the risks are too often endogenous, correlated in unpredictable ways, and of unknowable magnitude. As a result, a single bank failing has systemic consequences for the banking system, where a single insurance company failure has no systemic consequences for the insurance sector.

An interesting observation both insurers and bankers agreed on was that international harmonisation of regulation had driven formerly diverse business models and management preferences toward uniformity by enforcing preferred models for capital and solvency. As a result, the risks of total systemic failure are much, much higher than before Basel II and Solvency II, because when the models are wrong, the whole financial system is compromised.

Models are always wrong because they are partial, approximate, and use historic data and correlations. In internationally harmonised regulation, the failure of models is even more assured as many domestic factors which have great implications for financial risk are ignored or discounted. Quite simply, models are illuminating, not correct.

What this means is that the 25 year drive to harmonise regulation using financial models is almost certainly counterproductive if the aim was to ensure wider financial integrity and stability. Instead of a global financial system constructed as a spider's web, such that the breaking of one strand does not compromise the whole web, we have a system that has bound all the threads into a single cable. And if that cable frays under stress . . .

There was controversy around the idea of functionally segregating the pedestrian but systemically important functions like payments and mortgage intermediation from the riskier eccentricities of modern of investment banking. About half the room thought it perfectly sensible, and half thought it couldn't be done. I'm of the view that "narrow banking" for some functions might be a very reasonable way to secure the taxpayer from future losses by reducing the scope for contagion in the banking system. And if we could do that, we could allow bad banks to fail, restoring some morals and some hazard to the management of banking.

Sap rising, a new job and the NHS

2011-03-02T09:12:00.000Z

I’m starting this month mildly optimistic. Those who have laden our societies with inequality and our economies with debt are being repudiated wherever the public is permitted to speak or vote. No longer dulled by panic, policy makers are realising there are other options than doing as they are told by their bankers, and their duty to their enraged public requires them to at least evaluate other options before caving into further banker demands. Emboldened by examples of bravery and solidarity in the Middle East, many publics are re-evaluating their relationship to the state and the service they receive from their political elites, and then finding a new voice to demand better.

The corrupt political machine that surrendered Irish sovereignty to a more corrupt banking system has been voted out of office. Denmark has allowed a bank to fail, imposing real losses for the first time in this crisis on bank bondholders. The governor of Wisconsin is being reminded that he works for the people of his state, within the bounds of its constitution and its laws. Signs of a shift toward accountability perhaps? It is spring, and I choose to hope.

I am in England, where a fine mist softens the air and birds sing in the budding trees outside my window. Contributing to my good humour is the imminence of a new challenge that will not require me to travel further than central London. I spent much of the autumn looking at the world, looking at my country, and searching for a way to make a difference here at home that will endure as a lasting contribution to economic stability. I have been fortunate enough to identify such a role, seek appointment, and be given the chance to fulfil my aims. It will be another adventure, but one I pursue in familiar surroundings and among friends.

Wish me luck.

And now a word about healthcare, a subject I rarely write about. I saw a chart at Wall Street Cheat Sheet this week that forced me to realise how blessed I am to be British. If I were an American, I would be shamed by this - especially when more than 30 percent of citizens have no entitlement to healthcare.

Here's an example of what I get for the money spent on the NHS.

In December I received a form letter from the NHS (National Health Service) saying that the time had come around again for a routine diagnostic procedure to detect a condition fairly common to people my age. It was the run-up to Christmas and I did nothing at the time. Yesterday I received a reminder that I had not had the test, urging me to schedule it. My GP (general practitioner doctor) is at the surgery (doctor’s office) on the high street five minutes’ walk from my door. I called the surgery’s appointments line, and the friendly receptionist gave me an appointment for later in the morning. I showed up, was seen within five minutes, and back home twenty minutes later. The doctor was even happy to chat about another minor matter that had been on my mind. The test results will be sent by post within two weeks. This was as easy, convenient, stress-free and professional as anyone could ever wish. And no one ever mentioned money.

The NHS is one reason why there is unlikely to be a revolution in Britain. Each of us living here can actually see the benefits of having a government that provides for the people in the ways that truly count. I never have to worry about whether I can afford a medical procedure. When my children are sick, they are seen quickly, often the same day. I can get urgent care 24 hours a day. I have even been pleasantly surprised by a Sunday house call. When I took my children to the emergency room (long ago now), they were seen and treated with all the professionalism and concern any loving parent might wish. All of this is provided by my government, and I never worry even for a moment about the cost. As a taxpayer, I enjoy a tangibly better life because my government provides for my care and the care of my family whenever it is required.

The NHS is far from perfect, but it is a great deal better than any insurance-intermediated system I could imagine. And it is infinitely better than no insurance and no entitlement to healthcare at all.

Not all taxes impoverish me. Some of what I pay enriches me too.

UPDATE:
I've just received a form in the post to permit me to register for patient management over the internet. I'll be able to book and change appointments online with my doctor or other doctors at the surgery, and I can request prescription renewals. This is my NHS delivering value and efficiency to me as a taxpayer, and I am again grateful.

Mervyn King: From Bagehot to Basel, and Back Again

2011-02-11T16:12:00.000Z

An American friend sent along the New York Times hatchet job on Mervyn King. It is a classic of its genre. The first four sentences include the prejudicial phrases "should command respect", "has been accused", "has been condemned", and "has so far been ignored". Since little appears in the American Pravda by chance, one wonders what and whose agenda is served by such a one-sided and un-journalistic attack on a Governor who has done pretty well in preserving Britain's financial sector, economy and currency when basket cases surround Britain on all sides (westwards not excepted). No one quoted as critical of Mr King in the hatchet piece is a working banker, I note.

This little propaganda reminded me that I wanted to blog one of Mr King's bravest speeches. Perhaps bringing what he said to light will help to explain the animosity of those behind the whisper campaign.

Below are excerpts from a speech Mervyn King gave at the Second Bagehot Lecture Buttonwood Gathering, New York City, October 2010. He had me from the mention of Bagehot in the title, but just the first few paragraphs will tell you why he lost Wall Street and Washington. He directly challenges "extend and pretend" as a solution to the crisis:

Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and Back Again

Introduction

Walter Bagehot was a brilliant observer and writer on contemporary economic and financial matters. In his remarkable book Lombard Street, Bagehot brought together his own observations with the analysis of earlier thinkers such as Henry Thornton to provide a critique of central banking as practised by the Bank of England and a manifesto for how central banks could handle financial crises in future by acting as a lender of last resort. The present financial crisis dwarfs any of those witnessed by Bagehot. What lessons can we draw from recent and current experience to update Bagehot’s vision of finance and central banking?

Surely the most important lesson from the financial crisis is the importance of a resilient and robust banking system. The countries most affected by the banking crisis have experienced the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. Output is somewhere between 5% and 10% below where it would have been had there not been a crisis. Unemployment is up, businesses have closed, and the direct and indirect costs to the taxpayer have resulted in fiscal deficits in several countries of over 10% of GDP – the largest peacetime deficits ever.

The Practice of Banking

At the heart of this crisis was the expansion and subsequent contraction of the balance sheet of the banking system. Other parts of the financial system in general functioned normally. . . .

For almost a century after Bagehot wrote Lombard Street, the size of the banking sector in the UK, relative to GDP, was broadly stable at around 50%. But, over the past fifty years, bank balance sheets have grown so fast that today they are over five times annual GDP. The size of the US banking industry has grown from around 20% in Bagehot’s time to around 100% of GDP today. And, until recently, the true scale of balance sheets was understated by these figures because banks were allowed to put exposures to entities such as special purpose vehicles off balance sheet.

Surprisingly, such an extraordinary rate of expansion has been accompanied by increasing concentration: the largest institutions have expanded the most. . .

Bank of America today accounts for the same proportion of the US banking system as all of the top 10 banks put together in 1960. . . .

While banks’ balance sheets have exploded, so have the risks associated with those balance sheets. Bagehot would have been used to banks with leverage ratios (total assets, or liabilities, to capital) of around six to one. But capital ratios have declined and leverage has risen. Immediately prior to the crisis, leverage in the banking system of the industrialised world had increased to astronomical levels. Simple leverage ratios of close to 50 or more could be found in the US, UK, and the continent of Europe, driven in part by the expansion of trading books (Brennan, Haldane and Madouros, 2010).

And banks resorted to using more short-term, wholesale funding. The average maturity of wholesale funding issued by banks has declined by two thirds in the UK and by around three quarters in the US over the past thirty years – at the same time as reliance on wholesale funding has increased. As a result, they have run a higher degree of maturity mismatch between their long-dated assets and short-term funding. To cap it all, they held a lower proportion of liquid assets on their balance sheets, so they were more exposed if some of the short-term funding dried up. . . .

Moreover, the size of the balance sheet is no longer limited by the scale of opportunities to lend to companies or individuals in the real economy. So-called ‘financial engineering’ allows banks to manufacture additional assets without limit. And in the run-up to the crisis, they were aided and abetted in this endeavour by a host of vehicles and funds in the so-called shadow banking system, which in the US grew in gross terms to be larger than the traditional banking sector. . .

The size, concentration and riskiness of banks have increased in an extraordinary fashion and would be unrecognisable to Bagehot. Higher reported rates of return on equity were superficial hallmarks of success. These higher rates of return were required by, and a consequence of, the change in the pattern of banks’ funding with increased leverage and more short-term funding. They did not represent a significant improvement in the overall rate of return on assets. Not merely were banks’ own reported profits exaggerating the contribution of the financial sector to the economy, so were the national accounts. . . .

Moreover, a financial sector that takes on risk with the implicit support of the tax-payer can generate measured value added that reflects not genuine risk-bearing but the upside profits from the implicit subsidy. And even without an implicit subsidy the return to risk-bearing can be mismeasured. It is widely understood that an insurance company should not count as profits the receipt of premia on an insurance policy that will pay out only when a low-frequency event occurs at some point in the future. But part of the value added of the financial sector prior to the crisis reflected temporary profits from taking risk and it was only after September 2008 that much of that so-called economic activity resulted in enormous reported losses by banks.

It is possible to make a very rough estimate of the possible size of this distortion in the reported financial sector output data. If we assume that true labour and capital productivity in the financial services industry grew in line with that in the wider economy in the 10 years prior to the crisis, then, given the inputs of capital and labour over that period, the official estimate might have overstated UK financial sector value added by almost £30 billion up to 2007 – around half of the growth in the official measure. . . .

The theory of banking

It is this structure, in which risky long-term assets are funded by short-term deposits, that makes banks so hazardous. Yet many treat loans to banks as if they were riskless. In isolation, this would be akin to a belief in alchemy – risk-free deposits can never be supported by long-term risky investments in isolation. To work, financial alchemy requires the implicit support of the tax payer. . . .

For all the clever innovation in the financial system, its Achilles heel was, and remains, simply the extraordinary – indeed absurd – levels of leverage represented by a heavy reliance on short-term debt.

Modern financiers are now invoking other dubious claims to resist reforms that might limit the public subsidies they have enjoyed in the past. No one should blame them for that – indeed, we should not expect anything else. . . .

Finding a Solution

The guiding principle of any change should be to ensure that the
costs of maturity transformation – the costs of periodic financial crises – fall on those who enjoy the benefits of maturity transformation – the reduced cost of financial intermediation. All proposals should be evaluated by this simple criterion.

The first, and most obvious, response to the divergence between private benefits and social costs is the imposition of a permanent tax on the activity of maturity transformation to “internalise the externalities”. Such a tax, or levy, has been discussed by the G7, and introduced in the UK. . . .

Why Basel III is not a complete answer

Basel III on its own will not prevent another crisis for a number of reasons.

First, even the new levels of capital are insufficient to prevent another crisis. Calibrating required capital by reference to the losses incurred during the recent crisis takes inadequate account of the benefits to banks of massive government intervention and the implicit guarantee. . . .

One criticism of Basel III with which I have no truck is the length of the transition period. Banks have up to 2019 to adjust fully to the new requirements. Although some of the calculations of the alleged economic cost of higher capital requirements presented by the industry seem to me exaggerated (Institute of International Finance, 2010), I do believe that it is important in the present phase of de-leveraging not to exacerbate the challenge banks face in raising capital today. Banks should take advantage of opportunities to raise loss-absorbing capital, and should recognise the importance of using profits to rebuild capital rather than pay out higher dividends and compensation.

Large Institutions

The implicit subsidy to banks that are perceived as “too important to fail” can be
important to banks of any size but is usually seen as bigger for large institutions for which existing bank resolution procedures either do or could not apply. Moreover, most large complex financial institutions are global – at least in life if not in death. . . .

Solving the “too important to fail” problem will require ultimately that every financial sector entity can be left to fail without risk of threatening the functioning of the economy. . . .

More Radical Reforms

One simple solution, advocated by my colleague David Miles, would be to move to very much higher levels of capital requirements – several orders of magnitude higher. . .

Another avenue of reform is some form of functional separation. The Volcker Rule is one example. Another, more fundamental, example would be to divorce the payment system from risky lending activity – that is to prevent fractional reserve banking (for example, as proposed by Fisher, 1936, Friedman, 1960, Tobin, 1987 and more recently by Kay, 2009). . . .

The advantage of these types of more fundamental proposals is that no tax or capital requirement needs to be calibrated. And if successfully enforced then they certainly would be robust measures. . . .

Of all the many ways of organising banking, the worst is the one we have today.

Conclusion

I have explained the principles on which a successful reform of the system should rest. It is a program that will take many years, if not decades. But, as Bagehot concluded in Lombard Street, “I have written in vain if I require to say now that the problem is delicate, that the solution is varying and difficult, and that the result is inestimable to us all.”

At a time when bankers are keen to supersize bonuses and dividends, based on massively relaxed accounting and transparency standards and a huge public subsidy, Mervyn King reminds us that any so-called "profits" are the result of alchemy that socialises losses to the taxpayers and inflation-hit masses of the world.

He demands more equity capital, no public subsidy, division of systemically important functions from TBTF banks so that they can be left to fail, curbing of dividends while banks rebuild balance sheets and other policies inimical to Wall Street, global banks and their puppets in the Fed.

Look at Bill Isaac's plea for higher bank dividends in the FT this week. Look at insider selling by bank executives. (hat tips to Barry Ritholtz and Simon Johnson) On suspects some executives are desperate to loot their banks before they fail again.

Gee, why would the New York Times want to question Mervyn King's authority just now? This couldn't stink more if it had Judith Miller's byline on it.

Quotable

2011-02-02T21:48:00.000Z

A Holding Company is a thing where you hand an accomplice the goods while a policeman searches you.
- Will Rogers, 1935

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Egypt, China and Famine Futures

2011-02-02T08:54:00.000Z

It's February already! When I was just 19 someone told me that when I turned 21 the speed at which time elapses would double, and then when I turned 45, it would double again. With January gone in a blink, the subjective acceleration of elapsed time is confirmed again. It makes me aware of how little time any of us have in our brief spans of life, and so how important it is to think forward to the future we help to create.

There are so many things I wanted to write about in depth, but perhaps what I need to do is just write something - especially since the comments may be the best part of this blog if the old Roubini posse hangs out here.

Along with the rest of the world, I am watching events unfold in Egypt and I am awed by the civilised and moderate nature of the Egyptian crowds. Students have formed protective rings around the most important heritage sites to prevent damage. Neighbourhood Watches have sprung up to provide civil security. Supplies of food and water are couriered to the protestors and shared with the police and soldiers. There is no obvious political leadership among the protesters, but their self-organisation is still impressive.

The looting that has occurred appears to have been a tactic of the security forces to prepare the way for an aggressive crackdown.

I wish it was only undemocratic regimes that used the technique of the agent provacateur, but there is too much evidence otherwise. Every post-9/11 group of "terrorists" arrested in the USA for bomb plots has had an FBI informant as the main agitator, planner and source of weapons or equipment. Here in the UK, we have police undercover agents infiltrating green and peace groups - sleeping with and even marrying activists - and they too foment unlawful violence. (It's worth clicking the link for the picture of the protestors in front of Scotland Yard.) At the G20 protests a couple years back, the peaceful crowd started to video an agitator and reported him to organisers and police, only to see him run for police lines and disappear among his colleagues. The agent provocateur has become a mainstream strategy of a political class which views organised, democratic resistance as a threat to entrenched privilege. The unscrupulous politician might even instigate violence to foment fear and justify further statist oppression.

A nation of 50 million Arabs is peacefully demanding democratic reforms and accountability. This is so starkly at odds with the narrative we have been fed by our leaders in the West that we should probably rethink what else they might have got wrong.

Now imagine if such activism spreads to China. I guarantee you that the Chinese elites are imagining it too. In a country where food and fuel take about half the money in the average consumer wallet, the risks of political instability from rising inflation are very real.

The monetary excressences of the central banks to maintain the dividends and bonuses of their corporate cronies are going to spur a political backlash as inflation takes hold. The Chinese elites, just like our own, have gained the disproportionate benefit of monetary laxity through their speculations in real estate and commodities. But now comes the inflationary backlash . . .

The current spike in food prices has exceeded the spike in 2008. Rice is limit up two days in a row. Storms and crop failures are threatening worse to come.

The role of public policy in worsening market failures in energy and food is worthy of deep and searching examination. As Barry Ritholtz points out, oil companies and agribusiness are among the top corporate welfare queens, sucking on the Treasury for subsidies while reporting huge profits largely secured from taxation by sweetheart tax breaks and global avoidance strategies. When real people go hungry, and many are unemployed, the offensiveness of this political and economic injustice becomes too great to stomach.

Egypt used to have a food surplus. Thanks to the miracles of modern agribusiness, population growth, and mismanagement by corrupt politicians, it is now a net importer of food. Food security is going to be a priority for any new leadership in Egypt. A recent UK study of food security makes clear that it is an issue we will all have a stake in resolving.

As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China's elites will be weighing life without easy credit against life with political chaos and hungry protesters. I used to be quite confident that they would crack down on banks and the shadow banks that have grown like fungus in the warm, moist environment of monetary excess. Now I am not so sure. Like their peers in the banks, oil companies and agribusinesses of the West, many Chinese elites cannot imagine a world of financial constraint and fiscal austerity. Despite the risk that they could lose it all to political instability if they delay and inflation takes hold, they appear to be wavering.

Interesting times . . .

What is clear is that our systems for energy and food production and distribution have become so highly concentrated and so easily manipulated by the corporate few that a popular uprising might be the best hope of reform for the hungry many.

Professor Roubini has a piece in the FT today discussing the stagflationary risks of instability.

Writing this, I went back and read "Famine Futures" which I wrote in 2008. That post goes into more detail about how progressively more concentrated ownership of critical energy and food production, alongside free market reforms and financialisation of commodity markets, have led us to where we are.

What I don't know as I watch political change unfold, is where we go from here. I'm still thinking a few chickens in the back yard might be a good investment.

Update: Why US farm policy caused Egypt crisis, by Thomas Kostigen

Quotable

2011-01-18T12:24:00.000Z

"Man is man because he is free to operate within the framework of his destiny. He is free to deliberate, to make decisions, and to choose between alternatives. He is distinguished from animals by his freedom to do evil or to do good and to walk the high road of beauty or tread the low road of ugly degeneracy."

Martin Luther King, Jr., The Measures of Man, 1959.

And this is from my son:

Embracing Accountability - Starting Right Here (Part 1)

2011-01-17T23:34:00.000Z

In common with much of Britain, my plans for the holidays were sacrificed to an untimely 'flu. Nasty. Very nasty. But now I gain strength daily and begin to address the backlog of social obligation - including this blog.

One of my frustrations with the bankers, central bankers, regulators and other worthies is their lack of reflection and shame regarding the errors of their past policies which have led to the crisis and the looting of global treasuries. There is no acceptance of personal or institutional responsibility and no public accountability.

Since it would be hypocritical to exempt myself from review, however modest my contribution as a blogger, I thought it might be good to start the year by reviewing what I wrote in 2008 and seeing how it stands up with today's perspective.

My first contribution to the blogosphere was Looting the Vaults at the Central Banks, published 15 May, 2008.

Any crisis now accelerates the trend toward greater public laxity, private excess and central bank secrecy. A crisis, real or manufactured, is most useful to increase the amount of public money clandestinely extended and diminish public oversight and administrative review of outcomes. This has been the pattern for at least 25 years, and may continue for some time to come before a taxpayer or creditor revolt ends the American spiral downwards towards bankruptcy and corporate tyranny.

It used to be the realm of conspiracy theorists to assert that policy makers in Washington were aligned with the military-intelligence complex in promoting international conflicts for profit or that the Federal Reserve was the tool of Wall Street banks in promoting irresponsible bubbles. Now it is accepted policy, defended openly in the media as right and inevitable, as providing an efficient means for America to meet the “threats” to security and financial stability in a changing world.

The danger of embracing the spin is that the productive economy shrinks from underinvestment and distortions as an increasing share of a slower growing pie gets diverted to government and the cronies who direct government policies.

I think I can safely say that I got that one right. The massive misallocation of public funds from taxpayers (present and future) to bankers in the US, UK and EU needs no further comment. Even in China, more and more credit is being diverted to large, speculative state-owned enterprises as productive, private, smaller companies are starved of credit.

Second up for review, is From Capitalist to Capital-less Economies, published 23 May, 2008:

For a time, the neo-classical economists appeared to have found a financial perpetual motion machine. As consumers, companies and governments borrowed more, they appeared to prosper more. Leveraging the accumulated equity in their homes, the consumers got bigger houses and bigger cars. Leveraging their fixed assets and future revenues, the companies got bigger balance sheets, bigger executive remuneration and bigger shareholder dividends. Leveraging their power of taxation and monetary creation, the governments got bigger militaries, bigger bureaucracies, bigger scope for patronage projects. The bankers intermediating all this debt got bigger too, with bigger bonuses for “loan origination”, bigger fees from M&A, bigger commissions and income from securities and derivatives dealing, and bigger influence with their supervisors to loosen any inconvenient accounting, reporting, audit, scope or expansion rules that might have impaired their freedom to keep the party going.

Free Market became the rallying cry of those who believed in perpetual motion. They passionately decried regulation as impairing the market’s freedom to allocate “capital” to the best likely return. They passionately decried taxes as diminishing the “capital” held by those who would reinvest it in growth. They passionately exhorted consumers, businesses and governments to borrow as much “capital” as they could possibly bear, and to err on the side of profligacy, so that more “capital” would be working to grow their revenues and balance sheets in the “free market”.

But the problem with this perpetual motion machine was that it was all the time grinding the seed corn. The “capital” it was pumping out was not the surplus of production over consumption, but the borrowed surplus of greater fools who believed in the hawkers’ pitch of perpetual motion and laid their meagre savings and accumulated assets on the barrelhead in faith the machine would return them multiplied.

Well, yeah. 'Nuf said. Only now, the government and central banks are forcibly appropriating what meagre assets may remain through public debt service which must be paid by either taxation or inflation. Either way, we are all poorer for the folly of excess leverage. Deflation in what you own; inflation in what you need.

As the third blog entry for back-validation, I offer Famine Futures: Deregulated Markets and Food Insecurity. The willful refusal of the political class to rein in speculation in essential foodstuffs is the more disgusting in many ways than their channeling of weath to banker cronies. Real people are really hungry, and it is going to get much worse.

Like so much that we have observed in the past eight years of the Bush administration, the origins of the current food crisis can be traced to the recycled policies of the Nixon White House. Henry Kissinger stated the premise succinctly in 1970: "Control oil and you control nations; control food and you control the people."

With credit, oil and food markets spiralling out of reach of the poor and straining the middle-class, it is worth exploring whether similar policies underpin similar problems. In each industry, a small handful of global companies control supply and a massive increase in ill-transparent speculation acting on pricing in exchange markets forces prices up regardless of the fundamentals of supply and demand. The risks for famine and political instability are huge. One doesn’t need to be a conspiracy theorist invoking the Trilateral Commission to feel that something is very wrong with policies leading to simultaneous crises in credit, oil and food that threaten not just the wealth but the wellbeing of most of the world’s population. . . .

Today global agriculture is dominated by eight multi-national corporations. The policies promoted by successive governments and international institutions including the IMF, World Bank and WTO have aimed at undermining local production, distributed commercial networks, and diverse local markets in favour of mass production, streamlined supply chains and concentrated global market pricing.

As with other areas of our lives, the policies of “free market fundamentalism”, as George Soros styles it, have not diminished risks but increased them. My children are hostages to food insecurity, as are yours and billions of others. A disruption in global food supplies or surge in prices that puts food staples beyond the reach of many low income or middle-class families cannot be offset from the back garden. The exposure of food to pricing in markets open to manipulation and excess speculation puts the lives of millions at risk.

With commodity prices still spiraling upwards, and riots leading to political instability, I wish I had been wrong.

So this week's back-validation is positive. I wrote well, and I wrote wisely. But nothing changed in 2008 except a few minds that were predisposed to question orthodoxy in any event.

I suspect this is the real reason why I find it hard to raise the pace and passion of 2008 today - although the 'flu was pretty awful. I can write, you can read, but who will change the world?

More on the lunacy of the Basel Accords

2010-12-18T17:51:00.000Z

I was looking at the preferred asset classes under the Basel Accords in my previous post on why central banks are so determined to stave off a government default, and realised that every single asset class that is given less than a 100 percent credit risk weighting is now tainted by widespread default, scandals or bailouts.

The credit risk weightings mean that instead of reserving the standard 8 percent of capital in respect of a debt, the bank can cut that by the weighting applied to the asset class. Effectively, the reduction in credit risk weighting operates as a powerful subsidy to the borrowers and equally powerful incentive to over-leveraging the lenders.

As a baseline, all financial, consumer and corporate debt must be reserved at a credit rating of 100 percent of 8 percent, unless explicitly discounted. A weighting of 50 percent, for example, means that instead of holding $8 reserves on a loan of $100, the bank only needs to hold $4 of reserves. A zero weighting means they lend $100, but hold no reserves at all.

Mortgages get a credit risk weighting of 50 percent, and we all know how well the mortgage market is performing. Mortgages and mortgage backed securities became the largest asset classes globally in a matter of years thanks to the credit weighting subsidy and securitisation. If I recall correctly, our present long crisis started with the collapse of the sub-prime market and now all categories of US mortgages are impaired by the ongoing mess with MERS and fraudulent or missing documentation. Borrowing short to lend long brought down Northern Rock in the UK and many other over-leveraged mortgage banks.

Interbank debt gets a credit risk weighting of 20 percent. We've seen from the collapse of interbank lending that banks do not trust each other. At the same time, inter-bank exposures and credit derivatives mean that financial institutions are massively dependent on each other, such that bailouts are justified as essential to prevent systemic collapse. If Too-Big-To-Fail is predicated on the systemic impact of a bank's failure on other banks, it would seem that the 20 percent inter-bank risk weighting was and is unsound.

Government agency debt gets a risk weighting of 10 percent. Looking at Fannie and Freddie, and the serial scandals and bailouts they have occasioned over the past decade, it is hard to see how such a subsidy can be justified.

Finally, sovereign debt of Zone A states is zero weighted - no reserves required at all. Zone A includes any country in the EEA, full members of the OECD, or states that have concluded special lending arrangements with the IMF except that any state that reschedules its debt is excluded from Zone A status for five years.

So the current financial crisis started with bad mortgage debt, spread to bad bank debt, carried over into bad agency debt, and now encompasses bad sovereign debt. Each of these categories was given preferential capital weighting under the Basel Accords, and now all are open sores on the financial system and the stability of excessively indebted governments.

Not only did the Basel weightings encourage poor risk assessment, they directly contributed to the inadequate capitalisation of banks for the risks they assumed.

And yet, have you heard any regulator take responsibility for regulatory failures yet? I haven't. In fact, I've seen no historic analysis of capital requirements, deregulation of credit markets, securitisation, derivatives, demutualisation, or any of the other regulatory policy innovations which should reasonably be matters for review in assessing the causes of the current crisis.

As the bankers and regulators do not seem keen to be reflective about their own policies and conduct, it's hard to imagine that they can craft constructive reforms to make the system safer or more efficient in future.

I've downloaded the draft Basel Accord III, released this week, for leisure reading. Sadly, I'm trending to the view that all harmonised regulation is likely to end in disaster as it precludes independent judgement and sensible challenge to orthodoxy. Once something has been agreed by a big enough committee, it becomes impossible to question whether it makes sense. Ultimately the unintended consequences of incentives and distortions mean it won't make sense, but by then it's far too late to change course and break from the herd.

Basel Faulty: Sovereign Defaults and Bank Capital*

2010-12-13T13:10:00.000Z

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. - Ralph Waldo Emerson

When historians of the future look objectively at the era preceeding this long financial crisis, they might well conclude that failure of the globalised capital system is traceable to the Basel Accords.** The unreasonable assumptions and myriad distortions introduced in this one-size-fits-all paradigm of bank capital adequacy fatally undermined the practice of independent judgement in assessing credit risk and prudential supervision of banks.

Bankers of the past had to assess the creditworthiness of a debtor or counterparty based on balance sheet, revenue potential and management reputation for competence. They husbanded their scarce capital, aware that each dollar lent remained at risk until repaid, with cash reserves proportional to the bank's assets usually 8 to 10 percent.

A primary fallacy of the Basel Accord is that OECD government debt is risk free and requires no bank reserves. Better yet, the banks can count the government debt they hold as Tier 1 capital, reserving against other debt assets. The Basel Accords assume all OECD government debt is a cash proxy, being liquid in all market conditions.

Walter Wriston's 1970s dictum that "sovereigns can't default" was disproved in the Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s, but somehow the BIS Committee on Bank Supervision still embraced it when applied to OECD state debts.

Roughly, the risk weights of the main asset classes under Basel I were:
- zero for Zone A (EEA and OECD) government debt of all maturities and Zone B (non-OECD) government debt of less than one year;
- 20 percent for Zone A inter-bank obligations and public sector entity debt (e.g. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, et al.);
- 50 percent for fully secured mortgage debt;
- 100 percent for all corporate debt.

The post-Basel bank supervisors applied their prudential supervision models unthinkingly, to rubberstamp the bankers' leveraging of their balance sheets toward ever greater excess. No one bothered to ask whether Basel Accord assumptions made sense. They were the harmonised norm for prudential supervision and too deeply embedded in the fabric of international finance to adjust, except to allow more and greater leverage in Basel II through liberal recognition of derivatives. Basel II allowed the banks to offset even more risk exposure with even less capital through collateral, securitisation, credit default swaps, and recognition of the validity of internal asset valuation models.

Global harmonisation of prudential supervision around the Basel Accord meant that the hobgoblin of excess leverage became systemically entrenched in all markets, in all nations. The foolish consistency of harmonised capital adequacy was adored by little minds of global bankers and central bankers worldwide.

The zero weight for OECD government debt must have appeared a harmless subsidy to OECD governments in 1988, promoting liquid government debt markets and enhancing the competitive positioning of OECD-based global banks who stood to gain most from the harmonisation of global bank regulation and capital rules.

Leveraging their balance sheets to work every dollar of capital harder became the obsessive preoccupation of two generations of bank executives once the Basel Accords were adopted. Risk management departments were less about controlling exposure to adverse credit events than about identifying deal structures which would minimise the amount of regulatory capital allocated to any exposure.

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and their ilk were an early mechanism to reduce the reserves required from 50 percent on an individual mortgage to twenty percent or even zero, allowing the banks to write more and more mortgages with less and less capital. When these entities proved inadequate in the go-go 1990s, asset back securities allowed banks to get sub-prime mortgages - and thereby the capital requirement - off their books entirely, passing the risks to yield-hungry investors. With Basel II they could reduce capital even further by writing each other a daisy chain of credit default swaps for all categories of exposure. Who could have known that it would end badly?

OECD government debt is zero risk weighted and accounts for a disproportionate bulk of Tier 1 capital of major banks. A default by any EEA or OECD government will force banks and central banks to recognise that government debt has inherent risk like all other debt. This would force recognition of a positive risk weighting, and bring into question the assumption that government debt can be counted as a cash-proxy in Tier 1 reserves. The illiquidity of impaired or defaulted government debt would undermine its role as a Tier 1 reserve asset in bank capital models.

At this writing the OECD governments at risk of default are Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, with other states queuing up in the wings. Already the ECB is the only buyer in the market for much of the impaired government debt.

If any OECD state were to default there would be very serious implications:
- The Basel Accord zero risk weight of government debt would be proved fanciful;
- The assumption of government debt as a liquid asset suitable for bank Tier 1 reserves to meet unanticipated and sudden cash demands will become unsustainable;
- Banks would be forced to recapitalise at much higher levels, forcing even sharper deleveraging and contraction of lending;
- Governments would lose the captive, uncritical investor base they have relied on to finance excess public expenditure for the past 30 years;
- Central banks could be forced to suddenly monetise even more government debt if required to meet the cash demands of a run on their undercapitalised banks.

Looked at this way, you should be able to understand why the ECB keeps repeating that there can be no Eurozone sovereign default, and why the UK and US are staunchly behind them in preserving the illusion of state solvency for all Eurozone states.

It will likely prove impossible to reform the bankers and central bankers dependent on the Basel Accords for their business models and careers. Harmonisation of global standards was supposed to make the world safer. A foolish consistency on bad policy and bad practice led instead to a world on the edge of financial implosion.

This hobgoblin haunts us all.
______________________________

* Hat tip to Tracy Alloway at FTAlphaville for suggesting a revision to the title for this post.
** Several commenters questioned my spelling of Basle Accords in the original post. I prefer the British/French Basle which was standard in my youth on Basle Accord documents, to the German/American Basel more common and current today. Nonetheless, I yield to the customs and usage current today in changing the spelling to Basel.

The Return of London Banker?

2010-12-09T12:39:00.000Z

I am back in the City that I love, at my pleasantly cluttered desk, after an adventure of nearly two years. I hope I did some good.

Looking back at what I published here and on Roubini.com in 2007 and 2008, I am proud of the passion and fluency I wrote with as we shared the experience of the financial crisis in its early stages. Some things I got right, some I got wrong, but that is to be expected when observing events honestly and with imperfect information as they unfold. I have not written with such passion since. I am not sure how or whether to start again.

Does anyone remember that I used to write? Does anyone care if I write again?

Let me know in the comments below.

Repost from 06/06/08: Reagan and Obama - Reforming the Welfare State

2008-12-23T17:37:00.000Z

In Britain a national election lasts just three weeks and spending by each candidate is strictly capped. Campaigning between elections is not permitted. Accepting so much as a hotel stay from a lobbyist is a resigning offence. As a result, our news is full of the American campaigns to make up for the deficit in newsworthy political conflict locally. I follow the American election, as does most of the world given the potential for good and ill that proceeds from it. Please indulge me in ruminating on one aspect of the Obama candidacy that intrigues me.

Ronald Reagan came to power on a popular backlash against the welfare state. It appears that Barack Obama may come to power on a similar backlash against the welfare state. The difference is the identity of the welfare claimants.

Ronald Reagan inflamed the public’s righteous anger against a stereotyped ghetto “welfare queen” who raised a brood of illegitimate, proto-criminal children on public funds. Barack Obama will inflame the public’s righteous anger against the corporate welfare queens who have raised a brood of profiteering executives and lobbyists in the generation since. Under Reagan and succeeding presidents, including Clinton, the K Street lobbying machine transformed Washington DC into a government by the lobbyists, of the lobbyists and for the lobbyists. Subsidies, market distortions, tax breaks, earmarks, selective protectionism, regulatory forbearance, cost-plus government contracts, relaxed accounting oversight, criminal and civil immunity, war profiteering and other policy depredations promoted a corporate welfare state beyond the dreams of ghetto avarice.

Ronald Reagan partisans demonised citizens who paid no taxes but claimed public housing, medical care and food stamps as their right. Barack Obama appears prepared to challenge corporations who pay no or nominal taxes (worth clicking through just for the graph) but claim government subsidies, earmarks and tax breaks as their right. Corporations have further stripped the US tax base by outsourcing or relocating jobs abroad, leveraged speculation rather than productive capital investment, and transfer pricing to avoid US tax. If Obama does parallel Reagan, both campaigns will tap a deep well of public anger against the perceived injustice of those who degrade the nation’s future prosperity while claiming too much from its taxpayers.

The bankers of Wall Street now toasting the Fed’s recent largesse from their Hamptons beach houses and yachts are the latest in a long line of American corporate welfare queens who have lobbied for and secured generous federal contracts, subsidies and regulatory forbearance. As noted two weeks ago in Looting the Vaults, more has now been lent to banks by the Fed under opaque new facilities than has been appropriated for the war in Iraq. Both the Fed’s new facilities and the war appropriations arguably benefit corporate welfare queens rather than serve the public interest.

The contrast between McCain and Obama on lobbyists alone is striking. Obama has banned contributions from lobbyists to his presidential campaign, even returning $500 donated by Thurgood Marshall, Jr. Instead, Obama has built a novel fundraising machine that reaches out to millions of working class Americans. McCain’s campaign relies almost entirely on wealthy contributors and lobbyists for finance. He has recently suffered a series of staff purges as high-ranking campaign officials - all of them lobbyists - were linked to large corporations and dictatorial regimes. Obama has committed to opening his fundraising events to the press pool. McCain insists on holding his fundraisers behind closed doors, no press allowed.

Obama as the presumptive Democratic nominee and party leader is preparing to drive the contrast home. Yesterday Obama enforced his opposition to special interest money on the wider party. Obama announced that from now on the Democratic National Committee will return cheques from lobbyists and political action committees, mirroring the Obama presidential campaign. This is a significant initiative in positioning the Democrats as the party to reclaim government from the corporate welfare queens.

The media pundits will use the reliable rhetoric of identity politics, religious strife, class war, patriotism and national security, but they are merely masking the fundamental policy conflict that divides the presidential candidates: Should government serve the people or the corporate elite? When Obama invokes Reagan, as he does very effectively in his elegantly crafted speeches, he is tapping the same vein of public outrage against a government promoting the comfort of those who contribute too little to the nation’s wellbeing.

A recession would clarify the public policy choices. When the economic pie is shrinking, fairness becomes a surer focus. The eyes of the hungry are watchful as the slices served get smaller.

Can Obama successfully challenge the K Street machine? He encourages us to hope, but we should be realistic. The K Street machine will not sit idly by as their unfettered control of the corporate welfare state is threatened by the upstart junior senator from Illinois who would not “wait his turn”.

Ghetto welfare queens were powerless to forestall the legislative and regulatory reforms that cut their subsidies. Corporate welfare queens are very far from powerless. We see new evidence of their power to claim public funds and direct public policy every day as the credit crisis closes off private finance options and squeezes profits. Whether the American public can elect enough reform-minded representatives to successfully challenge the corporate welfare queens may be the political test of this generation and may well determine whether the American economy recovers its powerhouse status.

Also on Thursday, Obama introduced legislation on the floor of the Senate to expose the corporate welfare queens hiding in the federal budget: The Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in Federal Spending Act of 2008 (pdf).

Is JP Morgan a welfare queen for the Fed subsidised Bear Stearns buy-out? Discuss.

Next week I promise to stick to economic and regulatory policy.

__________________________

Post Script on 22/12/08: JPM's paltry $37 billion subsidy from the Fed back in the Spring seems like chicken feed compared to the over $5 trillion the corporate welfare queens have looted from the Fed and Treasury since then. Worse, I am now sceptical that Obama will be any different to Bush in terms of restraining taxpayer largesse to corporate elites. He seems to endorse every bailout and stimulus, regardless of merit. We shall just have to wait and see what happens, but so far Obama is looking only marginally more fiscally sound than Bush.

Robert Paterson's Boyd 2008 Summary - Hope!

2008-12-22T06:05:00.000Z

From Robert Paterson's blog on Boyd 2008:

* The goal for us all to work to is clear - that we have to build back into the system Resiliency. This means that each region has to work to become largely energy, food and financially self sustaining and that each region needs to network into the others. In effect we shift from an efficient machine to a resilient network

* That the leadership model is no longer the dominant hero but the ego-less servant

* That we cannot wait to be saved. We have to all do our part to make our place "Home"

Many are desperate that somehow President Obama save us and importantly turn the clock back. Take us back to consumer heaven of 2006. Even if he could, would this be the right thing to do? To take us back to a world that is a fantasy?

What got us to this place?

The Dark Side of a Mindset. The Machine/Institutional/Newtonian/Engineering Mindset that created most of the wealth of the 19th and 20th century tipped over into the dark side. Where not only did we give up all our power to institutions but gave the few that ran them the license to use these institutions for their own benefit.

So we spend nearly a trillion on defense but not on what the troops really need. We spend billions of health and America is on a par with Cuba. We spend billions on education and more than 50% of Americans are functionally illiterate. We spend billions on food and we eat crap. We see that the leadership of these institutions live in a bubble. The gap between the rich and poor has never been greater. The middle class is being squeezed. We don't make anything anymore. We make no progress toward energy independence.

Re-Post from 30/05/08: Famine Futures: Deregulated Markets and Food Insecurity

2008-12-17T14:56:00.000Z

Originally published at RGE Monitor on 30 May 2008.

In a week when Hormel celebrates another surge in Spam sales, my preferred indicator of US food insecurity, it is appropriate to raise the market and regulatory failures that are driving global food insecurity.

Like so much that we have observed in the past eight years of the Bush administration, the origins of the current food crisis can be traced to the recycled policies of the Nixon White House. Henry Kissinger stated the premise succinctly in 1970: "Control oil and you control nations; control food and you control the people."

With credit, oil and food markets spiralling out of reach of the poor and straining the middle-class, it is worth exploring whether similar policies underpin similar problems. In each industry, a small handful of global companies control supply and a massive increase in ill-transparent speculation acting on pricing in exchange markets forces prices up regardless of the fundamentals of supply and demand. The risks for famine and political instability are huge. One doesn’t need to be a conspiracy theorist invoking the Trilateral Commission to feel that something is very wrong with policies leading to simultaneous crises in credit, oil and food that threaten not just the wealth but the wellbeing of most of the world’s population.

Two or three generations ago, most of us would have been directly involved in food production as a hedge against food insecurity. My parents’ generation kept a garden in the back yard, putting to me to work each summer to raise corn, tomatoes, cucumbers and other fresh foods for the table, sending me to pick berries and fruits in season from our own and the neighbours’ bushes and trees. My grandparents’ generation kept chickens as well as a garden behind their house in the middle of a large industrial city. The garden and chickens helped my mother survive the Great Depression at a time when my father suffered stunted growth from rickets. My great-grandparents’ generation were almost entirely farmers working the land.

Today global agriculture is dominated by eight multi-national corporations. The policies promoted by successive governments and international institutions including the IMF, World Bank and WTO have aimed at undermining local production, distributed commercial networks, and diverse local markets in favour of mass production, streamlined supply chains and concentrated global market pricing.

As with other areas of our lives, the policies of “free market fundamentalism”, as George Soros styles it, have not diminished risks but increased them. My children are hostages to food insecurity, as are yours and billions of others. A disruption in global food supplies or surge in prices that puts food staples beyond the reach of many low income or middle-class families cannot be offset from the back garden. The exposure of food to pricing in markets open to manipulation and excess speculation puts the lives of millions at risk.

Mack Frankfurter at Seeking Alpha has written a compelling review of how we got where we are.

The Commodity Conundrum: Securitization and Systemic Concerns (Part I)

The Commodity Conundrum: Securitization and Systemic Concerns (Part II)

The Commodity Conundrum: Securitization and Systemic Concerns (Part III)

Mr Frankfurter reviews the history of “securitized commodity products” and the development of commodities as speculative investments, distinct from their role in production and consumption within the economy. He suggests that something “systemic and possibly more insidious” has altered the benign role of speculators as providers of market liquidity and ties this change to the ill transparency of OTC derivatives arising from The Enron Loophole. I recommend reading the whole series.

We begin to see a pattern emerging. Free market policies and liberalised regulatory regimes promoted rapid concentration of a sector into a global oligopoly which could control supply. Free market doctrines and trade liberalisation enabled predatory targeting of markets to undercut domestic production and smaller producers, reinforcing the concentration of the market and the pricing control of the oligarchs. Free market ideologies and innovative financial derivatives promoted domination of market pricing mechanisms by speculative investors able to accelerate steep price gains regardless of supply and demand fundamentals.

Whether it is credit, oil or food, we are all going to suffer from bad policies which promoted free markets as risk reducing rather than risk enhancing. In the US and the UK we may hope that our food insecurity does not worsen to the point of riots, looting, political instability and the starvation of children, but many parts of the world will not be so fortunate. If there is a backlash against free trade, against free market doctrines, against the domination of big banks, big oil and big food, perhaps it will not be unenlightened but enlightened. Perhaps it is overdue.

We can live without credit. We can live without oil. We cannot live without food.

Credit and oil prices are also feeding the food price bubble. The Kansas City Fed highlighted risks confronting the agricutural sector from higher credit costs for infrastructure, fuel and margin calls on hedged exposures in its report Survey of Tenth District Agricultural Credit Conditions.

The role of market mechanisms and deregulation in fuelling the commodity price rises is coming under increasing scrutiny as the markets themselves now fail to meet their basic function of matching buyers and sellers of commodities.

Bloomberg News:

The divergence between CBOT futures and the underlying commodity is so great that some grain merchants have stopped bidding for new crops, said Niemeyer, a member of the National Corn Growers Association board. Others won't guarantee a price for more than 60 days. ''We have a fundamental problem with the markets,'' said Kevin McNew, president of researcher Cash Grain Bids Inc. in Bozeman, Mont., and a former Montana State University economist. ''It is very difficult to operate a grain business when the cash prices are below the futures'' by such a wide margin, he said. The price gap should converge when futures contracts expire and deliveries are settled. Instead, the average premium for CBOT wheat has quadrupled in two years to 40 cents a bushel, compared with 10 cents the prior five years, McNew said. For James McReynolds, who farms 2,000 acres of wheat outside Woodston, Kan., futures aren't worth the risk. ''The differential of what the market should be and what you can actually sell is so far out of line that you aren't willing to do it,'' McReynolds said. ''This is a tough situation. Agriculture is not as healthy as we'd like to think it is.''

One of the drivers of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 was a desire to have regulators responsible for ensuring that commodity markets serve the legitimate hedging needs of producers and consumers in the economy and not merely speculators. The Enron Loophole devastated regulation of commodity markets. Once again, legislators and regulators have failed to protect the public by discharging their mandate in favour of protecting the speculators who bid higher for influence.

Re-Post from 15/05/08: Looting the Vaults of the Central Banks

2008-12-15T07:01:00.000Z

Originally published on RGE Monitor.

When I was a young central banker, we often spent our lunchtimes debating how best to rob our employer. Tempted by the thought of great mounds of gold ingots far beneath us in the third sub-basement, nestling deep in bedrock, we would speculate on the viability of various plans for plundering our nation’s store of wealth. The presence of sufficient security forces to defend a medium size city and enough steel around the vault for a battle cruiser only spurred our youthful imaginations. After some months of fantasy gold robbery, I began to assert to my colleagues that stealing the gold would be foolish as it would be impossible to get away with enough gold in city traffic to make the attempt worthwhile, and selling it in any sizeable amount would lead to instant detection. I argued instead in favour of stealing the wheelie bins of cash conveniently lining the hallway to the loading ramp. Cash would be faster and easier to steal and more liquid to spend than gold.

I see now that I was a central banker of very little brain – and lacking ambition. The way to rob a central bank efficiently is to be a bank executive so skilled in financial engineering that I take my bank to the edge of extinction. I can then swap all my unpriceable, illiquid, engineered credit instruments for good central bank cash and Treasuries. That’s larceny without risk, making the central bank a complicit partner in the looting of its vaults, and earning gratitude and bonuses instead of audits and indictments.

Since the credit crisis was first diagnosed last fall, the Federal Reserve has advanced more cash and Treasuries than the entire five year cost of the Iraq war – over $400 billion. It has plundered more than half its holdings of US Treasuries, taking impaired asset-backed securities collateral in their place. It has overseen the devaluation of the dollar to third world levels of instability and inflation. And all of this debasement has as its objective the re-financing of those bank and shadow-bank executives who have so looted their own institutions that they hold the global financial system hostage to their incompetence, malpractice and greed. Without consultation or review, the Federal Reserve was able to chuck out decades of transparency and accountability in favour of secret facilities, secret loans favouring secret beneficiaries of secret largesse.

The Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Treasury Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) are all ill-transparent conduits funnelling central bank cash to bankers in the private sector free of oversight, audit or scrutiny. The recent liberalisation of collateral by the Fed means that it is now officially the market maker of last resort for securities which are unmarketable in the private sector.

And the creepy thing is that most of the establishment thinks the Fed is doing a great job. Because there will never be an independent investigation or audit, we will never know whether they are policy geniuses or criminally complicit accomplices. Perhaps it makes no real difference to either motivation or outcome.

Now the Fed wants powers to enable it to create even more credit to finance failure. It is said to be seeking Congressional authority to pay interest on bank reserves (via Forbes with a hat tip to Steve Waldman). While this might sound benign, especially in a modern era when American banks hold no non-borrowed reserves, the expanded powers are potentially very dangerous. Paying interest on reserves would permit the central bank to extend hundreds of billions more in TAF, PDCF and TSLF credit without the inconvenience of having to sterilise the monetary expansion through further sales of its increasingly meagre inventory of Treasuries.

Spies and weapons, whether real or imaginary, are asserted by the military-intelligence complex as justifying more spies and weapons. If no attack occurs it is because they are so efficient at protecting us and pre-empting many unpublished threats. If an attack occurs, it was because they were under-funded or over-constrained. In the same way, financial excess and bad credit have been used by the banking system to justify more financial excess and bad credit in a self-reinforcing loop of financial and supervisory indulgence and forbearance. If no crisis occurs, it is because there is a new paradigm and risk management models are more reliable. If a crisis occurs, it is because banks lacked access to adequate liquidity and were over-regulated. For too long the cycle has reinforced monetary laxity, permissive deregulation and regulatory forbearance on accounting and capital adequacy, with all accountability and market discipline excused by the need to forestall contagion and systemic failure.

Any crisis now accelerates the trend toward greater public laxity, private excess and central bank secrecy. A crisis, real or manufactured, is most useful to increase the amount of public money clandestinely extended and diminish public oversight and administrative review of outcomes. This has been the pattern for at least 25 years, and may continue for some time to come before a taxpayer or creditor revolt ends the American spiral downwards towards bankruptcy and corporate tyranny.

It used to be the realm of conspiracy theorists to assert that policy makers in Washington were aligned with the military-intelligence complex in promoting international conflicts for profit or that the Federal Reserve was the tool of Wall Street banks in promoting irresponsible bubbles. Now it is accepted policy, defended openly in the media as right and inevitable, as providing an efficient means for America to meet the “threats” to security and financial stability in a changing world.

The danger of embracing the spin is that the productive economy shrinks from underinvestment and distortions as an increasing share of a slower growing pie gets diverted to government and the cronies who direct government policies.

The thrift failures in the 1980s were followed by financial deregulation and increased mortgage subsidies, enabling the massive misallocation of credit and leveraging of balance sheets on an even greater scale. Further deregulation, forbearance, subsidies and bailouts can only lead to more frightening misallocation of scarce capital in zero-savings America and more fragile over-leveraged banks, but now presenting a danger of contagion to the rest of the world. It is the savings of the world’s productive economies funding American misallocation and excess, and the world’s poor that suffer the contagion of inflation from a devalued dollar.

Already the ECB and Bank of England have followed the Fed in extending good central bank funds against questionable collateral under rapidly liberalising lending facilities. While they appear slightly more resolute on prudential supervision and inflation-fighting, they are nonetheless compromised and constrained by the policies and practices of bankers and central bankers across the Atlantic. As American banks receive forbearance and largesse, the European banks shout, “Me too!”

Globalisation of banking and regulatory “best practice” was once seen as raising standards, but may be at risk now of lowering them. Just as Japanese zero-interest rate policy flooded the world with cheap liquidity from the carry trade, fuelling speculative bubbles and providing cover for low rates elsewhere, Federal Reserve forbearance and credit accommodation may flood the world with warped management incentives and credit distortions which pervert the banking sector and financial markets, undermining rationales for savings and productive investment.

Without transparency of central bank facilities and policies, there can be no accountability for misuse of public resources and abuse of the public trust. Transparency provides an essential check on bank mismanagement, even for central bankers.

When Bloomberg revealed this week that Ben Bernanke lunched with [JPM's Matt] Dimon at the New York Fed on March 11 with key Wall Street bankers just three days before the emergency $14 billion financing for Bear Stearns and five days before the sweetheart $30 billion financing of JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear (again, the acquired assets the Fed received for the cash are secret), it made me very uneasy. Suspicious minds might think the public interest and integrity of market mechanisms, including the corrective of the occasional failure, weren't foremost in their discussions.

Whether cock-up or conspiracy, recent reforms set the scene for looting of the central banks on a scale never imagined by my younger self.

_______________________________

As some regulars to Professor Roubini’s blog will know already, I am a mere commenter on the blog who has been elevated to posting by invitation of the Professor. Having seen the list of new posters who will be joining us here, I can assure you that I am deeply honoured to be among them.

London Banker will continue to post anonymously. It permits me to be more forthright than I could be otherwise.

Despite being a poster, my commitment to this site is as a commenter, and I hope to see many comments from my blog buddies below so that we can continue the dialogue I have enjoyed on this site for so long.

Being new at this, I will also welcome ideas and guidance at londonbanker ( at ) btinternet.com.

Re-Post from 23/05/08: Capital-ist Economies to Capital-less Economies

2008-12-14T12:05:00.000Z

I'm going to cross-post early RGE posts that weren't published here over the coming week so I'll have all my writing up here somewhere for the record.

It's an interesting exercise in reviewing my perceptions from earlier in the year for me, and I hope for you too.

__________________________________

Originally posted on RGE Monitor.

A farmer who eats the seed corn over the winter must borrow to plant in the spring. He must repay the loan from the harvest, leaving him with even less to live on come the following winter if the crop does not yield a greater harvest. The misfortune of one bad harvest can start a cycle of decline that leads to permanent penury. Sharecropper plantation owners have exploited and impoverished sharecropper farmers on this principle for centuries.

Is it different for nations?

"It is the aim of good government to stimulate production, of bad government to encourage consumption." - Jean Baptiste Say

In the classical conception of economics, capital is the surplus of production over consumption. Only by consuming less than is produced can a person, or a company, or a nation accumulate capital for reinvestment, growth and continued prosperity. Capital cannot be borrowed, because borrowing implies repayment from the proceeds of the endeavour at a rate which – on the whole – precludes accumulated surplus.

A gambler might get lucky and make enough to both repay the debt and hold a surplus over his consumption, but gambling erodes investment discipline and prudence, and so over time proves a poor basis for economic management in the home, the boardroom or the Treasury.

A thief or con-artist might steal or defraud enough to repay the debt and hold a surplus over his consumption, but theft and fraud erode commerical confidence and invite retribution, and so over time prove a poor basis for economic management in the home, the boardroom or the Treasury.

A defaulter can simply refuse to repay the debt, and keep any surplus for himself, but defaulting erodes investors’ confidence and leads to bankruptcy, and so over time proves a poor basis for economic management of the home, the boardroom or the Treasury.

Borrowing implies risk, for both the lender and the borrower.

Somehow neo-classical economics was able to finesse this principle to convince a generation of consumers, bankers, regulators, legislators and investors that debt should be considered capital too, and that more debt than savings could be good for economic growth and prosperity.

For a time, the neo-classical economists appeared to have found a financial perpetual motion machine. As consumers, companies and governments borrowed more, they appeared to prosper more. Leveraging the accumulated equity in their homes, the consumers got bigger houses and bigger cars. Leveraging their fixed assets and future revenues, the companies got bigger balance sheets, bigger executive remuneration and bigger shareholder dividends. Leveraging their power of taxation and monetary creation, the governments got bigger militaries, bigger bureaucracies, bigger scope for patronage projects. The bankers intermediating all this debt got bigger too, with bigger bonuses for “loan origination”, bigger fees from M&A, bigger commissions and income from securities and derivatives dealing, and bigger influence with their supervisors to loosen any inconvenient accounting, reporting, audit, scope or expansion rules that might have impaired their freedom to keep the party going.

Free Market became the rallying cry of those who believed in perpetual motion. They passionately decried regulation as impairing the market’s freedom to allocate “capital” to the best likely return. They passionately decried taxes as diminishing the “capital” held by those who would reinvest it in growth. They passionately exhorted consumers, businesses and governments to borrow as much “capital” as they could possibly bear, and to err on the side of profligacy, so that more “capital” would be working to grow their revenues and balance sheets in the “free market”.

But the problem with this perpetual motion machine was that it was all the time grinding the seed corn. The “capital” it was pumping out was not the surplus of production over consumption, but the borrowed surplus of greater fools who believed in the hawkers’ pitch of perpetual motion and laid their meagre savings and accumulated assets on the barrelhead in faith the machine would return them multiplied.

The reality of the American, UK and other heavily leveraged economies is that we have eaten our seed corn and eaten the seed corn of those who have financed our profligacy. Over the past twenty-five years there has been a quiet conspiracy among those bankers profiting from the process to promote gambling, stealing, fraud and default as solutions to disguise the implications of a failure of perpetual motion.

Financial markets have morphed over this time from mechanisms for efficient allocation of scarce investment capital to promote greater production through rewarding foresight and diligence into casinos that reward those with a system that beats the unwary and beats the house. Leverage has been used to overcome bad judgement, rewarding those willing to risk more at the expense of the prudent. Modern markets have arguably never been less transparent, with fragmentation, off-exchange dealing, derivatives, structured finance, hedge funds and other ill-transparent innovations making it all but impossible for the average Joe Investor to assess activity and prospects with any confidence.

Companies were urged to borrow for sprees of mergers and acquisitions, and then either declare bankruptcy to shed their inconvenient pension liabilities or move production offshore to reduce expenditure on labour or both, emerging from these contortions as desirable prospects for more mergers and acquisitions. Any setback resulted in the generous retirement of one incompetent executive and the more generous appointment of another that would borrow the company into future prosperity.

Consumers and consumer finance companies were urged alike to feed the machine by overstating house values, overstating incomes, understating debts, juggling credit cards, and continually recycling any proceeds from the mania’s inflation of asset prices back into more accumulated debt through regular refinancing. Workers were forced to give any surplus savings from labour to the machine as mandatory pension contributions or cajoled into it through tax breaks on 401Ks and other ruses funnelling seed corn to the machine.

Governments were urged to finance wars, social welfare spending, police state intelligence technologies, infrastructure and excess, defaulting through loose monetary policy, defrauding through massaged official statistics, and deregulating the financial sector and capital markets when credit constraint threatened to stem the tide. A government that got into trouble was urged to "privatise" by leveraging or selling government assets, the seed corn of past accumulations, or to put services out to tender in the private sector so that they could pay more to receive less through the miraculous efficiencies of free market fulfillment of social needs. Any difficulty or disruption was overcome with tax breaks, subsidies and public underwriting of yet more debt creation - with mortgage interest deductions, corporate debt interest deductions, FNMA, FHLC and other ploys all feeding more seed corn to the machine.

All of this will someday unwind. It may be this year. It may be next year. It may be several years hence if central bankers can scrape together more seed corn from ever greater fools to keep the perpetual motion machine turning over. At some point, indebted societies must revert to the discipline of consuming less than they produce to repay their debts, or these societies will suffer the even worse consequences of the social dislocation and commercial disruption that follows gambling, theft, fraud and default.

Globalisation has allowed the bankers to hawk their perpetual motion wares to a wider pool of greater fools. This is a dangerous policy. Warren Buffett has long warned that as long as the US has major foreign trade deficits, it has to "give away a little part of the country" each year. He warned America was becoming a "sharecropper economy," where Americans largely work for foreign-owned firms – or governments. The profusion of sovereign wealth funds represents the rational diversification of states with surplus production over consumption – capital – to preserve that wealth through equity investment that unlike debt will be secure from the debtor’s attempt to inflate away his obligation through the expedient of monetary laxity. Owning equity means a permanent claim on American production. Like the sharecropper, foreign equity ownership implies permanent want and decline to penury for the borrower nation.

Worryingly, globalisation has increased the likelihood that debt will lead to political instability and international conflict. The wars for resource, long a “Great Game” but now increasingly a violent and expensive gamble, are only one outcome. Food riots and inflation encourage governments to resort to intervention and oppression. Internal economic decline and dissent reinforces calls to patriotism, theocracy and militarism over reason. Lately I find myself wondering if the “beggar thy neighbour” policies of the 1930s weren’t a result of a similar dynamic, following, as they did, a similar era of massively irresponsible bank-fuelled credit growth and deflation.

When I was young and in debt, an old mentor of mine enjoined me to pay off my loans and my credit cards and to never again “borrow for consumption”. Investment that would confidently yield a good return, such as buying an education in a profession or purchasing a home for the long term, could be financed, but a new TV or a holiday must always be earned and paid for from present income.

Strange to say, but his advice shocked me. I had grown up with debt. My parents were always in debt. My earliest memory of economics is my father explaining to me that he loved inflation because his salary would get bigger and his debts would get smaller.

Nonetheless, I took my mentor’s advice and have lived within my income, whether large or modest, ever since. Perhaps I have missed out on having a grander house, or a flashier car, or the trendiest gadgets, but I have slept remarkably well for over twenty years and feel confident of withstanding the challenges and profiting from the opportunities that the future may bring.

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Hat tip to Capone (the blogger formerly known as JMa) for suggesting the title in his comment on Professor Roubini's blog on2008-05-13 14:39:49.

I've been given a regular Friday slot here on Finance & Markets Monitor. This allows us to carry on the chitter chatter over the weekend when the Professor's blog is quiet for the most part. There may be some weeks when I don't post, but the team at RGE now has enough depth that there will always be something worth reading here.

Deflation has become inevitable

2008-12-12T11:56:00.000Z

For a while now I have been on the fence on the inflation/deflation issue – whether the massive monetisation of bad debts by central banks and governments will lead to rapidly escalating inflation as currencies are debased or, alternatively, lead to deflation as bad debts and illiquidity undermine all commercial and financial activity in the economy. I’m now coming down on the side of deflation for a very simple reason: there is no longer any incentive to save or invest, and so debt and investment cannot increase much beyond current bloated levels.

In Lombard Street, Bagehot’s seminal tome on fractional reserve central banking, Bagehot advises any central bank facing a simultaneous credit crisis and currency crisis to raise interest rates. By raising rates they will ensure that foreign creditors remain incentivised to maintain the general level of credit available while the central bank resolves the local liquidity crisis through liquidation of failed banks and temporary liquidity support of stressed banks.

The very opposite policies have been pursued by central banks in the US, Europe and UK since the beginning of the sub-prime crisis in August 2007. They have cut policy rates drastically, and as the crisis escalated and spread, the yield on government debt has dropped to negative territory. Meanwhile they have shielded those responsible for the creation of record levels of bad debt from any regulatory accountability, relaxed transparency of accounts, and provided massive taxpayer-funded financial infusions to prevent failure and liquidation.

While in the short term these policies have expediency and the maintenance of market “confidence” on their side, in the longer term these policies must undermine any confidence a rational and objective saver or investor might have that savings or investment in the US, EU or UK will be fairly remunerated at an above-inflation rate, or that savings and investments will be protected by effective oversight and regulation from the sorts of executive debasement and outright misappropriation and fraud that are beginning to colour our perceptions of the past decade.

Anyone sitting on a pile of cash now is unlikely to want to either (a) place it in a bank, or (b) invest it in the stock market. As a result, the implosion of the financial and real economy must continue no matter how big the central bank’s aspirations for its balance sheet or the treasury’s aspirations for its deficit.

If US, EU and UK had substantial domestic savings to fund their banks (as in Japan in 1990), then perhaps the consequences would not be so imminently disastrous. Lacking sufficient domestic savings, however, their actions will likely make foreign creditors in Japan, China, the Gulf and elsewhere question whether it is worthwhile to keep pumping scarce savings into such flawed and reckless economies.

During the reckless boom years, savings collapsed in bubble economies as retail and commercial and financial actors alike chased speculative yields with greater and greater leverage. During the reckless bust years, savings will collapse further as retail and commercial and financial actors chase safety by hoarding their meagre remaining assets from further erosion by refusing to lend at negative returns and refusing to finance failed corporate and investment models that only enrich poltically-connected management and intermediaries.

The determination to avoid any accountability for failed banks, failed business models, failed regulatory systems and failed academic rationales for all the above invites anyone with spare cash – an increasingly select crowd – to withhold it from further depredations. It is this instinct, more than confidence in the government, which is driving so many to seek the temporary safety of short-dated government securities.

The result of discouraging domestic and foreign creditors and investors must be inevitable deflation as debt levels become increasingly hard to finance and ultimately contract. Irresponsible central banks and governments can try to bail out the failed banks, businesses and municipalities at the centre of every popped bubble, but the bubble economies are ever more certain to deflate with each bailout. Each bailout further undermines the market discipline which is bedrock to a saver or investor’s decision to part with hard-earned cash by trusting it to the intermediation of the management of a bank or business.

It’s this simple: I won’t invest in a country that bails out failure and punishes savers. I won’t invest in the US or UK until they change course and protect savers and investors, ensuring a reasonably predictable positive return. In the EU, I will be very selective, preferring those conservative states like Germany that never embraced the worst excesses, although sadly still have fall out from individual banks' stupidity in buying into foreign excess. I will know when it is safe to reinvest when policy interest rates, bank/intermediary oversight and accounting standards give me confidence I am better protected than the corporate or financial elite.

While it may take the Asian and the Gulf State investors longer to embrace my analysis, I have no doubt that they too will eventually conclude that parting with their savings under the terms now on offer will only deepen their losses. They would be better off keeping the money at home, investing locally under local laws and vigilance, and letting the US and UK implode.

The argument against this has always been that with trillions already invested in the US during the deficit years, the Chinese and Gulf States would suffer even more horrible losses from a collapse of the western economies. This is accurate, but not complete, as it ignores the relative value of cash investment at the top and bottom of a bursting bubble. Once the collapse has bottomed out, so long as a globalised economy survives, there will be even better opportunities for those with savings to invest selectively in businesses with clearer prospects and more certain profitability under regulatory frameworks which have been restored to a proper balance of investor protection and intermediary oversight.

Right now survival of businesses in the West depends largely on political pull and access to regulatory forbearance and central bank or treasury finance. The market has failed, and officialdom is collaborating in perpetuating that failure.

Should the western economies implode in deflation, however, there will be new opportunities to return to market-based policies that reward effective, efficient management and punish corrupt, debased management. Until that happens, those that invest will continue to lose money. Once deflation is exhausted, then those that invest can expect to make and retain profits again.

I think it took me so long to feel confident about predicting deflation because the floating currency system under dollar hegemony and Bretton Woods II distorts the workings of both inflation and deflation. Despite the US being the epicentre of all the failed debts, failed securitisations, failed credit derivatives, failed rating agencies, failed banking businesses, failed corporate governance, failed accounting standards, failed capital adequacy models, and failed regulatory forbearance, the US dollar has recently strengthened as deflation globalised. The US exported inflation in the boom years, and now exports deflation in the bust years.

Since spring 2008, as US investment banks sold off assets, imposed margin calls, and used access to unsegregated wholesale assets in custody in the rest of the world to upstream liquidity to their US-based parents and affiliates, the dollar has strengthened relative to other currencies. The media reports this as a “flight to quality”, but it is more like a last looting of the surrounding countryside before dangerous brigands hole up in their hilltop fortress. The brigands appear temporarily wealthy compared to the peons left stripped and penniless and facing winter. When the brigands have eaten all the stolen grain and livestock, however, they will have no means to replenish except to use force to raid the countryside again. The peons can always hunt, forage, farm and carefully husband a surplus to gradually increase their wealth. If the brigands raid too thoroughly or too regularly, the peons have no incentive to grow crops or keep herds (negative savings returns) and everyone starves (deflation).

In the meanwhile, the peons just might wise up, hide any surplus more securely and organise mutual defense against further attacks to ensure that their peon children prosper and the brigands die off. That would be the end of Bretton Woods II, and the rise of China, India, the Gulf and other productive and/or resource rich states which invest surplus in domestic productivity and regional growth.

I reread my piece on Fisher’s Theory of Debt Deflation in Great Depressions the other day. One of the more confusing aspects is his assertion that the dollar “swells” as debt deflation takes hold. What he meant, of course, is that deflation increases the quantity of assets and the likely investment return each dollar purchases as deflation wrings debt and misallocation of capital out of the economy.

It is now clear to me that policy makers in the West are determined to apply every available resource to underpinning failure, misallocation and executive excess. As this discourages the honest saver from parting with cash, policy makers are ensuring that deflation will wreak its havoc on the financial and real economies of the world. Only when that deflation has played out and rational policies that reward market-based management and returns are restored will it be worthwhile to invest again. In the meanwhile, any wealth saved securely from state seizure will "swell" to buy more assets in future - a key aspect of deflation and a key means of restoring the control of the economy into the hands of more farsighted savers and investors.

I have quoted Mr John Mill before, but it bears repeating: ““Panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it has been destroyed by its betrayal into hopelessly unproductive works.” The extent to which capital has been betrayed in the past quarter century under Bretton Woods II, bank deregulation and the Basle Capital Adequacy Accords is unrivalled in the history of fiat banking. The bankers, lawmakers, regulators and academics who collaborated in the betrayal still hold power, like the well-armed brigands in the fortress, and their continued collaboration to prevent accountability must inevitably discourage honest savers from risking further loss. Even so, it is the savers/peons who hold the ultimate power as they can starve the brigands.

Some day soon savers will revolt at financing further depredations. They will refuse to buy even government securities, gagging at the quantities of issue forced upon them under terms of only negative return. When that final massive bubble bursts, deflation will follow its harsh corrective course and clean out deficit-financed “unproductive works”.

When that happens, if reason is restored in markets with effective oversight, I might consider investing again, very selectively, in whatever productive works might then be on offer and only when secure in realising - and retaining - a positive yield.

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Apologies for not posting last Friday.

Writing for this blog has been a great experience, forcing me to refine my views about current events and the principles which should underpin financial market interactions and supervision. In parallel, I have been forced to re-evaluate whether I should commit to sorting out some of the practical aspects of the future of banking in the global economy. Writing takes a lot of time and passion, and these are limited commodities for any of us.

I have accepted a full time executive position which will take all of my time and passion going forward in 2009, so the blogging has to be suspended at year end. The job will enable me to put into practice the principles I’ve illuminated here, hopefully mitigating some of the impacts of financial instability. I’ll still lurk, and maybe comment on Professor Roubini’s thread from time to time.

Wish me luck!

What We Value Is What We Save In a Crisis

2008-11-28T12:32:00.000Z

“When a woman thinks that her house is on fire, her instinct is at once to rush to the thing which she values most. It is a perfectly overpowering impulse, and I have more than once taken advantage of it. . . . A married woman grabs at her baby; an unmarried one reaches for her jewel-box.”

-- Sherlock Holmes from A Scandal in Bohemia, by Arthur Conan Doyle

When a central bank thinks its house is on fire, it too will rush to save the thing valued most. In the United States, the central bank has rushed to save the bonuses and dividends of its Wall Street clientele by hiding away the bad assets that can no longer be foisted on gullible investors. In Europe too the response of central banks has been to save the wholesale banking and securities industry rather than the consumers and businesses underlying the real economy’s longer term productive strength.

For a comparative of what is valued elsewhere, it is worthwhile to look at what is being saved. I received in my inbox yesterday documents outlining the efforts being taken by the Hong Kong and Chinese authorities to address the liquidity crisis in their respective jurisdictions. They are available online here (Hong Kong) and here (PRC). The contrasts with the West are striking, and humbling.

Hong Kong is swiftly introducing a scheme to guarantee credit to SMEs (small and medium enterprises) and exporters. China is introducing controls to limit bank credit to over-extended speculative sectors, accelerate rebuilding in the regions affected by the earthquake earlier this year, and promote improvements in local infrastructure, education and economic adjustment.

Holmes would have been disgusted by a married woman who grabbed her jewel-box in preference to her baby. In the same way, I am disgusted by the central banks preserving the privileges of the financial elite in preference to the jobs, incomes and businesses powering the real economy. The US and UK authorities may criticise the banks for their inaction in freeing up lending to commercial businesses constrained by the credit crunch. The Hong Kong and Chinese authorities are implementing guarantee schemes and innovating initiatives to rapidly address the problem.

As Holmes would have considered a child’s life worth more than jewels, I consider the workers and businesses in the real economy as meriting greater protection than the financial elite. It is not merely that I think the financial elite little better than criminals for their irresponsible excesses of recent years, but that I fear long term harm and political instability will come from neglecting the needs of the real economy.

Shortsightedness is a peculiar affliction of the Western economies. We cannot seem to project the consequences of our actions beyond the next quarterly report, fiscal year or - at most - election cycle. Eastern policy makers have a capacity for longer vision – and longer memory – which makes them appreciate sooner the potential consequences of bad policy. Perhaps this is a consequence of the longer term dedication required to gain political ascendancy in their less cyclical heirarchy.

That China's leadership is concerned with the implications for the real economy – and political stability – was confirmed this morning in an unusually blunt public statement by the chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission. From the Financial Times:

The downturn in the Chinese economy accelerated over the past month and could lead to high unemployment and social unrest, the country’s top economic planner warned on Thursday.

Zhang Ping, chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, said the government needed to take “forceful” measures to limit the slowdown in the economy, which included Wednesday’s large cut in interest rates and a sharp increase in fiscal spending. The rate cut was the fourth since September.

“The global financial crisis has not bottomed out yet. The impact is spreading globally and deepening in China. Some domestic economic indicators point to an accelerated slowdown in November,” Mr Zhang said on Thursday at a rare news conference.

Mr Zhang’s warning about the potential for social unrest as a result of factory closures underlined the mounting concern in Beijing about the fallout from the global financial crisis.

“Excessive production cuts and closures of businesses will cause massive unemployment, which will lead to instability,” Mr Zhang said.

As Jim Rohm observed, “Failure is not a single, cataclysmic event. You don't fail overnight. Instead, failure is a few errors in judgement, repeated every day.”

The crisis in debt markets has been rolling since the sub-prime collapse of August 2007. The increasing illiquidity of commercial paper, trade credit, municipal finance and other debt markets was foreseeable and inevitable. And yet the central banks and treasury authorities of the Western nations have done nothing to shield these essential sectors from the ill effects of the financial sector implosion while giving virtually unlimited funds to the banks authoring the collapse.

Any discussion of China always invites criticism of its anti-democratic governance. It is worth remembering that the philisophical defense of democracy lies in the proposition that it is more likely over time to serve the interests of the electorate than a system which disenfranchises the people from the determination of their leadership. If the democratically elected governments - through their appointed executives and central bankers - are free over an extended timespan to ignore the interests of the people, then how is a Western democracy superior to a Chinese bureaucracy? From looking at the policies and practices of the past year, the merits of Western democracy are not immediately apparent in ensuring that policy responses to the financial crisis are aligned with the interests of the people. Even over the past decade, it is not clear that the policies of the democratic Western governments have aimed to strengthen and broaden the economy to benefit of the electorate rather than a narrow, self-serving elite.

According to Brad Setser, the World Bank is projecting increases to China’s trade surplus in 2009 as falling commodity prices lower production costs. Those unelected bureaucrats are doing something right.

If China and Hong Kong recover sooner, prosper more, and gain global political and economic authority in consequence, it will be because they made fewer mistakes and made them less persistently than their Western counterparts. If the promoters of democracy want to strengthen their case, they might best do so by ensuring that their leadership adheres to policies which promote the longer term health and well being of the economy as a whole rather than the short term enrichment of an undemocratic elite.

Dollar Strength Sustainability

2008-11-21T10:25:00.000Z

Coincident with the passage of the Paulson Plan in early October, the top prime brokers (MS, GS, JPM) issued margin calls on hedge funds which raised the average margin required from about 15 percent to about 35 percent. At a time of fragility in global markets and global confidence, this was equivalent to the sudden contraction of global market liquidity by a trillion dollars or so. A huge sell off in quality assets followed as hedge fund managers struggled to meet the margin calls.

Because hedge funds are unregulated, and prime brokerage credit isn’t well reported for aggregation, there is no obvious way to compile exact data. Nonetheless, it would be rational to assume that simultaneous global margin calls on a vast cross-section of hedge funds would have a dramatic effect on global markets. Hedge funds accounted for well over half of all market transactions in 2007, so are a huge driver of maket trading and liquidity.

Trillions of dollars of value were wiped off the balance sheets of the world’s investors over the next few weeks as forced selling forced prices lower and lower. Adding to the selling pressure, many hedge funds were simultaneously raising cash for redemption demands of investors also squeezed by margin calls by their creditors.

I’m sure none of this was intentional (wink, wink). I’m sure there was no coordination among the prime brokers (nudge, nudge). I’m sure it would never occur to anyone in the Wall Street prime brokerage banks that manipulation of leverage could create profitable trading opportunities (cough, cough).
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The result was a collapse in global prices for equities, debt and commodities. FIRE SALE! Everything must go!
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As the margin calls got met, the dollar strengthened. It strengthened hugely against the pound. From $2 to the pound earlier this year, Sterling has slid to below $1.50. This is likely because there are such a lot of hedge funds and private equity funds here in London, all struggling to meet their margin calls in New York.

At the same time, we observed a huge expansion in the monetary base as the Fed doubled its balance sheet and Paulson doled out taxpayer largesse to Wall Street. The banks began to accumulate massive reserves and Treasury yields crashed lower, especially at the short end. Treasuries gained value as the prime brokers parked the incoming margin cash in the safest, most liquid asset - the primary collateral for all interbank obligations too. These reserves and Treasuries are just sitting in the Fed and not contributing one iota to the stimulation of the economy.
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All of this is interesting recent history. Now what happens when some of these trends reverse?

What happens to the global markets when the deleveraging stops? What happens when there are no more global margin calls on the surviving hedge funds? Will anyone want to buy dollars when they don’t need them to repay dollar debt?
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Will there still be inflows to US Treasuries when few need a place to park cash for short term liquidity? What will prop up demand for the Treasuries then?

What happens when banks begin to use reserves to lend or speculate in the now crashed assets available globally at fire sale prices?

With most of the growth still projected to occur outside the USA, will some of those Treasuries be sold to take advantage of the many equity investment deals on offer? How will that affect the dollar?

We are observing huge swings in asset markets. We are observing huge swings in foreign exchange markets.

I’m not going to make any recommendations, but I predict we haven’t seen the end of volatility. The rapid rise of the dollar, the massive demand for Treasuries, are hugely convenient for the US Treasury as it finances the expansion of the Fed balance sheet and the giveaways to the corporate welfare queens on Wall Street and elsewhere in the last days of the Bush administration. It seems unlikely, however, that the conditions can be long sustained.

When they reverse, we may see a fair sized bounce in global equity markets, a loosening of credit conditions in global debt markets, a revaluation of commodities, and a revaluation of the mighty dollar. Many will call the bottom and pile back in.

I wonder how long that will last . . .

Hat tip to FTAlphaVille where the team gives me much to think about every day and the analysis of trends is superb. Picks for this week include:

M3, where are thou?

Fill your boots!

Dollar *danger* ahead

Systemic Risk, Contagion and Trade Finance - Back to the Bad Old Days

2008-11-14T09:20:00.000Z

Back in the old days (pre-1980s), the term systemic risk did not refer to contagion of illiquidity within the financial sector alone. Back then, when the real economy was much more important than low margin, unglamorous banking, it was understood that the really scary systemic risk was the risk of contagion of illiquidity from the financial sector to the real economy of trade in real goods and real services.

If you think of it, every single non-cash commercial transaction requires the intermediation of banks on behalf of – at the very least – the buyer and the seller. If you lengthen the supply chain to producers, exporters and importers and allow for agents along the way, the chain of banks involved becomes quite long and complex.

When central bankers back in the old days argued that banks were “special” – and therefore demanded higher capital, strict limits on leverage, tight constraints on business activity, and superior integrity of management – it was because they appreciated the harm that a bank failure would have in undermining the supply chain for business in the real economy for real people causing real joblessness and real hunger if any bank along the chain should be unable to perform.

As the “specialness” of banks eroded with the decline of the real economy (and the migration globally of many of those real jobs making real goods and providing real added-value services to real people), the nature of systemic risk was adjusted to become self-referencing to the financial elite. Central bankers of the current generation only understand systemic risk as referring to contagion of illiquidity among financial institutions.

They and we all are about to learn the lessons of the past anew.

We are now starting to see the contagion effects of the current liquidity crisis feed through to the real economy. We are about to go back to the bad old days. Whether the zombie banks are kept on life support by the central banks and taxpayers of the world is highly relevant to whether the zombie bank executives pay themselves outsize bonuses and their zombie shareholders outsize dividends with taxpayer money. It appears sadly irrelevant to whether the banks perform their function of intermediating credit and commercial transactions in the real economy along the supply chain. The bailout cash and executive and shareholder priorities do not seem to reach so far.

The recent 93 percent collapse of the obscure Baltic Dry Index – an index of the cost of chartering bulk cargo vessels for goods like ore, cotton, grain or similar dry tonnage – has caused a bit of a stir among the financial cognoscenti. What is less discussed amidst the alarm is the reason for the collapse of the index – the collapse of trade credit based on the venerable letter of credit.

Letters of credit have financed trade for over 400 years. They are considered one of the more stable and secure means of finance as the cargo is secures the credit extended to import it. The letter of credit irrevocably advises an exporter and his bank that payment will be made by the importer's issuing bank if the proper documentation confirming a shipment is presented. This was seen as low risk as the issuing bank could seize and sell the cargo if its client defaulted after payment was made. Like so much else in this topsy turvy financial crisis, however, the verities of the ages have been discarded in favour of new and unpleasant realities.

The combination of the global interbank lending freeze with the collapse of the speculative, leveraged commodity price bubble have undermined both the confidence of banks in the ability of a far-flung peer bank to pay an obligation when due and confidence in the value of the dry cargo as security for the credit if liquidated on default. The result is that those with goods to export and those with goods to import, no matter how worthy and well capitalised, are left standing quayside without bank finance for trade.

Adding to the difficulties, letters of credit are so short term that they become an easy target for scaling back credit as liquidity tightens around bank operations globally. Longer term “assets” – like mortgage-back securities, CDOs and CDSs – can’t be easily renegotiated, and banks are loathe to default to one another on them because of cross-default provisions. Short term credit like trade finance can be cut with the flick of an executive wrist.

Further adding to the difficulties, many bulk cargoes are financed in dollars. Non-US banks have been progressively starved of dollar credit because US banks hoarded it as the funding crisis intensified. Recent currency swaps between central banks should be seen in this light, noting the allocation of Federal Reserve dollar liquidity to key trading partners Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Singapore in particular.

Fixing this problem shouldn't be left to the Fed. They aren't going to make it a priority. Indeed, their determination to accelerate the payment of interest on reserves and then to raise that rate to match the Fed Funds target rate indicates that the Fed are more likely to constrain trade finance liquidity rather than improve it. Furthermore, the Fed may be highly selective in its allocation of dollar liquidity abroad, prejudicing the economic prospects of a large part of the world that is either indifferent or hostile to the continuation of American dollar hegemony.

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If cargo trade stops, a whole lot of supply chain disruption starts. If the ore doesn’t go to the refinery, there is no plate steel. If the plate steel doesn’t get shipped, there is nothing to fabricate into components. If there are no components, there is nothing to assemble in the factory. If the factory closes the assembly line, there are no finished goods. If there are no finished goods, there is nothing to restock the shelves of the shops. If there is nothing in the shops, the consumers don’t buy. If the consumers don’t buy, there is no Christmas.

Everyone along the supply chain should worry about their jobs. Many will lose their jobs sooner rather than later.

If cargo trade stops, the wheat doesn’t get exported. If the wheat doesn’t get exported, the mill has nothing to grind into flour. If there is no flour, the bakeries and food processors can’t produce bread and pasta and other foods. If there are no foods shipped from the bakeries and factories, there are no foods in the shops. If there are no foods in the shops, people go hungry. If people go hungry their children go hungry. When children go hungry, people riot and governments fall.

Everyone along the supply chain should worry about their children going hungry.

When that happens, everyone in governments should worry about the riots.

Controlling access to trade finance determines who loses their jobs, whose children go hungry, who riots, which governments fall. Without dedicated focus on the issue of trade finance and liquidity from those in the emerging world most interested in sustaining the growth of recent years, little progress can be expected.Trade finance is rapidly communicating the stress on bank liquidity to the real economy. It presents a systemic risk much more frightening than the collapsing value of bits of paper traded electronically in London and New York. It could collapse the employment, the well being and the political stability of most of the world’s population.

The World Trade Organisation hosted a meeting on trade credit in Washington Wednesday to highlight the rapid and accelerating deterioration in trade finance as an urgent priority for public policy.

I look at the precipitous collapse of the Baltic Dry Index and I wish them Godspeed.

Further reading:

WTP warns of trade finance ‘deteriorating’ amid financial crisis

Cost of some trade finance deals up sixfold – WTO

Shipping holed beneath the water line

Shipowners idle 20 percent of bulk vessels as rates collapse

The Fed doubles its balance sheet - above $2 trillion in just 5 weeks

2008-11-07T14:25:00.000Z

Think about that. If any commercial or investment bank had been seen to do that, it would become an instant leper in the credit markets. It is a truism that banks go bust by writing business that wiser banks rejected, and so grow their balance sheets faster. As a young bank supervisor I was told that the surest way to spot a potential bank failure was to look for outliers in asset growth.

Had anyone at the Fed or FSA been brought up in the old school, they would have seen Countrywide and Northern Rock coming a mile off. Perhaps they did, but in the new Friedmanite culture of forbearance and free markets, and Basle II risk models, they decided to let capitalism run its disastrous course rather than take unpopular decisions about constraining the prerogatives of over-compensated executives and shareholders.

And now we have the Fed doubling its balance sheet in just five weeks. It is exactly by taking on the assets of the banking sector that are otherwise unmarketable that the Fed has grown its balance sheet. And it is by doing this while indulging the banks in continued oversized dividends and executive bonuses that leads me to believe the policy must ultimately fail to either correct the problems in the US banking sector or sustain the credibility of the Federal Reseve as a prudential supervisor and lender of last resort.

Dallas Fed President Richard W. Fisher has speculated that the balance sheet could expand to $3 trillion by January:

“You can see the size and breadth of the Fed’s efforts to counter the collapse of the credit mechanism in our balance sheet. At the beginning of this year, the assets on the books of the Fed totaled $960 billion. Today, our assets exceed $1.9 trillion. I would not be surprised to see them aggregate to $3 trillion—roughly 20 percent of GDP—by the time we ring in the New Year.”

At the same time the Fed has equalised the interest it pays on reserves deposited in the Fed and the Fed Funds target rate. That undermines any incentive to interbank lending, virtually ensuring that banks will prefer to hold their cash as reserves at the Fed rather than as lending exposures to one another. On the other hand, according to a Fed research note from August, it allows the Fed to supply greater liquidity for market needs without the risk of pushing lending rates below target rates.
In contemplating the anomalies of this policy, it occurred to me that it might be aimed at reinforcing the dollar by drawing reserve balances to the Fed in preference to other central banks as they follow the Fed by cutting rates this week. Perhaps the Fed is pre-emptively combating dollar capital flight, or perhaps it is a further extension of the "ring fence" tactic of drawing assets to the US in contemplation of future insolvencies to secure advantage for US creditors over global peers.

As Sam Jones at FTAlphaVille commented yesterday:

There’s a big danger here for the Fed: that it is trying to catch a falling knife. The Fed is risking things it’s never risked before. That’s not to say we’re in apocalyptic territory at all; consider the firepower the Fed has behind it. It is though, to use a hackneyed, but apt phrase, paradigm shifting.

In Japan, where quantitative easing failed, the central bank’s balance sheet swelled to a size equivalent to 30 per cent of GDP. The Fed’s balance sheet is currently equivalent to 12 per cent of GDP.

This is uncharted territory for a central bank of a reserve currency. I suspect, however, that these moves play into the strategy of the Paulson Plan survivor bias. As someone reminded me recently, Mr Paulson's primary objective at Goldman Sachs was to outperform peers in both good times and bad times. If profits were to be made, he wanted Goldman to have more of them. If losses must be booked, he wanted Goldman to have less of them. He seems to have taken the peer outperformance strategy global with the Paulson Plan.

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Hat tip to FTAlphaVille for posting relevant Fed insights yesterday and today:

The mother of all balance sheets

Fed capitulates: the central bank is broken

Change I can't quite believe in

2008-11-07T09:08:00.001Z

I wanted Obama to win. I really, really, really wanted Obama to win. McCain/Palin gave me nightmares. Just about the whole world held it’s collective breath willing Obama to win on Tuesday.

Obama’s election is powerful confirmation that America remains a land of opportunity, a democracy where power is allocated at the ballot box. It reassured the world that despite the lawlessness and arrogance of the past eight years, Americans are capable of enlightened, rational self-determination. It restores hope in much of the world that America can reorient itself toward tolerance and dialogue.

For all of that, I haven’t been happy since watching Obama’s acceptance speech live Wednesday morning on the BBC.

I have a bad feeling that America has just elected its Tony Blair. The package of Change the voters ordered isn’t what is being delivered to the White House.

The appointment of Rahm Emanuel as White House chief of staff didn’t ease my mind. Like Mr Blair’s close advisors Lord Goldsmith and Baron Levy, Mr Emanuel may inflame the suspicions in the Middle East that the agenda for the region under Obama will be no different than under Bush. The credibility of the United States as an honest broker and agent for peace will be further eroded if Obama’s gatekeeper is viewed as pre-disposed to more of the same policies which have fuelled hostilities. I hope it is not anti-Semitic to make the point that objectivity and fair dealing will be suspect with a chief of staff who is the son of an militant Israeli, who served as a civilian volunteer for the Israeli Army, and who has used his public positions in American politics – except for a brief stint at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein – to promote Israel’s interests.

Those who know Mr Emanuel suggest that because his devotion to Israel is unquestionable, he will be able to push Israelis toward moderation. Perhaps the combination of a Kenyan goat herder's son with an Irgun terrorist's son will be a winning combination for crafting a durable peace. But many in Israel, the Middle East and Washington will expect that future acts of aggression by Israel against Iran or other neighbours will be defended – if not promoted – by the man at Obama’s elbow.

It is now emerging that Mr Emanuel was also a director of Freddie Mac when it stands accused of misreporting profits and ignoring red flags.

The rumours that either Larry Summers or Tim Geithner will be made Treasury Secretary made me even queasier. The appointment of either of these architects of the current global financial disaster, these arch-deregulators and serial-forbearance artists, would be a great middle-finger to America’s foreign creditors and the global investors suffering asset deflation. Both men have been instrumental in, first, the Fed’s exported inflation via massive monetary bubble-blowing and, now, the Fed/FDIC/SIPC exported deflation through Chapter 11 and margin call orchestrations ensuring more pain abroad than at home.

Summers would be particularly egregious. Not only did Summers promote the Friedmanite export of toxic debt to the rest of the world at the Clinton Treasury, at the World Bank he promoted the export of toxic pollution to underdeveloped nations to add poison to poverty. To quote from his 1991 memo, "I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that."

The much bandied idea that Robert Gates, former deputy director of the CIA under President G.H.W. Bush, architect and financier of Saddam’s military machine and Bin Laden’s Al Qaida, might be kept as Secretary of Defense under Obama “for continuity’s sake” after six years of failed and callous military adventurism in Iraq and Afghanistan, with occasional illegal forays into Pakistan, Georgia, Syria and Iran, makes me frankly nauseous. If America is ever to restore its fiscal balance, cuts in the bloated military/security/intelligence apparatus will have to be implemented. A career insider central to the creation and export of the bloat is the wrong man for the job.

.
Maybe the problem in America is not a struggle between rich and poor. Overtaxed and undertaxed. Empowered and disenfranchised. Educated and illiterate. Insured and uninsured. Law abiding and lawless. Godless and God-fearing. Republican and Democrat. Red and Blue.

Maybe the problem in America is there is no struggle about the fundamental mechanisms of American oppression and aggression: debt and threat.

American policies promote debt and force as the hammer and anvil for shaping the economy and the political dialogue. What cannot be financed into penury must be crushed into submission. The bulk of the economy is designed to prosper either the bankers or the police/prison/military/intelligence industries at everyone else’s expense. Propped up on these twin pillars of debt and threat, America remains staunchly and irrevocably American whoever wins the elections.

The restoration of fiscal prudence has been swiftly repudiated post-election in favour of more debt-financed “stimulus” and “stabilisation”.

The restoration of the rule of law and holding those who committed crimes accountable – both within America and internationally – has received no post-election endorsement from Obama.

I asked the asylum Iraqis at the local kebab shop last night what they made of the American election. They follow the news, and I’ve always found them knowledgeable and articulate. The kebab chef (a former civil engineer from northern Iraq) looked glum. “It makes no difference. They are all the same.” I fear his well-informed cynicism is sound.

Our unglamorous and unelected British prime minister, Gordon Brown, called for more international cooperation “with American leadership central to its success” – as he toured the Arab Gulf with his begging bowl. He was physically following American “leadership” as he trailed Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmet’s pilgrimage to the Gulf last week. American leadership got us successfully into this debt crisis, and Brown appears determined to follow it even deeper.

The central banks in the UK, EU and Switzerland obliged yesterday by following the Fed toward negative real interest rates, discouraging savers and lenders alike by cutting 150bps, 50bps and 50bps respectively. Jean-Claude Trichet spoke of the cooperation of the central banks as a “brotherhood”. He made me think of the mafia or the Freemasons. Perhaps he meant to.

Obama’s election still inspires me. I still hope for change.

Obama demonstrated good judgement throughout the campaign, and good management of the people working for him. That in itself will bring major change to the White House.

Better managed American debt and threat policies under Obama will be an improvement over the horribly managed debt and threat policies under Bush. Some hope.

Byways and Tribal Capitalism

2008-10-31T08:38:00.000Z

I have been indulging in leisure again. For nine days I backpacked along the ancient Ridgeway, the superhighway of Neolithic Britain and a trade route into the modern era. Starting about 6,000 years ago, (roughly the time Sarah Palin imagines Adam and Eve holding hands in a newly wrought Eden) the Britons occupying the plains either side of the Ridgeway were settling the river valleys to raise crops and herd animals. As the crops and herds increased, and the Iron Age and Bronze Age opened trading opportunities in new technologies, these Britons took strides that set them and their heirs on the road to market capitalism.

The road they followed is the road I walked – the Ridgeway Trail.

The Ridgeway is a geographic feature of Jurassic and Corallian limestone, an 87 mile long spine of rocky downs running through Southern England from Ivinghoe Beacon in Buckinghamshire to Overton Hill, near Avebury in Wiltshire. It was linked by other routes to ports in the South and on the Channel. The Ridgeway was admirably suited as a commercial highway in early times because the limestone was porous, draining rain away from the high pathway to the plains below. When the tracks below were impassable mires of mud for man and beast, the Ridgeway remained a quick and easy road from one region to another. Being high, with excellent views down the slopes and over the plains, it was also possible to detect and defend against brigands who might beset unwary travellers, with ring forts provided to secure travellers and goods along the route.

Neolithic Britons were secure enough to form large agrarian tribes, planting and harvesting grains and herding sheep. They were prosperous enough to have excess grain and sheep to trade for iron and bronze tools and gold jewellery and other valuable trade goods. They were economically advanced enough to have specialisation, with certain tribes and regions known for their skill in producing iron or bronze or pottery. They were politically advanced enough to have organised militias, with a ‘warrior aristocracy’. They were wise enough to promote collective security and agree byways for safe passage with neighbouring tribes to enable commerce along the Ridgeway.

The Ridgeway reminded me every day we walked along that it is infrastructure, transparency and mutually-enforced rules which secure and grow markets for productive capitalism. Infrastructure provides a common framework for trade to take place. Transparency allows those trading in markets to evaluate each other’s wares and defend against brigands who might wish to ambush the unwary. Rules of safe conduct and fair dealing promote the confidence which encourages those with excess production to bring it to market to trade for their present and future needs. Mutual enforcement ensures that the temptation of any tribe to loot its neighbours is curbed by the risk of finding itself precluded from the trade routes and from access to markets.

I imagine that like many small, agrarian, tribal states, England of the pre-Roman period was organised into settlements relying on militias with only small dedicated military elites. This arrangement, as exists in modern Switzerland, allows the civilian militia to contribute most of its energies under secure conditions to increasing production, growing the surplus which sustains collective prosperity. Although a professional military or ‘warrior aristocracy’ can be useful in providing skilled leadership, if that military gets too large, or the aristocrats too greedy, the incentive to produce a surplus is removed and tribes tend to weaken, grow poor and fail. Prosperity and security require a delicate balance in the social contract.

The Ridgeway also reminded me that prosperity invites looting by aggressors. By the Roman era, England was producing a large enough surplus to be exporting across the Channel, with trade goods from as far afield as the Mediterranean. This has been substantiated by findings of pottery, jewellery, coins and other goods in early Celtic settlements.

It was the prosperity of England as a grain exporter that led Julius Ceasar to covet it for the Roman Empire.

A professional military demands a large production surplus from the civilian population to sustain it. The state expropriates the surplus production and provides it to the military. If the military can secure more resources and more production to the state, the expropriation can increase prosperity of its tribe – or at least the elite that commands it. But if the military fails to secure more resources, then the expropriation from those producing a surplus will gradually erode the incentive to produce a surplus – leading to decline and increasing poverty and political strife.

Ceasar understood that securing the large agricultural surplus of England to finance and feed his armies would help underpin the military strength of the Roman Empire. Naturally, the Romans secured and settled the most prosperous agricultural regions. As a result, there are Roman traces along the Ridgeway – improvements to the roads, the forts, and the commercial links to market towns and ports on the coasts. We walked Roman roads last week too - straight, raised and solid even 2,000 years later.

Following the Romans, the Danes, the Angles, the Saxons and the Normans invaded and occupied the same lands. Throughout the changing political and ethnic mix of tribes and elites, the Ridgeway continued to function as a trade route through prosperous middle England.

Modern markets could usefully reflect on the durable Ridgeway model of market infrastructure. Transparency of assets – whether sheep or shares or CDOs – is critical to the effective function of markets for price discovery and investment. Those who have secured a surplus are unlikely to risk taking their wealth to a market where assets are not open to inspection and proper valuation. Security of trade routes and market towns for merchants and traders is essential to encourage those with a surplus to bring it forward, promoting effective allocation of assets and underpinning growth in production. Mutually-enforced rules of conduct, fair dealing and safe passage are key to building a reputation that attracts both buyers and sellers and ensures a sustained market prosperity.

The modern ‘warrior aristocracy’ could usefully reflect on the fate of societies that deplete the incentives to surplus production and fail to secure commensurate returns from a costly military. Whether a Neolithic tribe, a Celtic settlement, the mighty Roman Empire or the Soviet Union, history proves that a tendency to excess expropriation by the state undermines any incentive to investment and surplus production. Excess expropriation will ultimately weaken the economy supporting the elites and the professional military that secures their privileges and interests.

As the global elites meet in the coming weeks to address the current economic crisis, they could do worse than contemplate the lessons I gleaned from the Ridgeway. Those who provided poor transparency, promoted dishonest market practices, looked the other way or collaborated in the robbing of passing merchants and investors, and otherwise violated the precepts embodied in the Ridgeway model should be held accountable for their failings. The global model going forward must return to the principles embodied in the ancient stone backbone of English commerce.

Links:

The Ridgeway (Wikipedia)

The Ridgeway National Trail

Neolithic, Iron Age and Bronze Age Britain (BBC)

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Congratulations to Rich H (Miss America) who was to cover for me last Friday and instead secured his own position in the RGE blogroll.

We had to burn the village to save it

2008-10-17T08:14:00.000+01:00

The title of this diary is a quote from the Vietnam era that sums up for many the arrogance and pointlessness of American aggression in Asia two generations ago. It keeps coming to mind each time I read President Bush’s (paraphrased) statement this week: We had to nationalise the banks “to preserve the free market.”

There is no free market when the government owns the actors and sets the terms of transactions. There is no village once it has been burned to the ground.

The collapse of the financial sector is unacceptable. It is unacceptable to bankers who have vested careers, status and equity wealth in the disproportionate expansion of the financial sector. It is unacceptable to politicians who have risen to high office doing the bidding of the financial sector in ceding progressively more generous taxpayer subsidy and regulatory forbearance to its chieftains.

And so in the US, UK and EU we have politicians appropriating more petrol to hand to the arsonists who started the conflagration which is consuming our economic and political fabric. The regulators whose forbearance is a root cause of the current conflagration are handing the arsonists fresh zippo lighters. The policies adopted in these debtor nations will fail, must fail, because they destroy what remained of market economies. In the meanwhile, however, the bankers and the politicians and the regulators cannot conceive of failure and so insist on more of the same – ordering hundreds of billions in more incendiaries to fuel the blaze. The same tax breaks. The same housing subsidies. The same regulatory forbearance. The same ill-transparent, off balance sheet, accounting sleight of hand. The same eradication of market incentives to productive, disciplined saving, investment and labour.

Those who would prudently save will be punished with negative real interest rates and asset deflation. Those who would prudently invest in productive industry will be starved of scarce capital and forced into liquidation. Those who would prudently labour for a decent wage will be slowly robbed by inflation and kept docile by the threat of unemployment.

There can be no more iniquitous alliance than to have the politicians at the service of the bankers, unless perhaps it is to have the military at the service of the bankers too. The US seems to have committed itself to this worst of all possible combinations, with Congressmen threatened by the imposition of martial law if they failed to acquiesce to the Paulson Plan. Thankfully the British and EU militaries are too small and ineffective to be leveraged into a similar threat to global or domestic peace and security.

Subsidised banking seems a faster method of going bust than military adventurism, but the two together will see the US bust even more certainly. The $700 billion appropriated for the Paulson Plan and the $840 billion extended in parallel by the Federal Reserve last month are together more than three times the expenditure on US wars for the past five years. The federal borrowing requirement for 2008 is now in excess of $1.02 trillion, and for 2009 is now estimated between $1.5 and $2 trillion.

Such hyperbolic growth in the fiscal deficit and debt is unsustainable, even with such very tolerant creditors as the Japanese, Gulf Arabs, Russians and Chinese. They can see that each dollar added to the Fed’s balance sheet is tinder for burning those already held or denominated in their reserves. They can project the curve forward. At some point, they must react and restrain further debasement of their reserves and investments, either by collectively raising the prices charged for the resources and products they export, the interest charged on existing and future debt, or the forced exchange of debt for equity ownership of real economic assets.

Or all three.

The cycle of debt deflation is just getting rolling. The banks were only the first bailout and already the federal deficits are ballooning unsustainably. What will be the recourse when municipalities and states face default through catastrophic tax and revenue shortfalls? What will be the recourse when large commercial employers, industries and infrastructure confront failure from collapsing consumption expenditure? What will be the consequence when unemployment, homelessness, political disaffection and crime are resurgent and threaten the political fabric?

We are at the end of the beginning. Hank Paulson has played a clever game for the past decade of exporting dodgy paper to the US creditors abroad while forcing a middle class subsidy of the tax exempt corporatists at home. Now he plays a clever game of devaluing all currency and paper assets, exporting the pain to foreign taxpayers and investors. But this is not a game that America can win without the debasement of everything America once represented as holding value in its formerly prosperous market economy.

In my experience, there is nothing so permanent as a temporary expedient. It is hard to see how partially nationlised banks will ever be more than the means of political redistribution of wealth and power, and so corrupt both the economy and political system.

We had to burn the village to save it.

Perhaps someday we will hear a remorseful Mr Paulson or Mr Brown echo Robert McNamara, early architect and aggressive propagator of the Vietnam War: “We were wrong, terribly wrong.”

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I will be out of touch for most of the next nine days, but will check in as and when I can. There may be a guest blogger here next Friday who I'm confident will be enthusiastically received, if he accepts.

Turbulence and Trends

2008-10-10T10:39:00.000+01:00

A trend is a trend is a trend.

But the question is, will it bend?

Will it alter its course

through some unforeseen force

and come to a premature end?

-- Sir Alec Cairncross

I’ve had a lot of meetings this week, and very little time to reflect on fast moving events. This entry may be light on cites and hyperlinks as I’m in a bit of a rush today. It will also lack much in the way of perspective or insight as I find it impossible to distance myself just now from the swirling turbulence around me.

Here in Britain, several banks were offered partial nationalisation as an alternative to private recapitalisation. Strangely, this seems to have encouraged them to more strenuous efforts to recapitalise. The plan is now being held up as a model as it seems to force managements to confront their undercapitalisation as a problem that they can solve to their advantage or that will be solved for them to their heavy personal cost.

Iceland collapsed. It was more of a hedge fund than a country, with it’s 200,000 population supporting a massive leveraged position in financial markets via risk loving bankers and financiers. There were approximately 200,000 British depositors in accounts offered by Icelandic banks. Local authorities (municipalities) and charities were also big investors, exposed for more than £700 million. As a result, the government has frozen Icelandic-owned assets in the United Kingdom – using terrorism legislation, naturally – to provide the basis for a partial recovery of the losses likely to be incurred. This is causing more stress between the two island nations than they have known since the Cod Wars of the 1980s. Also causing tension is a rumour that Russia might bailout Iceland with $4.5 billion of credit, leading to speculation that the Russians may be eying the vacant airbase formerly used by Americans. This is problematic as Iceland is a member of NATO, and so has spurred efforts toward finding European alternatives.

Europe continues to call for collaboration while each country unilaterally defines and acts on its self-interest. That is the way it should be, and I approve heartily. I would rather not have the European Union making hasty decisions or holding such concentrated powers that it can force a uniform resolution across all member states. Either the EU builds consensus for action in the common interest, or it remains impotent. Either is preferable to too much concentration of power in Brussels.

In an attempt to shut just one stable door in a barn full of bolting horses, the Treasury has laid legislation before Parliament to reform the treatment of UK bank insolvencies and deposit insurance arrangements. Roughly described, the Financial Services Authority will decide if a bank is bust, the Bank of England will be responsible for overseeing its resolution and ensuring financial stability of the system, and the Treasury will oversee a new deposit insurance scheme that no one can currently describe but will make permanent the rise in protection to £50,000 per depositor. Despite the massive failure of Lehman, and the huge losses incurred by investors and hedge fund prime brokerage clients in London, the legislation is completely silent on the insolvencies of investment banks and broker-dealers and other institutions of systemic importance to financial markets. My fear is that the failure to address the systemic issues as a whole will be a vulnerability exploited by US banks and authorities as they try to undermine London as a financial centre, gaming the fragile global markets.

There is still a touching confidence among many in the City that the US authorities will provide the “leadership” to reinforce collapsing markets. As John Plender of the Financial Times quipped, “Gaul votes for Rome to take the strain.” This seems to me to display a total incomprehension of the way US authorities operate to externalise pain and loss to the greatest extent possible in times of crisis. Gaul, after all, was an occupied state that was militarily and economically exploited to Rome’s advantage for centuries before Rome’s collapse. Saving Gaul was never a high priority once Rome was threatened.

Elsewhere in the world, bureaucrats continue to show up at the office in the morning and check to make sure all boxes are ticked, all forms are correctly ordered, and all initiatives in progress continue their stately way forward unimpeded by global chaos. I find this comforting, although much of their efforts will ultimately prove futile and failed.

Finally, an optimistic note. I was reminded yesterday that the vast bulk of “wealth” created during the Greenspan/Bernanke bubble years accrued to the very top percentiles of population – with many in the OECD middle class and lower class either stagnating or getting poorer as they mired themselves in unsustainable debt. While opportunity and employment grew strongly in emerging countries, there too the elites gained disproportionately as income inequalities surged. The crash of global financial markets therefore will have disproportionate effect on the elites, impoverishing them to a far greater extent, although it will be felt throughout society as employment, pensions, investments and public services contract.

Once we hit bottom of this downturn, some years hence in all probability, we may experience a democratisation of wealth and opportunity like none seen since the end of World War II when education reforms and unionisation laid the groundwork for the rise of the American and OECD middle classes. Those who have lost economic and political power during the boom years, are likely to organise and retake authority within economic and political systems during the bust years. The collapse of concentrated wealth in Wall Street will spur more collaborative capital formation and investment throughout the economy. This could provide reorientation of economic progress toward more equitable, sustainable and democratic outcomes in coming generations. I hope so, it’s the only bright spot of the week.

Financial Eugenics: The Paulson Plan for Survivor Bias

2008-10-03T06:43:00.000+01:00

As I write this I don’t know the outcome of the attempt to ram through legislation for looting the US Treasury of $700 billion before the end of the Bush administration. I suspect that Congress will force the passage of the bill in some form because the media and political narrative on the necessity of the measure is unremitting and so horribly biased.

No alternatives will be considered.

No constraints on the unilateral executive authority of Hank Paulson will be considered.

No assurances that funds will be used to unlock credit markets or promote lending to the real economy (as opposed to the financial robber barons) will be considered.

Instead, the bill will get laden with an additional 300 pages of pork to sway the dissenters, adding to the tab imposed on the American taxpayer.

Having listened to all 42 minutes of the late night Treasury briefing of investment banks on Sunday, there is no doubt in my mind that this legislation represents the sort of federal largesse for Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citibank and JPMorgan Chase that the Iraq war provided for Halliburton and Blackwater.

The most cynical moment in the call is when the Treasury official confirms, ”our preference would be to help the healthy banks become even healthier” rather than helping troubled banks or illiquid banks.

America is now a centrally planned economy where the Treasury will determine which firms survive and prosper through allocation of scarce capital to an undercapitalised financial sector.

Clearly what is going on here has nothing to do with kick starting the credit markets or stabilising the equity markets or restoring depositor confidence in banks. (Treasury official: “No provision in the legislation that mandates re-lending.”) What is going on here is a blatant attempt to provide government funds to a select cadre of firms (not all banks) which are chosen to be the survivors feasting off the carcasses of their less fortunate and less well-connected brethren as the downturn intensifies in the years to come.

The crash in equities will still happen. The debt deflation of the economy leading to mass commercial and consumer credit defaults will still happen. The collapse of many national, regional and local financial institutions will still happen. The bankruptcy of many municipalities and shortfalls in state budgets will still happen.

This bill is about engineering survivor bias to friends of the Bush administration so that they profit disproportionately from the collapse of these markets using the funds provided by the taxpayer via the unreviewable and unconditional authority of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The basic plan is to set up a federal money laundering operation. Bad assets come in, get laundered by the Treasury and put in a new AAA “wrapper” (as it’s termed on the call), and good assets go out, issued as Treasury guaranteed securities. Whether the final value of the legislation this week is $700 billion or $150 billion is irrelevant as long as the laundering operation can accommodate the throughput, as that number is only a cap on total extensions at any one time.

The SEC will support the plan and survivor bias by relaxing FASB 157 on mark to market accounting. If there is no agreement on what an asset is worth, it is worth whatever the firm holding it says in its Level 3 accounts or the Treasury Secretary accepts in buying it.

The Federal Reserve will support the plan by relaxing the definition of “control stake” in US banks and bank holding companies to allow secretive cabals to hold through private equity and offshore hedge funds. No one knows the beneficial owners of these ill-transparent private equity investors, and so it is the ideal way to reward loyal and helpful insiders, legislators and officials – as well as cede further ownership of American assets to foreign stakeholders who would be politically unacceptable if publicly acknowledged. Many foreign creditors are irate at the losses their funds, banks and pensioners have sustained from investments in the United States, and this plan provides a secret way to buy them off and keep them lending and investing as their own economies are roiled by the deflation to come.

For the past year the survivor bias has been orchestrated from the Federal Reserve, with its extension of innovative credit facilities and selectively engineered rescues or forced mergers. That has been very useful, but that well is now dry. The Fed has no more good assets to trade for the bad assets the banks can offer. And the supply of bad assets just keeps growing as market illiquidity spreads further from the core of the mortgage backed securities market. Instability is now leading to a realistic threat that the Fed and Treasury could lose control of the deflationary process.

Part of the reason the Paulson Plan is so attractive is that it recapitalises the Fed by promoting the unwinding of repos and lending facilities which left the Fed holding toxic assets. As the repos and credit facilities gradually unwind, these toxic assets can now be taken back by the banks and exchanged for good cash. The Fed gets its balance sheet Treasuries and cash back to restore its flexibility to intervene anew.

Favoured private equity and insiders who swap US dollars for equity in the banking system will presumably be aware of the survivor bias being engineered on their behalf. Sovereign wealth funds, investment funds and private equity investors ripped off in the first round of recapitalisation may be willing to come back in once it is clear to them that the next round will benefit from official favouritism. Warren Buffett’s timely stake in Goldman Sachs is clearly linked to his confidence the Paulson Plan will benefit them disproportionately.

A factor which is probably critical but has received little discussion is that literally thousands of Bush administration apparatchiks will need jobs come January, and a fair selection of GOP House and Senate legislators and their aides too. What better way to enahance their CVs in their final months in power than to distribute $700 billion or so in pre-Christmas largesse to the most remunerative employers in the world? And what better way to ensure the corporate largesse is returned to the GOP to win back the White House and Congress in 2012 as the recession fuels public anger?

And then there is a huge arbitrage opportunity as well so that everyone makes money for years to come. According to the conference call, the pricing on offer from the Treasury will be a bit below Level 3 pricing. The toxic assets will be repackaged and resold with a new AAA wrapper, possibly priced well below what the Treasury paid, assuring a huge profit on both immediate liquidation by the banks and ultimate maturity by investors. The Fed gets its cash and Treasuries back; the banks make huge profits; the foreigners and off-shore tax avoiders get disguised ownership of the American financial system; the taxpayer gets ripped off. What’s not to love?

Think back to Fisher’s Theory of Debt Deflation in Great Depressions. Dollars become “bigger” as deflation takes hold because each dollar can buy more assets as assets deflate. That means that as these clowns crash the markets, their $700 billion of liquid cash funnelled to their friends and recycled through the Treasury laundrymat can progressively buy up the rest of the pieces on the gameboard at low discount prices. Game over with those who caused the crash and robbed the bank winning.

Deflation is going to happen – globally. Either we can use the course of deflation to shape healthy economies that will provide growth and employment and productive returns on investment in future, or we can allow deflation to further enrich those miscreants whose irresponsible policies led to the violent financial collapse we are about to experience.

There is a fundamentally healthy economy in America – somewhere underneath all the financial excess and chicanery and all the financial/oil/military/healthcare/developer corruption of local, state and federal politics. It will be a painful and slow process to kill off the metastasising cancerous growths on the economy, but if Americans achieved that, they could embrace a healthier and more productive and more prosperous future.

I would like to believe Americans expressed the courage to change over last weekend when they 25 to 1 rejected an unconstrained and unconditional bailout of Wall Street in favour of cold turkey deleveraging of the economy. I wish I could believe that it mattered in the political calculus, but the result of the House vote on the bill will tell us that.

Fight the survivor bias. It’s not your survival they’re engineering.

Quotable

2008-09-29T18:35:00.000+01:00

I had the following quote ready to publish when the bill passed. The vote against the bailout bill was a pleasant surprise, but the House still has until Thursday to be bought off or to cave to pressure. Or maybe democracy is still alive in America?

"The bank was saved, but the people were ruined."
- Henry M. Gouge, circa 1830

Learning from Rudi Bogni: The Thin Space of Financial Activity

2008-09-26T12:42:00.000+01:00

Every good morality tale needs heroes as well as villains. In the past few weeks all we’ve seen are the villains raping and pillaging and despoiling all that we hold dear – rather like the first hour of the original and uncensored Mad Max.

I’ve made it pretty clear what I think about the villains that have got us into the current meltdown mess. Even I need a break from cynicism every now and then, however, to remind myself that better is truly possible. I thought I would take the opportunity of my post this week to reflect on a personal hero who epitomises what banking once was and whose philosophical writings can point us toward what banking should be again when the dust settles and we contemplate rebuilding our collapsed financial house of cards.

No one is perfect, and I’m sure he’s not either, but he’s shown consistently good judgement, intellectual curiosity and resistance to orthodoxy over the years. If we had a hundred bankers in the world like him, we wouldn’t have today’s crisis.

The bravest decision he took was in 1995, following the collapse of Barings Bank, as he explained in The Prospect:

I am a 47-year-old banker - chief executive of Swiss Bank Corporation in London, to be precise - and I have just decided that I need to go back to university for two years to study mathematics. Some of my friends think I am mad, and perhaps they are right. But perhaps something strange has happened to banking too.

It is hard to imagine that there is anything really new in banking. The tools of the trade have been around and in use, pretty much unchanged, for hundreds of years. Yet within the span of my own career, the world of international finance has enjoyed a renaissance-a spurt of creativity in the 1970s and 1980s, when new techniques emerged which have transformed the conduct of many banks and bankers. These techniques-collectively known as derivatives-have spawned a new jargon (would you know what to do with a Jellyroll, or an Alligator Spread?), huge new sources of profit, and mystifying new types of risk.

Imagine devoting yourself to the study of advanced mathematics in your mid-40s from the lofty heights of CEO of a Swiss bank! I wouldn’t be so noble, from more modest altitudes.

SBC had acquired O’Connor Associates, a Chicago derivatives trading partnership. The O’Connor partners were soon installed as senior executives throughout SBC, and changed it from a sleepy private bank to a powerhouse of aggressive power trading in the newly emergent global derivatives markets. Rudi needed to go back to school to know the business he was managing. He stepped down from the top job and got a degree in advanced mathematics at Imperial College, London.

That made Rudi an instant legend in the City and was the first I heard of him. He returned to finance as the Chief Executive of UBS Private Bank and Member of the UBS Group Executive Board. Since then I have followed his writings. For some years past I have enjoyed his friendship.

One year into the course, he emphasised again the importance of executives confronting the changing requirements of banking:

IC Reporter (10 February 1997)

Despite holding a degree in economics and business administration, Mr Bogni really did go back to basics under the tutelage of the Centre, sitting mock GCSEs and A levels in maths and statistics. Probability theory, calculus, algebra and stochastical modelling are also on the programme. “It’s a course not really designed towards a degree,” said Mr Bogni, “but towards the specific mathematics required for my type of business.”

Not all of those who share Mr Bogni’s business of derivatives are convinced of the benefits to be gained from the study of modern applied mathematics. However Mr Bogni believes that those who do not recognise its importance are avoiding the changing nature of financial markets. “Among the people that I respect there is a genuine understanding of what the issues are. It’s not a question of derivatives being a part of the financial markets, they are the financial market now.”

Rudi Bogni wasn’t afraid to admit that his bank had become unmanageable within the limits of his traditional banking background and understanding, and to take a hard look at his own qualifications to wager the bank’s capital on derivatives. If more CEOs had done that, then the proprietary dealing desks would never have gained the leverage that leaves the banking system so woefully undercapitalised today. If more CEOs pondered the philosophical basis for creating and allocating wealth, and the political means of asserting or coercing state power in the cause of more wealth accretion, then perhaps the destruction of jobs, savings and security would be less threatening to the investors, pensioners and taxpayers facing systemic financial failure this week.

In June of this year, Rudi published a piece in Wilmott Magazine (subscription only – the most expensive monthly on either side of the Atlantic, according to Forbes). At the risk of stretching fair use, and with the author’s consent, I’m going to quote it extensively here as it gets to the heart of the crisis we now face:

The Thin Space of Financial Activity

Those of you who may have read Bill Bryson’s A Short History of NearlyEverything will certainly recall his thesis that life on earth as we know it is an exceptional event and a possibility that materialized only within very small boundaries.

I wish you to consider how much smaller those boundaries are for the existence of financial activity.

First of all, you need a thinking species that lives and prospers in a cooperative environment. Second, you need a reasonably developed economy. Third, you need the ability to save and do more than survive only hand-to-mouth on a daily basis. Finally, you need reciprocal trust and a framework of law, as well as accepted customs and rules.

. . .

We have just witnessed last year—and we are still witnessing this year—how a relatively minor breakdown in trust and information has brought two markets, the interbank money market and the CDO market, to either display strong anomalies or freeze. Worse could come if we do not all learn to respect the boundaries within which financial activity can exist and thrive.

Investment bankers have to learn that if you have ambitions to act as an agent for an issue of a financial product, you should also have the means to make a market in that very same product in good and bad times—and investors should hold you to that. Regulatory walls between origination and trading have solved some problems, but they have also become an easy alibi for not standing behind one’s responsibilities.

Furthermore, they must understand that a revaluation of financial assets because the cost of capital has sharply decreased is not due to their genius. It is a physical law as much as conservation of energy, and therefore they do not deserve bonus payments for that. They should also realize that when they push bonus expectations beyond the moral threshold of 50/55 percent of net revenue, they are forcing their employers to take unacceptable risks to meet such expectations and that such a course of action can only end in tears.

Rating agencies have to learn about financial history and free thinking, not only about ticking boxes. Furthermore, they have to learn that the theory of overcollateralization differs from the historical experience, if you dig long enough into the past.

Regulators must learn that any new rule is a starting point for regulatory arbitrage and the mother of unintended consequences. Hence, there should be a few good rules, not thousands aimed at covering each potential circumstance. Most governments seem to have understood the lesson that the pursuit of inflation as an easy solution will bring them down in due course and for a long period. They seem to be deaf, however, to the fact that corporate taxation above 30 percent and personal direct taxation

over 40 percent, as well as an overall tax take including indirect taxation of over 50 percent, will either cripple both financial and economic activity, force people to take excessive risks, or push them elsewhere.

Retailers of financial products and solutions must realize that they are dealing with people’s lives and families’ futures. They cannot behave as street peddlers. Clear ethical boundaries must be the first line of defense, even before any legal framework is considered, because the law is unlikely to be as clear-cut as morality.

Finally, investors must be realistic about expectations. The best you can hope through financial activity is to preserve your wealth. If you want to create it, become an entrepreneur. If you want to gamble, stop whining when you lose.

If we do not all learn to be guided by such simple principles, financial activity as we know and need it will be put at risk. Trust will be eroded, impossible expectations will be created, and we will look back to the past 60 years as a golden age of economic development and financial maturity that may not be replicated any longer.

. . .

Politicians and regulators must stop hectoring and accept responsibility for having unintentionally pushed financial activity beyond sound boundaries by meddling without really understanding. Basel 2 in particular requires a very critical new look, if not a recall, as you would do for a line of cars when you realize that the brakes do not work as expected.

. . .

An excess of CO2 may be a major threat to civilized life as we know it, but the malfunctioning or freezing of the financial system could happen much faster, and we would have no control over it, as it depends on the psychology of literally billions of individuals. The consequences of such a malfunctioning do not bear thinking: breakdown in trade and investments, freezing of savings and pensions, advent of totalitarian regimes, war, and so on.

The financial system is a delicate mechanism and an essential one. Let us all treat it with some respect.

The thin space of financial activity requires a carefully calibrated commitment to balance by all parties participating in defining the sphere and scope and framework for financial interaction. In trying to deliver ever-increasing profits all around by growing the pie with inflationary monetary policies, executive excess, heightened investor expectations, regulatory and rating agency forbearance and other unrealistic and unsustainable policies, we have each and every one of us contributed to the current collapse.

Soon we will be doing a forensic analysis of what went wrong, and then look to craft new policies as a basis for rebuilding. We could do worse than look to Rudi Bogni’s analysis of the thin space of financial activity as providing the template.

___________________________________________

More excerpts from Rudi’s writing over the years:

Re: Excessive Liquidity, Self-Indulgence and Self-Deceit (1 March 2007)

I read Dr Malmgren’s submission to ATCA with great interest. As in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, there is an increasing risk in our less and less enlightened and less and less educated societies for the financial operators to be blamed for all economic evils, the same way that unfortunately the Jewish and Lombard bankers used to be blamed for the disasters caused by the excessive indebtedness of the European monarchies of the time.

Reality is much simpler. Take a bathtub and fill it to 1/3, then throw a stone into it. It may cause waves, but it might not flow over. Take the same bathtub and fill it to the brim, then throw a stone into it. It is most likely to flow over.

What we are experiencing is an unusually long period of extreme liquidity. Whatever the motivations for it, they are essentially political motivations, driven by political intents. Whether it is to finance wars without increasing taxation, whether it is to make people feel good about the inflated value of their assets so that they are going to spend more and promote GDP growth, whether it is to buffer one country’s voters from the natural effects that working less should entitle them to a lesser share of global goods and services, there are political intents behind the excessive liquidity.

Politicians are shying away from telling the truth to their voters and a vicious circle of self-indulgence and self-deceit is being buttressed by excessive liquidity.

Blaming incorrectly the equivalents of the Jews and Lombards of today, ie hedge funds and private equity investors, is the modern version of the French kings locking up the bankers in order to avoid taking the due blame and repaying the debts.

Long term it is a strategy which can ultimately lead only to decline.

Turning difficult issues which require courage, like global warming or global competition, into a religion of fear is the novel way by which politicians aim and unfortunately short-term succeed in keeping the masses, and often even the intelligentsia, in the dark and unable to confront policy-makers on the rightful field of rationality.

Rudi Bogni

The Left and Right defined the 20th century. What’s Next? Prospect (March 2007):

Left vs Right was and is purely a nominal distinction between two strands of the same totalitarian posture. The real problem of the 20th century was that the demographic and economic pressures that fractured the empires gave rise to national states with leaderships ill equipped to face the nihilist challenge. The vacuum was filled by totalitarian regimes, whose ideologies set fire to Europe and the world. Remember that Hitler was a failed architected, Staline had studied for the priesthood an Mussolini was a schoolteacher. The heirs of the 19th and 20th century nihilists are today’s faith-based terrorists. If today’s democracies fail to win against the new nihilists on the intellectual and communication level, they will have no chance to win in the security space and will create another dangerous vacuum, ready to be filled. Nation states have proven a disastrous political experiment in the 19th and 20th century; they may well prove catastrophic in the 21st century, due to nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, I hope that the 21st century will see a substantial reduction of political infrastructures. If a conglomerate is bad or indifferent at most of what it does, shareholders force it back to its core competences. Everything else has got to go. Why should it be different for governments? This is neither left nor right; it is common sense. Large countries’ politicians love to deride small countries’ direct democracies. Why? Because they fear their example and their nimbleness. The political systems inherited from the 20th century, whether democratic or totalitarian, are neo-feudal, incompatible with a 21st century when electors vote every so many years, but consumers vote and bloggers blog 24/7.

The Stars and Gripes (12 July 2002):

Curing hatred of America is not easy. The European intelligentsia, because of the value its educational system places on knowledge for its own sake, tends to develop a highly critical sense and a healthy scepticism. US elites, despite being trained to think for themselves, tend to be less self-critical, perhaps too focused on getting rich. This creates a big communication gap. I concentrate on Europe versus America because if there is anybody who can help America to shed its self-satisfied myths and treat the rest of the world as equals with whom it is OK to disagree, it is us Europeans. US and European interests often converge, even when our hearts and minds do not meet.

What is certain is that half-educated people, with puerile, dogmatic, self-centred half-knowledge, are the salt of tyranny. The greatest tyrants of the century we have just survived, Hitler and Stalin, were half-educated men of hatred. Only knowledge accompanied by self-deprecating critical spirit can dispose of hatred, whether of America or of the rest of the world.

But I must admit - and this is why this book created a sense of emotional release - that until now I have never seriously confronted my close American friends with what I did not like about their country. I used the same polite diplomacy to avoid taking to task my Jewish and Arab friends over Palestine. This is wrong. Discourse is the stuff of civilised life; complacency is the crystallisation of ignorance and the begetter of lost lives.

Raised by the Yankee Game (3 May 2002)

When I hear the debate as to whether capitalism won over communism, triggering perhaps the end of history, I get very annoyed. Capitalism did not win a thing. Thatcher and Reagan may have pushed down communism’s crumbling walls, but the revolution was elsewhere. It was in places such as the City of London, beacons of freedom, where young men and women of any nationality could go to work every day reporting to a person of different background and culture, working for shareholders perhaps of a different country, free to choose their career, employer, lifestyle, perhaps even work attire. Free to speak their mind and to pay the price for it if necessary. But what a small price in comparison to that of living in an autocratic society such as the Soviet Union.

Brad Setser: Extraordinary Times

2008-09-26T09:33:00.000+01:00

Brad Setser has a fascinating insight to offer in his newest post, Extraordinary Times:

In the last two weeks — if I am reading the Federal Reserves’ balance sheet data correctly — the Fed has:

Increased “other loans” to the financial system by around $230 billion (from $23.56b to $262.34b);

Increased its “other assets” by about $80b (from $98.67b to $183.89b);

Increased the securities it lends out to dealers by $60b (from $117.3b to $190.5b);

That works out to the provision of something like $370b of credit to the financial system in a two week period. And that is just what I saw on a cursory glance.

The most that the IMF ever lent out to cash strapped emerging economies in a year?

$30b, in the four quarters through September 1998 (i.e. the peak of the 97-98 crisis).

The most the IMF ever lend out over two years?

$40b, in the eight quarters through June 2003 (this covered crises in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Turkey)

This is a very real crisis. The Fed’s balance tells a story of extraordinary stress. I never would have expected to see the Fed lent out these kinds of sums over such a short-period.

My response:

Excellent and timely, Brad. I’ve been speculating all week that the pressure being used on the Congress to pass the Paulson Plan is the threat of Fed illiquidity. As of two weeks ago, the Fed had lent out more than $600 billion of its $800 billion balance sheet Treasuries against crap MBS collateral.

The Paulson Plan would have allowed the banks to unwind the repos putting the Treasuries back in the Fed, get cash for the crap MBS, and get more Treasuries from the issues financing the $700+ billion funding of the Plan. As a bonus, the Paulson mark-to-maturity price becomes the implicit Level 3 price for capitalisation of all the firms and banks in the system, giving them some breathing room to stay in business. Everyone wins except the poor American taxpayer.

The Fed is very close to being illiquid. That is the fear factor we are seeing at work, and the reason no one will discuss why the bailout is needed - only emphasise the urgency.

Did Buffett Just Give Us A Coded Warning?

2008-09-24T15:17:00.000+01:00

Warren Buffett, new stakeholder in the megalithic survivor-biased Goldman Sachs, has referred to recent upheavals in the financial markets as "an economic Pearl Harbour". He is a very smart man who knows his history, having lived it and seen it up close. He will know better than most that Pearl Harbour is now understood in well informed circles to not only have been foreseen by FDR, but provoked by FDR in an orchestrated campaign to engineer a war with Japan dating from a plan adopted in 1940.

As yoyomo reminds us in an earlier thread, the book Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbour provides dispositive documentary evidence.

Historians have long debated whether President Roosevelt had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Using documents pried loose through the Freedom of Information Act during 17 years of research, Stinnett provides overwhelming evidence that FDR and his top advisers knew that Japanese warships were heading toward Hawaii. The heart of his argument is even more inflammatory: Stinnett argues that FDR, who desired to sway public opinion in support of U.S. entry into WWII, instigated a policy intended to provoke a Japanese attack. The plan was outlined in a U.S. Naval Intelligence secret strategy memo of October 1940; Roosevelt immediately began implementing its eight steps (which included deploying U.S. warships in Japanese territorial waters and imposing a total embargo intended to strangle Japan's economy), all of which, according to Stinnett, climaxed in the Japanese attack.

Warren Buffet knows better than most just how dirty and mean this Bush administration plays. The politically motivated prosecutions of AIG after he endorsed Kerry in 2004 will have left scars, and his advising Obama puts him at huge risk if Rove succeeds with another GOP victory.

He is in the insurance business, isn't he? So think of his acquisition of a huge stake in Goldman Sachs and his endorsement of the Paulson Plan as insurance. Meanwhile, he may just be patriot enough to have provided a coded clue as to what he really believes you can expect.

Marcy Kaptur (D-OH): "Real reform now or nothing!"

2008-09-23T21:20:00.000+01:00

Must see.

She rips Wall Street a new one.

Quotable: On Bank Balance Sheets

2008-09-23T11:41:00.001+01:00

"The problem with financial institution balance sheets is that on the left hand side nothing is right and on the right hand side nothing is left."

Rep McDermott (D-WA): Paulson "able to catch a pass he threw to himself"

2008-09-23T06:07:00.000+01:00

Rep McDermott gets it:

Mr Speaker,

The people in Washington State are very troubled by the fact that King George has been disposed of by King Henry.

We picked up Newsweek magazine today and we have a new King... King Henry?

We're supposed to give him 700 billion dollars of our money. He doesn't want any review. He wants to be able to do whatever he wants with it. He doesn't want any Congressional oversight. And worst of all, the new king is just like the old king: He doesn't want any sacrifice.

He says, "Oh we can't threaten the salares of the investment bankers who drove us into a ditch. We can't get anyone to pay for this."

This is the third time we've done it with this bunch. First the war, that didn't get paid for. Then the tax cuts, that didn't get paid for, and now King Henry takes over to distribute 700 billion dollars. He's going to be there for four months. And in four months he will make deals and then he'll go out and he'll be able to catch a pass he threw to himself.

"Non-Reviewable" - Sometimes there really ARE conspiracies

2008-09-20T22:17:00.000+01:00

The text of the proposed emergency markets legislation is now available. Just as expected, it will contain a provision to provide immunity from any review by any court or executive agency. Either get with the collaborationists or get with the insurgents. There is no other choice. The USA doesn’t exist as we once knew it.

The relevant text from the legislation:

Sec. 8. Review.

Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.

Good luck, everyone. We’re in uncharted waters now. There is no rule of law if this passes - there are no markets. We’ve all been had, and the worst is yet to come.

The Unitary Federal Reserve - Crisis Choreography

2008-09-19T09:14:00.000+01:00

Along with much of the world, I have watched with increasing disquiet as the United States of America morphed under President Bush into a lawless soft dictatorship more like the USSR than the USA. Under his theory of the "unitary executive" the laws that Congress enacted were disapplied by signing statements and secret legal opinions. The protections of the Constitution were eroded and marginalized by police powers and warrantless surveillance. International treaties governing the protection of sovereignty, rules of war and the universal rights of man were distorted by unilateral interpretation and willfully hidden misconduct. Court rulings and judicial review were avoided, and where forced, were ignored or overridden or negated by executive pardon. Transparency and audit became a joke with refusals to cooperate with tribunals or to comply with supeonas or produce evidence. This lawlessness has not made the world or the United States or its allies safer in the age of terrorism as it has degraded and confused what we might have hoped to defend.

Just as we here in the rest of the world hoped we might breathe easy with the end of the Bush administration in sight, and several creditable candidates for president coming forward, the lawless unitary executive has expanded to embrace the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, debasing and contaminating the financial markets globally with its spread to our own central banks and market authorities and destabilizing our banks and investment markets. Once again in the name of crisis and expediency the laws are ignored, decisions are taken in secret, extra-judicial reapportionment of property and contract is mandated by executive fiat, and legislative review and judicial intervention are impossible. Over the past year every financial crisis has been met with lawless and Enron-esque innovation by the Federal Reserve and Treasury, and this week was arguably more extreme.

After this week's secret and unaccountable and extra-legal moves by the US financial authorities, I will not be holding any assets in the United States. I do not understand the rules. I doubt any rules will be applied fairly to all the players. I cannot be sure who the umpire works for, or what principles the umpire thinks they should uphold. I will not play the game.*

Let's look at a timeline of some of the decisions I would class as extra-legal or Enron-esque:

The (Selectively Leaked) Discount Rate Cut (August 2008)

Super SIV (October 2007)

Term Auction Facility (December 2007)

Bear Stearns/JP Morgan bailout and subsidy (March 2008)

Primary Dealer Credit Facility (March 2008)

Reverse MBS Swaps (April 2008)

Equity investment and collateral (September 2008)

Administrative Repeal of 23A (September 2008)

AIG nationalisation (September 2008)

Expansion of the Fed Balance Sheet through unprecedented Treasury refinance without appropriation by Congress (September 2008)

Central bank dollar liquidity draws (September 2008)

Resolution Trust Company/Super SIV Redux (next)

And that's just the list of actions we know about. Much may have been orchestrated and influenced behind the scenes in credit markets and traded equities and commodities.

At no stage have any of these significant enhancements to the prerogatives of the Federal Reserve, these derogations of explicit statutory limits, these stark departures from past authority and conduct, been the subject of democratic legislative proposal or review, or even public consultation and comment. In the name of exigency, they have all been sprung as fait accompli on a shocked financial community, and since been treated as unquestionable and unreviewable. Every initiative introduced as a temporary measure has become a permanent fixture.

The unitary executive of the Bush presidency eroded and disregarded the civil rights of Americans and others. The unitary Federal Reserve disregards the property and contract rights of Americans and others. Arguably the actions of the Federal Reserve over the past year represent the largest state confiscation of wealth in the history of man, dispossessing currency investors, equity investors, bond investors and taxpayers of literally trillions of dollars of current and future wealth by executive fiat.

The hypocrisy of the Bush administration criticizing Chavez while defending Paulson and Bernanke should be the stuff of late night stand up comedy.

And the answer to the crisis so created, according to those in authority in Washington and Wall Street, is to give more concentrated power with less review and less oversight to the Federal Reserve. The reforms now being discussed in Washington are aimed at (1) gutting the SEC so that it can no longer challenge the Fed's primacy in investment bank and financial conglomerate prudential supervision, oversight of clearing and settlement systems, market integrity and stability and introducing “principles based” regulation so that no one well connected need ever worry about prosecution or conviction ever again; (2) gutting the FDIC so that it can no longer challenge the Fed's determination of capital adequacy or prudential supervision at insured banks or restrain cross-affiliate financing or excessively risky activity within bank holding company groups; (3) gutting the CFTC so that the Fed has primacy to oversee risk management in all OTC and exchange-traded derivatives clearing and margin; and (4) providing explicit powers to the Federal Reserve to promote "market stability" by means which shall be secret, unreviewable, and above challenge in the courts; and (5) making the Federal Reserve the prime global regulator for review of the regulatory and prudential supervision arrangements everywhere else in the world through mandated “harmonization” of global standards as a quid pro quo for foreign market recognition and access.

Stalin couldn’t have drafted a better plan for central control of the global economy after wreaking such havoc and devastation.

Up until this week I thought the gold bugs a bit mad. I couldn't see the sense of holding something that couldn't be spent but could be seized (as gold was seized in the 1940s). I still think they are a bit mad, but I am actively looking for any alternative to currency and market investments as a medium of exchange and store of value. Given the very public concerns now being expressed in China and Russia, I am keeping company I would have once thought very surprising indeed.

For now the ECB, Bank of England and others are content to cooperate with the Fed, but as the chaos deepens and it becomes clear that the losses are to be allocated principally outside the US borders to those foolish enough to hold assets the Fed’s policies degrade and debase, they will begin to question and to look to each other for common interest and alignment.

The loss of 1200 lives on the Lusitania was deliberately allowed to justify US entry into World War I. The attacks on Pearl Harbour were known in the White House three days before the bombs fell, but were ignored to justify entry into World War II. Tonkin Gulf was a fraud. WTC hijackers were financed by US allies and WTC 7 was . . . whatever. Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction were fabricated in the forgery shop of Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. You get the idea.

Not all catastrophic events were willful or anticipated, but all were used to force through an agenda that was pre-agreed by a powerful elite that stood to profit from a preferred course of policies that could only be pursued in the undemocratic atmosphere of crisis. Crisis prevents objective determination of the public interest. Crisis undermines both markets and democracy.

I no longer believe that every financial collapse is unanticipated or without behind the scenes orchestration of effects. I no longer trust the authorities to act fairly, honestly, in the public interest.

In the past year and just this past week, trillions of dollars of wealth have been allocated or misallocated, preserved, appropriated or destroyed by central bank fiat. If we really have nations of laws and not men, capitalist markets and not command economies, then it’s essential we peek behind the curtain to ask by whom and why and hold them accountable.

Lawlessness has not enhanced our security as citizens, and lawlessness will not enhance our security as investors or depositors either. Banks and markets require regulation in the public interest, and determination of the public interest requires transparency, accountability and the rule of law.

_____________________________

* For those cynics out there, let me remind you I gave up trading in January this year. I had a small amount of cash in a US dollar account. That account is now closed.

Hat tip to Joe Mason, for expressing similar views here on RGE Finance and Banking yesterday: Crisis Policy is Redrawing the Boundaries of our Financial System - and not necessarily in productive ways

And, as ever, thanks to the courageous Professor Roubini for providing a forum for views challenging the orthodoxy.

Denninger warns of US political failure

2008-09-18T09:32:00.000+01:00

Every now and then I have enjoyed reading Karl Denninger's Market Ticker on current events. His most recent video, which he warns may be his last, warns that the line crossed by the Treasury and Federal Reserve in creating new money to bail out Wall Street will - if unchallenged - lead to the political failure of the United States and its constitutional government as a representative democracy. He makes some very good points.

Unlike most people, I knew in 2002 and early 2003 that the United States was determined to attack and occupy Iraq because I have a long memory for bank failures. I knew that Ahmad Chalabi was the same forger, embezzler and fraudster who had looted Bank Petra of $300 million before fleeing Jordan, almost causing the collapse of the Jordanian economy. Since all the intelligence fabricated for the war emanated from Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, I knew the whole thing was being orchestrated by authorities.

I get the same queasy feeling today about events on Wall Street, and like Denninger, I wonder what the plan really is for the nation as more and more lines are crossed with extra-legal executive authority. I did not expect in 2002 and 2003 that war for oil in Iraq would lead to black sites, renditions, torture, Blackwater deployed in New Orleans, and other proximate results of a lawlessness and unaccountability that remained unchallenged and unchecked. I do not know what to expect of the USA in the years to come. That worries me deeply.

Ring Fences, Rustlers and a global bank insolvency

2008-09-12T11:17:00.000+01:00

In this week which has seen so much speculation on the fate of Lehman Brothers, it seems only sensible to review how an international insolvency of a major bank works and what it might mean for international creditors. The insolvency treatment of international banks has remained one of the stubbornly difficult areas of law to harmonise and huge uncertainty and complexity remains. For excellent background, see Cross-border bank insolvency by Rosa Maria Lastra of Queen Mary, University of London.

Although markets are global, and Lehman Brothers operations span the globe, all insolvency is local. The basic premise is that each jurisdiction buries its own dead and keeps whatever treasure or garbage it finds with the corpse. Local creditors get to recover their claims out of the locally available assets. If, and only if, there are any assets left over will international creditors be invited to make a claim for the rest. Europe has managed to harmonise cross-border insolvency for banks under directives and local law to embody principles of universality and unity within the EU, but that only works equitably if enough assets are in the EU when the bank fails, and local insolvency law still applies in all its divergent complexity.

Claims against a bank are deemed located wherever the contract creating the claim is undertaken. If it is under US law then the claimant must look to the liquidator in the United States and assets under his control for recovery. If the claim is in Hong Kong, then the claimant looks to the Hong Kong receiver and assets.

The key to having a happy insolvency, if such a thing exists, lies in ensuring that when a globalised bank goes bust, all the best assets are inside your borders and subject to seizure by your liquidators on behalf of your creditors. Everyone else outside your borders is on their own. As the US dollar is the reserve currency of banking and US Treasuries, Agencies and other assets are the highest preferred asset class, the US is almost always in a good position in an international bank failure.

The principle of using local assets for local recovery is known as the “ring fence” – the idea being that insolvency drops an invisible “ring fence” around any valuable assets at the borders to meet claims arising within the borders. No country is more assiduous in weaving the ring fence than the United States of America. It is a very successful strategy for US creditors. US creditors of failed international banks tend to recover disproportionately relative to creditors anywhere else. The ring fence contains all these choicest assets for US creditors, and all the international creditors are forced to pick among the dross of foreign assets to eke out a recovery, only receiving any residual US assets remaining after US creditors get 100 percent recovery.

Lehman has been deeply troubled and subject to speculation since the early spring. That was just about the time that we started to see a marked sell off in foreign markets where Lehman has long been a major player. Recently, along with intensification of that sell off, we have seen a strengthening of the US dollar and US asset markets.

If one were cynical, and one believed that Lehman was going to be allowed to fail pour encouragement les autres one might wonder if Lehman was quietly bidden – or even explicitly ordered – to sell off its foreign holdings and repatriate the proceeds to asset classes within the US ring fence. This would ensure that US creditors of Lehman received a satisfactory recovery at the expense of foreign creditors. It would also contribute to a nice pre-election illusion of a “flight to quality” as US dollar and assets strengthened on the direction of flow.

If one were really cynical, one might even think that a wily bank supervisor might arrange to ensure 100 percent recovery for its creditors with a bit of creative misappropriation thrown in the mix. Broker dealers normally hold securities and other assets in nominee name on behalf of their investor clients. Under modern market regulation, these nominee assets are supposed to be held separately from a firm’s own assets so that they can be protected in an insolvency and restored to the clients with minimal loss and inconvenience. Liberalisations and financial innovations have undermined the segregation principle by promoting much more intensive use of client assets for leverage (prime brokerage and margin lending) and alternative income streams (securities lending). As a result, it is often very difficult to discern in a failed broker who has the better claim to assets which were held to a client account but reused for finance and/or trading purposes. The main source of evidence is the books of the failed broker.

On the wholesale side, margin and collateralisation in connection with derivatives and securities finance arrangements mean that creditors under these arrangements should have good delivery and secure legal claims to assets provided under market standard agreements. As a result, preferred wholesale creditors could have been streamed the choicest assets under arrangements that will look above suspicion on review as being consistent with market best practice.

If Lehman were to go into insolvency, I will be interested to discover whether US creditors achieve a much higher proportion of recovery than their global peers in other locations where Lehman did business. If so, it will likely be because of the US ring fence and the months of repatriation of assets and funds back into the confines of the ring fence before the failure was finally orchestrated. It will also be because the choicest assets were preferentially delivered to preferred US creditors under market standard margin and collateral arrangements.

Unfortunately, the pace of an international insolvency means that any retrospective evaluation will be so far down the road that I will likely be almost alone in looking backwards to see what the final distribution effects are and what they mean for equitable principles of international banking practice.

Weaning the banks off the Old Lady's teat

2008-09-05T13:32:00.000+01:00

There is a warm sense of security that comes from suckling liquidity from the teat of the central bank rather than foraging for capital and earnings in a harsh world full of threats and predators. Nonetheless, there comes a time when a good mother pushes away her importunate young and forces them to fend for themselves subject to her stern guidance and supervision.

Central banks have been suckling their broods of commercial banks since the credit crunch first exploded on the scene in August 2007. Now there are signs that the Bank of England and European Central Bank, at least, are keen to push their broods toward self-sufficiency, even at the risk that not all survive independently.

The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street has announced that she really, really means it when she says that the Special Liquidity Scheme introduced to enable banks to draw her gilts against mortgage-backed collateral will be closed down 20th October. The SLS was opened as a “one-off operation with a finite life” and was never intended to do more than bridge the liquidity gap created by the collapse of the mortgage-back securities market while banks adjusted their business models to changed market conditions.

The banks, led by UBS, are throwing temper tantrums, stamping their little feet, screaming in the financial press, but so far the Old Lady is holding firm. Mervyn King said last month:

"The SLS was introduced as a measure to deal with a legacy problem of liquidity of the stock of assets which banks owned last year when the crisis hit. So that window will close in October. The longer-term issue of tightening of credit conditions is much wider. That is to do with the health of the capital position of the banking system, and it's very important not to confuse the two".

Mr King’s determination to husband what remains of the Old Lady’s resources may have something to do with profligate abuse of them when opened to her brood. What started out as a scheme to extend up to £50 billion (a bit less than $100 million) in liquidity to shore up the UK credit markets during a surprise credit dislocation may have been drawn for as much as £200 billion in total as crunch turned to constriction. The Bank will only publish the true scale in October after the SLS closes. The SLS has been hungrily drained by banks keen to swap whatever unmarketable dross remained on their books for good central bank gilts.

The abuse has been made plain in numbers reported by the BIS.

Banks issued a record £45bn in mortgage-backed bonds in the three months to the end of June - more even than at the very height of the housing boom in 2006 - according to figures from the Bank for International Settlements. . . . . The Quarterly Review added: "Most of the UK issuance followed the Bank of England's announcement in April 2008 of a Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) that enables UK banks to swap illiquid assets such as mortgage-backed securities against UK Treasury bills."

This record mortgage-backed issuance comes at a time when new mortgage lending in the UK has contracted very sharply, down 71 percent year on year for the month of July. That indicates a cynical abuse of the Old Lady’s generosity. Rather than be left with dry dugs dangling to her waist, the Old Lady would prefer to wean the banks while she retains ample bosom and sufficient other assets to shore up her public stature.

Over at the European Central Bank, a rule change this week will increase haircuts (discounts to stated market value) for collateral provided under that liquidity scheme from next February. The ECB has made available over EUR 367 billion (a bit less than $700 billion) under very liberal terms.

According the Financial Times:

The changes, which take effect from February 1, include increases in the average “haircuts” applied to asset-backed securities. A haircut is the amount deducted from the market value of a product when judging its value as collateral. In future, a blanket 12 per cent haircut will apply, replacing a previous sliding scale of between 2 per cent and 18 per cent. There will be penalties for asset-backed securities valued using models and for unsecured bank bonds.

Restrictions already in place on banks using assets they themselves had formed were extended to stop banks using assets from issues to which they had offered currency hedges or liquidity support above a certain level.

Analysts at Barclays Capital said the extra haircuts would mean banks might have to post an additional €25bn-€45bn of securities for collateral purposes. “That could cost €375m to €450m annually to banks ... Not insignificant, but probably bearable,” said Laurent Fransolet, analyst at Barcap.

The normally politic Yves Mersch made explicit reference in his remarks to "dangers of gaming the system".

Nonetheless, with house purchases falling to new lows and credit getting progressively tighter, the Labour government and the Council of Mortgage Lenders are wild to have another source of cheap liquidity if the Old Lady denies them. A new scheme for taxpayer-subsidised mortgage finance is in the offing. It is clearly bad public policy to have the government subsidise further borrowing for the housing sector after such a destructive bubble, but the scale of vested interest and the unpopularity of the Labour incumbents as the house prices fall make a new scheme a certainty all the same.

Rather like a mother who loves her young no matter how ill-bred, destructive and abusive they are to their peers or the community, the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street is unlikely to mind very much if British banks prosper by depredations on the politicians, taxpayers, market counterparties, corporate treasurers, hedge funds and others so long as they are out of the house. Having proved they have no sense of gratitude or duty to the Old Lady that preserved them in time of need, the others who will become their new targets can expect even less consideration.

Is the FDIC another troubled monoline?

2008-08-29T15:11:00.000+01:00

Reading Reggie Middleton’s latest blog on RGE (he looks much younger than I'd have guessed!) reminded me of a metric which is critical to assessing the velocity of a financial crisis as it affects a financial institution. In looking at American Express, he highlights (among a lot of other useful data) the extent to which charge-offs on credit cards are exceeding the growth of reserves. Both numbers are moving. Charge-offs are going up. Reserves are going up too to cover the losses from charge-offs, but are not growing as quickly.

As we all know, it is liquid reserves that enable a credit institution to cope with periods of uncertainty, underperformance and/or illiquidity. In the banking industry, the relationship between losses and reserves is referred to as the “coverage ratio” and it is a critical indicator of stress.

Those with too low reserves must borrow or recapitalise just at that point in the cycle when lenders and investors become wary sceptics as they contemplate the worsening business climate in general and deteriorating performance of the needy in particular. Those unable to secure credit or attract investment must look to official liquidity facilities, if available, and/or face forced asset liquidations and/or insolvency. Those who can secure credit or attract investment typically do so at a cost which impairs future profitability and so undermines future reserve growth (see From Capital-ist to Capital-less Economies).

It occurred to me to examine the coverage ratio in another context that I already planned to write about today: the FDIC.

For the past month or so, I haven’t been able to look at the FDIC without seeing a big, undercapitalised, monoline insurer. I didn’t want to see the FDIC that way, especially since Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England and normally a very sensible bloke, is a huge admirer of the US deposit insurance system and wants to import FDIC principles here to the UK. If the FDIC is fundamentally flawed, then the UK may once again follow the US over yet another cliff with too little reflection of our inherent self-interest in avoiding yet another public policy disaster.

Facing my fears, as we all should if we aspire to be rational and make superior judgements, requires assessing the facts.

The following excerpt from Wikipedia describes the characteristics of a monoline insurer:

Monoline insurers (also referred to as "monoline insurance companies" or simply "monolines") guarantee the timely repayment of bond principal and interest when an issuer defaults. They are so named because they provide services to only one industry.

The economic value of bond insurance to the governmental unit, agency, or company offering bonds is a saving in interest costs reflecting the difference in yield on an insured bond from that on the same bond if uninsured.

So what is the FDIC then? The FDIC “guarantee[s] the timely repayment of [deposits] when a[n insured financial institution] defaults.” The FDIC “provide[s] services to only one industry. The economic value of [FDIC deposit insurance] to the [insured banks] offering [deposit accounts and certificates of deposit] is a saving in interest costs reflecting the difference in yield on an insured [deposit] from that on the same [deposit] if uninsured.”

The similarities are too great. The FDIC is a monoline insurer in all the ways that matter.

Taking that as a starting point then, what makes the FDIC better able to withstand the rigours of a financial crisis than its private sector monoline brethren? Let’s look at the advantages the FDIC has over lesser monolines.

Regulatory Powers: The FDIC has the power to compel banks to increase their capital, limit their riskier business activity, and otherwise intervene to curb management’s rush toward bank failure.

Mandatory Participation: American banks have no choice but to buy their deposit insurance from the FDIC, and are obligated to do so. They have no choice but to pay the premia assessed by the FDIC when due if they want to remain in business. With more than 6,000 banks participating, the risks should be diversified (except, of course, that banks are herd animals so that risk outcomes are highly correlated for the sector as a whole). Risk-Weighted Premia: Theoretically, the FDIC’s risk-based CAMELS rating system should require riskier banks to pay more. It would be interesting to apply rigorous market backtesting methodologies to see whether CAMELS is performing as expected in this downturn, or whether like so much else, CAMELS has been distorted by forbearance and crony capitalism into another tool for industry concentration and selective competitive advantage favouring well-connected big banks during the M&A boom years.

Statutory Receiver of Failed Banks: When a bank fails, the FDIC takes over the assets and liabilities, and is able to rapidly arrange for bridge banks, purchase and assumption transactions to healthy banks, and otherwise realise value from failed banks while minimising systemic disruption to retail and commercial account holders. This is a critical function as the surest way to prevent draws of deposit insurance is to compel a work out that secures depositors unimpaired access to their accounts.

Treasury Credit as a Backstop: If it runs into trouble, the FDIC can borrow from the Treasury (just like everyone else in corporate America, it seems).

This is a formidable armory of powers and privileges. And we know the FDIC is experienced at using its powers to good effect, having proven itself several times through the past 75 years. Nonetheless, these powers may be insufficient if the scale of losses insured by the FDIC overwhelm the capitalisation of the insured banks and the resources of the FDIC.

This is where Reggie’s test of losses relative to reserve growth becomes a telling indicator of future problems.

Looking at the most recent Quarterly Banking Profile from the FDIC, we see an ugly picture:

Net Charge-Off Rate Rises to Highest Level Since 1991

Loan losses registered a sizable jump in the second quarter, as loss rates on real estate loans increased sharply at many large lenders. Net charge-offs of loans and leases totaled $26.4 billion in the second quarter, almost triple the $8.9 billion that was charged off in the second quarter of 2007. The annualized net charge-off rate in the second quarter was 1.32 percent, compared to 0.49 percent a year earlier. This is the highest quarterly charge-off rate for the industry since the fourth quarter of 1991. At institutions with more than $1 billion in assets, the average charge-off rate in the second quarter was 1.46 percent, more than three times the 0.44 percent average for institutions with less than $1 billion in assets.

Note that big banks – those presumably with favourable CAMELS ratings in years past, allowing them to gobble up their less favourably rated peers – have much worse charge-offs than smaller banks.

Large Boost in Reserves Does Not Quite Keep Pace with Noncurrent Loans

For the third consecutive quarter, insured institutions added almost twice as much in loan-loss provisions to their reserves for losses as they charged-off for bad loans. Provisions exceeded charge-offs by $23.8 billion in the second quarter, and industry reserves rose by $23.1 billion (19.1 percent). The industry's ratio of reserves to total loans and leases increased from 1.52 percent to 1.80 percent, its highest level since the middle of 1996. However, for the ninth consecutive quarter, increases in noncurrent loans surpassed growth in reserves, and the industry's "coverage ratio" fell very slightly, from 88.9 cents in reserves for every $1.00 in noncurrent loans, to 88.5 cents, a 15-year low for the ratio.

I had to smile at the heading. The clumsy phrasing of “Does Not Quite Keep Pace” has been carefully drafted in preference to the less wordy but more apt “Lags”.

The bottom line is that the “coverage ratio” is worsening for the FDIC flock, and the coverage ratio for the FDIC is not looking too healthy either. At the end of the second quarter, the FDIC reserve fund was down to a mere $45.2 billion after just 9 bank failures this year. While it does not publish a coverage ratio in respect of itself, IndyMac alone will require an estimated $8.9 billion of FDIC reserves to resolve, almost twenty percent of remaining reserves. The FDIC intends to raise reserves through a premium increase in October, but a lot can happen in two months in these febrile times.

So the FDIC may well become yet another troubled monoline insurer. Indeed, Sheila Bair, serial forbearance artiste chairman of the FDIC (formerly a Treasury official and Republican congressional aide), conceded as much when she raised the possibility this week that the FDIC might be joining the queue for a Treasury hand out to see it through short term liquidity problems.

"I would not rule out the possibility that at some point we may need to tap into [short-term] lines of credit with the Treasury for working capital, not to cover our losses," Bair said in an interview.

The FDIC is too critical to the fabric of the US banking system to become another monoline casualty of the forbearance backlash crippling the banking industry. If there ever was a case for “systemic risk” deserving a bailout, the FDIC would get my vote (and presumably every Congressman’s too). But an FDIC bailout would be yet another signal to international creditors of America that the financial methods and models so widely exported and extolled over the past quarter century were fundamentally misguided and dangerous.

If the FDIC model fails, then what are the alternatives for deposit insurance? An intriguing idea floated in the Financial Times a couple weeks ago was to partially privatise deposit insurance through the excess liability reinsurance markets, allowing Warren Buffett to run his sliderule over the regulatory and risk management profile of banks to set a market price for insuring a failure.

Excess liability insurance would spread deposit insurance risk beyond the UK banking sector to global catastrophe insurance markets, reducing the pro-cyclical liquidity impact of any deposit insurance claim. In normal circumstances it should cover the risk of a large UK bank failure at a cost well below pre-funding, particularly in upswings of the economic cycle, while spreading the costs in a managed way if claims are sustained during downswings. Periodic tendering would ensure that market pricing reinforces discipline in the banking sector toward better management throughout the business cycle, co-operation on rescues of troubled banks and efficient resolution processes. The capital efficiency of these flexible arrangements should give UK banks a competitive edge.

In globalised markets, with globalised banks, perhaps globalised deposit insurance through excess liability insurance and/or catastrophe bond finance is not such a bad option. It may not be popular, however, with the crony capitalists and their political clientele who prefer the cheaper option of socialising losses via the Treasury to taxpayers and global public creditors, but at least it’s an alternative to the US model for the UK and others to consider.

China Threatens to Raze the House of Cards

2008-08-28T13:37:00.000+01:00

Via Bloomberg:

Freddie, Fannie Failure Could Be World `Catastrophe,' Yu Says

"If the U.S. government allows Fannie and Freddie to fail and international investors are not compensated adequately, the consequences will be catastrophic,'' Yu said in e-mailed answers to questions yesterday. "If it is not the end of the world, it is the end of the current international financial system.''

"The seriousness of such failures could be beyond the stretch of people's imagination,'' said Yu, a professor at the Institute of World Economics & Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. Yu is "influential'' among government officials and investors and has discussed economic issues with Premier Wen Jiabao this year.

And from this morning's Financial Times:

Bank of China flees Fannie-Freddie

Bank of China has cut its portfolio of securities issued or guaranteed by troubled US mortgage financiers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by a quarter since the end of June. The sale by China’s fourth largest commercial bank, which reduced its holdings of so-called agency debt by $4.6bn, is a sign of nervousness among foreign buyers of Fannie and Freddie’s bonds and guaranteed securities. Asian investors, in particular, have become net sellers of agency debt, said analysts. However after a sharp drop in their market value last week, Fannie and Freddie have made a strong recovery after successful short-term debt sales. Fannie was 13.5% higher on Thursday and Freddie was up 12%. Bank of China’s disclosure on its holdings of Fannie and Freddie securities came as the bank reported a 15% increase in Q2 profit.

Quotable: Mandela, Biko and Tutu

2008-08-24T17:17:00.000+01:00

“To be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains. But to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.” - Nelson Mandela

"The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed." - Steven Biko

“We may be surprised at the people we find in heaven. God has a soft spot for sinners. His standards are quite low.” - Bishop Desmond Tutu

A Better Bill of Rights

2008-08-24T16:35:00.000+01:00

At the Apartheid Museum yesterday morning, I saw a summary of the terms of the South African Bill of Rights. We have no equivalent here in the United Kingdom. I envy the South Africans for having such a clear, unequivocal statement on the limits of government power to discriminate or oppress.

The summary in the Apartheid Museum pictured above reads as follows:

The South African Bill of Rights

• No one may be discriminated against on grounds of race, gender, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, culture or language.
• Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.
• Everyone has the right to life.
• Everyone has the right to freedom and security of person, including the right not to be detained without trial and not to be tortured.
• No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour.
• Everyone has the right to privacy.
• Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.
• Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the media.
• Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and present petitions.
• Everyone has the right to freedom of association.
• Everyone is free to make political choices, which includes the right to form a political party and the right to free, fair and regular elections.
• No citizen may be deprived of citizenship.
• Everyone has the right to freedom of movement.
• Everyone has the right to fair labour practices, including the right to form and belong to trade unions and the right to strike.
• Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being.
• No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application.
• Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
• Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, sufficient food and water.
• Every child has the right to care, basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.
• Everyone has the right to a basic education.
• Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice.
• Everyone has the right of access to any information held by the state and by another person where the information is required for the exercise of any rights.
• Everyone who is arrested has the right to remain silent, to be brought before a court within 48 hours and to be released if the interests of justice permit.

The South African Bill of Rights sets the high mark we should all aim for in reforming relations between the people and the state, fighting back against the derogations of civil liberties forced through in consequence of the manufactured and hyped hysteria of the war on terror. Violence, no matter in what form or from what source, should never be the justification for relaxing our vigilence in preserving our rights or our principles.

In this context, one uncomfortable fact I learned in the Apartheid Museum was that it was the British that innovated concentration camps. In the actions to clear South Africa of Boers from 1900 to 1902 they rounded up whole Boer families and kept them in concentration camps. I had thought it was a joint German-Turkish innovation for the Armenian genocide, but it appears the British led in the ethnic cleansing stakes early in the last century.

Go read the South African Bill of Rights - especially if you are a lawyer.

Hat tip to NYCviaRachel on Flickr for the great photo of the Bill of Rights summary at the Apartheid Museum. My picture wasn't clear enough.

Optimism in Dubai and Johannesburg

2008-08-22T18:33:00.000+01:00

I am in Johannesburg, South Africa, by way of Dubai. It is hard not be optimistic about the future of humanity having visited these vibrant, modern cities. They have their problems, but each in its own way stands testimony to the ability of humans as a species to adapt, collaborate and generate prosperity under good leadership despite – and perhaps because of – challenging circumstances.

First, Dubai. I never cease to be amazed by this city. Having very little oil, Sheikh Mohammed and his predecessors chose to use Dubai’s historic advantage as a trading port as the basis of growth and development. Having achieved world class status as a port, tourism hub, commodities trading hub, trans-shipment hub, technology/communications hub, and finance hub, the latest ambitions are to drive development as a centre of excellence for higher education and medical treatment – and then a space programme.

I would never, never bet against Sheikh Mohammed. I’m not sure he isn’t more successful at investing than Warren Buffett, were a dollar for dollar comparison of returns possible. Unlike Warren Buffett, the Sheikh does not invest in equity of companies with proven management, but creates whole companies and industries from scratch by driving high achievement throughout the Emirati community which he educates and appoints to managerial positions, and through attracting the best business talent globally. Dubai’s scale, sophistication and prosperity are proof he understands both leverage and results-driven management.

Is Dubai a bubble economy? Of course it is, but even when the bubble bursts the accomplishments and dynamic commercial skills concentrated in Dubai will persist and form a solid foundation for enabling future growth. My guess is that as the US and UK financial-based economies implode from debt-deflation, and their military influence in the Gulf recedes, Dubai will strengthen its network of trade and finance deeper into former Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Dubai will facilitate the investment capital flows that allow all of these diverse geographies to develop according to their internal political, economic and resource constraints.

A word about cronyism and the difference between the USA and Dubai. In the US the well connected can fail upward, with friends covering for them and promoting them and financing them to new ventures. George W. Bush’s whole miserable business career and cronyist administration of failed Nixonites is proof of that. In Dubai, you don’t fail because it would shame your family. I have seen young Emerati with no background in the businesses they were appointed to mature rapidly into good managers because the massive pressure of family and social connections demands that they not screw up when given an opportunity to perform.

The reward for good work is more good work, and Sheikh Mohammed only promotes those who have proven adept at managing the opportunities formerly provided to them. Being a small country that loves to gossip, he stays very well informed. Those who choose to be corrupt, lazy, selfish and self-aggrandising are given enough commercial rope to hang themselves, and then obligingly hung (metaphorically) as an example to others. Those who are diligent, professional, ambitious and productive are promoted, also as an example to others. Families gain status by producing good executives, reinforcing a family interest in educating and motivating their young. Those who fail can go into business for themselves, as there is no shortage of opportunity, and that saves the emirate underwriting their risks while it gains from new enterprise. I suspect the recent investigations of corruption at real estate and finance companies are based on good evidence, but the subtext of the very public inquiry is a warning to every manager in Dubai to remember that they owe their success and their loyalty to the leadership, family and community that put them in their current positions.

I once heard of Franklin Delano Roosevelt that in his administration, he owned the successes and the appointees owned the failures. That seems to me to be a reasonable way to motivate innovation and infrastructure development. It doesn’t fit with the bonus-centric incentive programmes so beloved of modern boardrooms and management consultancies, but as a means of engineering social prosperity through government programmes, it might have merits. FDR would not have renewed massive no-bid contracts with Halliburton’s KBR and others once they failed to deliver essential goods and services to wartime troops in a combat zone. FDR would not have appointed the delusional and incompetent Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz as president of the World Bank. Times have changed.

Perhaps Halliburton in Dubai will corrupt Dubai, or perhaps Dubai will reform Halliburton. Since Halliburton is moving its global headquarters to Dubai to evade US taxes, investigations and subpoenas, we will have the chance to find out.

Now to Johannesburg, where I stay in as comfortable a hotel as anywhere I’ve been. I drink the tap water – that says a lot in Africa. The food is excellent, with springbok shank and kudu steak new favourites.

I have been here every two years since 2004. Each time I am impressed with the rapid progress. There are problems, sure, but there are problems everywhere. The electricity grid failures in the early part of this year were a wake up call that the government needs to focus on the basics of infrastructure if it is to continue to provide growth and jobs to the vast population. Unemployment remains stubbornly high, at almost 40 percent. The refugees who have fled to South Africa from neighbouring Zimbabwe, add to the pressures (and explain why stabilising Zimbabwe is more important to the Mbeki government than confronting the egregious Mugabe).

When I first visited in 2004 there were still vast shantytowns around the capital. When I next visited in 2006 these had been largely replaced with neat little tract houses, each with plumbing and electricity. Now the housing boom is slowing, credit is tightening, but millions have homes they did not have before. That is a major achievement. Unlike America where huge houses are the norm, here the norm is much more modest and sustainable.

On learning I was in banking, my driver from the airport handed me an e-mail he had received quoting John Mauldin’s recent praise of South Africa:

Johannesburg is a world-class city, on a par with New York or London or any major city in terms of facilities, shops, infrastructure... and traffic. There were new shopping malls all over, and the stores were busy. The restaurants were excellent. The hotels I stayed in and spoke at were excellent and modern. The Sandton area is particularly pleasant.

Durban is a tropical jewel on the Indian Ocean. Again, there was construction everywhere - a green, verdant city of 1,000,000 people, with modern roads and great weather.

I have been to Sydney, Vancouver, and San Francisco. I love all of them. But for my money, Cape Town is the most beautiful city I have been to in the world. Amazing mountains, blue water harbours, white sand beaches, with wineries nestled in among the mountains and valleys. The Waterfront area, where I stayed, is fun and vibrant. Again, an amazing amount of construction everywhere, especially in the waterfront area, as investors from Dubai are pouring huge sums of money into creating a massive residential/business/ retail/restaurant development. There are several similar, quite large developments going up in different parts of Cape Town.

. . .

The simple fact is that as the world grows more prosperous we are going to need more grain and other foods. Where is the land we are going to need to feed the world? There is an abundance in Africa, along with the needed water and labour. And as African countries upgrade their infrastructure, it will improve the ability of farmers to get their grains to market at profitable levels.

There is much to like about emerging markets. That is where a great deal of the real potential growth in the coming decades will be. And South Africa will be one of the better stories. If you are not doing business there already, you should ask yourself, why not?

Mauldin offers specific praise for development of South Africa’s housing, retail, banking, commodities and farming sectors. I have never read a piece by him so optimistic about anywhere else, particularly in the developing world.

I thanked my driver for the Mauldin article, but suggested that the problems in the banking sector would cause problems for South Africa too. My driver then proceeded to detail his own preparations for a downturn in the economy: selling his old passenger van to pay off the newer one; paying off all his credit cards and keeping the balance at zero each month; delaying his purchase of a new house for at least a year while he sees what happens in property. This lone tour driver was more prepared for a shift in the economy than most of the bankers in the City of London. And if he reads John Mauldin, he is better informed too.

The group of bankers which showed up the next day for my workshop was another pleasant surprise. In 2004 the group was widely mixed as to backgrounds, race and abilities. In 2006 it was whiter and more professional, but also less friendly. In 2008 the group is blacker, more professional still, more experienced, more knowledgeable and universally friendly too. They are delightful to teach as they know enough to take in information readily and apply it to their careers and specialties. They collaborate readily, with clear trust and confidence in each other. Everyone is respectful and considerate.

I asked some neutrally each break about the challenges in South Africa, and they were uniformly optimistic. This is a big contrast to 2006, when the group complained about racial quotas, reforms and problems much more. One expressed concern about the potential damage of a corrupt government when Zuma takes over from Mbeki, and the others all nodded, but then he confirmed that the direction of change for the present remained for the better, and that it would take time to reform the ANC.

I have always believed that democracy can only really exist in those states with a large middle class. I do not subscribe to the view that democracy should be universal, as poor or rich are too self-interested to allow uncorrupted democratic government unless constrained by a middle class from abuses. As South Africa continues to grow at 4-5 percent each year (probably an under-estimate of real growth), the middle class continues to grow and prosper. So although a Zuma administration may hold risks, I hope there will be constraints on their policies as the already substantial and growing middle class enforces longer term discipline on the government.

I could not live in Dubai, but for the first time, I find myself looking around me and thinking I could live in South Africa. That says more about the optimism I feel here than any statistics.

Insider Dealing or Insiders Scheming?

2008-08-18T08:08:00.001+01:00

This should have gone up Friday, as I posted on RGE, but I've been up against a deadline and juggling multiple commitments before traveling this week.
_________________________

In the early 1990s, when Britain was in deep recession and banks and investment banks were under nasty financial pressures, the new Chairman of the Securities and Investments Board started a crusade against insider dealing. We all thought his obsession bizarre as London was then widely regarded as being the cleanest securities market in the world. Largely institutional, dominated by 25 or so market makers and fewer than 200 significant fund and pension managers, abnormal conduct was easily detected and brutally sanctioned. Since the average trade size in the cross-border market exceeded $270,000 and in UK stocks exceeded $80,000, it was very difficult for anyone to undertake a pattern of activity that went unscrutinised by their peers. NatWest (Blue Arrow) and Goldman Sachs (rigging the FTSE 100 options expiry) found to their cost at the time that their market counterparties and clients were very unforgiving of misconduct. A director of Goldman Sachs complained to me then that London was their least profitable operation globally.

Nonetheless, the SIB Chairman instigated a crusade, rallied the government, demanded tougher investigative powers and tougher penalties, and carried on as if London were a cesspool of corruption. We scratched our heads and wondered at it. He was and is a good man, even if we thought his efforts then over the top.

While insider dealing prosecutions never picked up much, he succeeded in imposing strict new transparency rules on the London Stock Exchange which quickly eroded its global dominance of equity markets. Transparency made market making impossible, as market makers need time to work a large order to quote a fine spread in institutional size from their own capital. Market making on the basis of quotes was gradually abandoned in favour of electronic order routing systems that transacted thousands of small orders dribbled out piecemeal into automated execution systems instead of finely priced large orders in size. From over 85 percent of global cross-border equity trading going through the London Stock Exchange at the peak in 1991, London’s market share collapsed as trading fragmented to smaller, more opaque markets elsewhere and to derivatives. Goldman Sachs profitability soared as the London Stock Exchange declined.

In this week’s announcement that the SEC will remove insider dealing enforcement from exchanges and concentrate it in two mega systems policed by NYSE and FINRA, I get an echo of this earlier era. I hope I am wrong, but it would not surprise me if once again police powers of regulatory authorities are used – with or without their conscious collaboration – to rig the market in favour of preferred models of interaction and preferred intermediaries.

Insider dealing is no more a threat to market integrity now than it was five years ago, ten years ago, or twenty years ago. If anything, insider dealing is more rampant in bull markets than bear markets.

On the other hand, it is true that insider dealing was much easier to detect when all dealing in securities was concentrated on exchanges rather than fragmented to multiple automated systems, dark pools and cross trading networks. It is also true that insider dealing was easier to detect before half the market volume fragmented to 8,000 unregulated hedge funds.

My concerns may have started with an echo of the UK in the 1990s, but they are aggravated by the pattern of state control and abuse of information observed over the past twenty years in the USA. George H.W. Bush created the “War on Drugs” in 1981 as vice-president of the United States to gain federal authority to monitor bank transactions and telecommunications and to seize property from anyone targeted by his special squads of DEA agents who were empowered to act outside normal due process and judicial review. Reagan then declared the "War on Terror" which Bush intensified as president later that decade, arrogating to himself and US intelligence agencies even broader powers beyond the review of democratic checks and balances. That morphed into the “War on Terror” under George W. Bush, who gained even more powers for the state to spy on its citizens and treat everyone as guilty until proven innocent, extrajudicially arrest and detain citizens and non-citizens alike, render them for torture globally, and otherwise abuse government powers.

It all started with sweeping up huge streams of data into unreviewable hands weilding huge power to seize and redistribute wealth. Forgive me then if I am sceptical when the SEC wants to protect investors by further concentrating both information and police powers.

The imposition of huge data sweeps in the name of “anti-money-laundering” in the banking sector and combating “insider dealing” in securities markets reeks of the same tactics and objectives as telecoms or internet search engine sweeps to the NSA.

Ronald Reagan once quipped that the biggest lie was, "I'm from the government and I'm here to help you." Given the pattern of abuse in his administration, and the subsequent treatment of US workers and taxpayers, he may have been more truthful than he knew. So what should we think when we hear, "I'm from the SEC and I'm here to protect you"?

Needless to say, the more data collection and police powers are concentrated in a single authority, the more difficult it becomes for anyone to contest an investigation or enforcement action by that authority. Without objective protections, alternative sources of confirmatory data, guarantees of judicial review and due process, it becomes impossible to challenge the arbitrary use of authority or the deliberate misuse of authority.

Think of just one scenario: a target firm becomes the subject of a very public investigation and charges. Its share price collapses, and investors flee. Enter a well-funded vulture fund who takes out the very best assets and a very well-connected competitor who sweeps up the choicest clients.

I hope you are not about to see in the United States a darker variation on the much milder reshaping of the markets I observed in Britain in the early 1990s. It is perhaps as well to be aware, however, that the new insider dealing powers in a single authority can be applied selectively to erode markets and undermine market participants who threaten those who wield the real power.

I would like to see more substantiation of the rationale for centralising data collection and enforcement, and more controls on the abuse of information and powers, before trusting that the regulators are acting in the interests of investors and of the greater economy as a whole.

Why not have an open database of anonymised transaction data that is reviewable and searchable by all market intermediaries and investors? That would allow anyone to investigage suspect patterns of transactions for reporting. But then that might catch the wrong people in the net and expose too many to scrutiny.

It has taken me many years to understand my discomfort with reforms in the early 1990s recession. I am worried that the proper function of markets in the intermediation of capital investment so critical to the prosperity of any economy may be further distorted and eroded. If competition is so good for capitalism, then surely markets should have to compete to demonstrate their ability to uphold efficient price discovery and market integrity. Regulators too should have to compete if only to promote vigilence in each other by maintaining reputation risk.

Harmonisation of market structure and regulation may be harmful if it tends toward sub-optimal choices. Without competition and independent data collection, we may never be able to prove that the choices our regulators make for us are not in our best interest.